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What are the least developed countries?
Forty-eight countries are currently designated by the United Nations as “least developed countries” (LDCs). 
These are: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. 
The list of LDCs is reviewed every three years by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
in the light of recommendations by the Committee for Development Policy (CDP). The following three criteria were 
used by the CDP in the latest review of the list, in March 2012:
(a) A per capita income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of the gross national income (GNI) 
per capita, with a threshold of $992 for possible cases of addition to the list, and a threshold of $1,190 for 
graduation from LDC status;
(b) A human assets criterion, involving a composite index (the Human Assets Index) based on indicators of: 
(i) nutrition (percentage of the population that is undernourished); (ii) health (child mortality ratio); (iii) school 
enrolment (gross secondary school enrolment ratio); and (iv) literacy (adult literacy ratio); and
(c) An economic vulnerability criterion, involving a composite index (the Economic Vulnerability Index) based on 
indicators of: (i) natural shocks (index of instability of agricultural production; share of the population victim of 
natural disasters); (ii) trade-related shocks (index of instability of exports of goods and services); (iii) physical 
exposure to shocks (share of the population living in low-lying areas); (iv) economic exposure to shocks 
(share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in GDP; index of merchandise export concentration); (v) smallness 
(population in logarithm); and (vi) remoteness (index of remoteness).
For all three criteria, different thresholds are used for identifying cases of addition to the list of LDCs, and cases 
of graduation from it. A country will qualify to be added to the list if it meets the addition thresholds on all three 
criteria and does not have a population greater than 75 million. Qualification for addition to the list will effectively 
lead to LDC status only if the government of the relevant country accepts this status. A country will normally qualify 
for graduation from LDC status if it has met graduation thresholds under at least two of the three criteria in at least 
two consecutive triennial reviews of the list. However, if the GNI per capita of an LDC has risen to a level at least 
double the graduation threshold, the country will be deemed eligible for graduation regardless of its performance 
under the other two criteria. 
Only three countries have so far graduated from LDC status: Botswana in December 1994, Cape Verde 
in December 2007, and Maldives in January 2011. In March 2009, the CDP recommended the graduation of 
Equatorial Guinea. This recommendation was endorsed by ECOSOC in July 2009, but by September 2012 
the General Assembly had not confirmed this endorsement. In September 2010, the General Assembly, giving 
due consideration to the unprecedented losses Samoa suffered as a result of the Pacific Ocean tsunami of 29 
September 2009, decided to defer to 1 January 2014 the graduation of that country. In July 2012, ECOSOC 
endorsed the CDP’s recommendation to graduate Vanuatu from LDC status.
After a CDP recommendation to graduate a country has been endorsed by ECOSOC and the General 
Assembly, the graduating country is granted a three-year grace period before graduation effectively takes place. 
This grace period, during which the country remains an LDC, is designed to enable the graduating State and its 
development and trading partners to agree on a “smooth transition” strategy, so that the loss of LDC status at the 
time of graduation does not disrupt the socioeconomic progress of the country. A “smooth transition” measure 
generally implies extending a concession from which the country used to benefit by virtue of LDC status for a 
number of years after graduation.
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Classifications used in this Report
Least developed countries
Geographical/structural classification
Unless otherwise specified, in this Report the least developed countries (LDCs) are classified according to a 
combination of geographical and structural criteria. Therefore, the small island LDCs which geographically are in 
Africa or Asia are grouped together with the Pacific islands, due to their structural similarities. Haiti and Madagascar, 
which are regarded as large island States, are grouped together with the African LDCs. The resulting groups are as 
follows: 
African LDCs and Haiti: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, 
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia.
Asian LDCs: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Yemen.
Island LDCs: Comoros, Kiribati, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.
Purely geographical classification
For the parts of this Report where migration flows are analysed (including on a geographical basis), LDCs have been 
classified according to strictly geographical criteria, as follows.
LDCs – Africa: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia. 
LDCs – Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Timor-Leste, Yemen.  
LDC – Americas: Haiti.  
LDCs – Pacific: Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.
Export specialization
For the purpose of analysing current trends in chapter 1, UNCTAD has classified the LDCs into six export specialization 
categories, according to which type of exports accounted for at least 45 per cent of total exports of goods and 
services in 2009–2011. The exceptions to this criterion are Bhutan, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and 
Uganda, for which a threshold of 40 per cent was used. The group composition is as follows:
Agricultural and Food exporters: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Malawi, Solomon Islands, Somalia, 
Uganda.
Fuel exporters: Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Yemen.
Manufactures exporters: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Haiti, Lesotho.
Mineral exporters: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Zambia.
Mixed exporters: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania.
Services exporters: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Nepal, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao 
Tome and Príncipe, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.
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Other groups of countries and territories
Developed economies: Andorra, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bermuda, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Holy See, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States.
Other developing countries: All developing countries (as classified by the United Nations) which are not LDCs.
Transition economies: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Product classification
Goods: The figures provided below are the codes of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), revision 3.
Agriculture and Food: section 0, 1, 2 and 4 excluding divisions 27 and 28.
Minerals: section 27, 28 and 68 and groups 667 and 971.
Fuels: section 3.
Manufactures: section 5 to 8 excluding group 667.
Section 9 (Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC) has been included only in the total 
export of goods and services, but not in the goods classificaiton above, except for group 971 (Gold, non-monetary 
(excluding gold ores and concentrates)), which has been included in Minerals.
Services: Total services cover the following main categories: transport, travel, communications, construction, 
insurance, financial services, computer and information services, royalties and license fees, other business services, 
personal, cultural, recreational and government services.
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Introduction
The uncertain global economic recovery and the worsening Eurozone crisis continue to undermine those factors 
that enabled the least developed countries (LDCs) as a group to attain higher growth rates between 2002 and 2008. 
Despite seeing real gross domestic product (GDP) grow slightly faster in 2010, the group as a whole performed less 
favourably in 2011, signalling challenges ahead. Indeed, with the world’s attention focused on Europe, there is a 
danger that the international community may lose sight of the fact that in recent years, LDCs have been most affected 
by financial crises caused by other countries. With less diversified economies, LDCs have neither the reserves nor 
the resources needed to cushion their economies and adjust easily to negative shocks. Furthermore, if another global 
downturn hurts the growth prospects of emerging economies, LDCs, as major commodity exporters, will be directly 
affected. Therefore, LDCs require increased external assistance to better protect their economies against external 
shocks and help them manage volatility. 
In May 2011, Heads of State and Government and Representatives of States gathered in Istanbul (Turkey) for 
the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDC-IV) to deliberate on the specific 
development challenges facing LDCs and agree on a Programme of Action for the Decade 2011–2020. The Istanbul 
Programme of Action (IPoA) identified eight “priority areas of action” to be implemented by both LDCs and their 
development partners. One of the eight priority areas is “mobilization of financial resources for development and 
capacity-building”, and the Programme refers specifically to five sources of finance: domestic resource mobilization; 
official development assistance; external debt; foreign direct investment; and remittances. On the latter, the IPoA 
states in paragraph 123: 
“Remittances are significant private financial resources for households in countries of origin of migration. 
There is a need for further efforts to lower the transaction costs of remittances and create opportunities for 
development-oriented investment, bearing in mind that remittances cannot be considered as a substitute for 
foreign direct investment, ODA, debt relief or other public sources of finance for development”.
The Least Developed Countries Report 2012 focuses on the issue of remittances from a wider perspective. It 
examines the potential role of migrants or diasporas at large from LDCs as sources of development finance and also 
as channels of knowledge transfer and as facilitators of trade and market access opportunities in the host countries. 
The Report identifies policies, including policy lessons from other countries that LDCs may wish to consider in 
designing policy frameworks for harnessing remittances and diaspora knowledge to build productive capacities.
Remittances have attracted increasing attention in the international discourse, partly owing to their significant 
growth over the last decade. A growing consensus is emerging that remittances constitute a significant source of 
external financing, whose availability, if managed through appropriate policies, could prove particularly valuable for 
capital-scarce developing countries (especially those with larger diasporas). 
Similarly, there is growing interest in the role that migrants, especially skilled professionals, can play as “development 
agents” linking home and destination countries. While concerns about the adverse impact of brain drain remain valid, 
as discussed in detail in this Report, the focus of the recent debate has to some extent shifted to how to engage 
with the diaspora and maximize its potential contribution to development, “turning brain drain into brain gain”. In this 
respect, the emphasis has been placed not only on diaspora members’ saving and investment potential, but also 
on their latent role as “knowledge brokers” who could facilitate the emergence of new trade patterns, technology 
transfer, skills and knowledge exchange. This calls for a pragmatic, context-specific policy approach to diaspora 
engagement. 
In general, the effective mobilization of a diaspora for development depends on the existence of a critical mass 
of migrants in a given destination. In some cases, however, the diaspora need not be large to generate a positive 
development impact. Even a small number of highly skilled expatriates can create enormous benefits, in particular in 
poor economies with severe shortages of skilled professionals. Nevertheless, the onus of mobilizing the diaspora and 
transferring specialized knowledge and technology should not be placed wholly on the diaspora. Rather, the latter 
should be viewed as a potentially important complement to a country’s development strategy; one which could be 
mobilized strategically within the framework of broader policy initiatives to support the financing and development of 
productive capacities. 
Harnessing remittances for increasing productive capacities requires that these resources be considered 
pragmatically, with the recognition that ultimately these are private sector resources, and that due account be taken 
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of each country’s specificities, while avoiding characterizations of this phenomenon as either a “curse” or a “new 
development mantra”. The jury is still out on whether or not they are the most stable and predictable source of 
development finance. While some unresolved questions remain as to their macroeconomic impact, substantial 
evidence suggests that remittances contribute to poverty reduction and improved health care and education. 
LDCs will likely be hard hit by the global economic slowdown. This will require rethinking alternative sources of 
development finance and the potential for tapping into LDCs’ diaspora knowledge networks as sources of knowledge, 
entrepreneurship and trade links.
Recent economic trends in the LDCs
In 2011, LDCs grew by 4.2 per cent, 1.4 percentage points lower than the preceding year, mirroring the slowdown 
of growth worldwide (from 5.3 per cent in 2010 to 3.9 per cent in 2011). Given their high dependence on external 
economic conditions, LDCs were unable to escape this broad-based slowdown, and the rate of deceleration was 
similar to that of developing countries (1.3 percentage points) and advanced economies (1.6 percentage points). 
In terms of country group performance, both African and Asian LDCs experienced a slowdown in 2011, and both 
grew by similar rates at around four per cent. For the Asian LDCs, however, the slowdown was more pronounced 
(over two percentage points). By contrast, GDP growth of the island LDCs (at 7.1 per cent) was much higher, 
compared with both the previous year and the LDC average.
The poor performance of oil-exporting LDCs in 2011 (-1.6 per cent) had a negative impact on overall LDC 
performance. Compared with oil exporters, LDCs specializing in exports of other products such as manufactures (6.0 
per cent), services (5.7 per cent), minerals (5.8 per cent), agriculture and food (5.9 per cent) or mixed exports (5.4 per 
cent) fared much better. However, in terms of resource gap, indicating the extent to which countries rely on external 
resources to finance their domestic investment, non-oil-exporting LDCs have performed poorly. While the resource 
gap for LDCs as a whole fell from 6.5 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 3.9 per cent in 2010, for non-oil-exporting LDCs, 
it increased from 10 per cent 2000 to 13 per cent just before the global crisis and hit 14.8 per cent in 2010. One 
result of the increasing resource gap in non-petroleum-exporting LDCs has been a growing balance of payments 
vulnerability. In 2011, thirteen LDCs had current account deficits of more than 10 per cent of GDP, while five had 
deficits of over 20 per cent of GDP. Only five LDCs reported current account surpluses.
If this pattern continues, along with slow global recovery, it may damage employment prospects in LDCs. The 
significance of employment for LDCs cannot be overemphasized. The relatively young demographic structure of 
LDCs means that increasing cohorts of young are entering the labour market and will continue to do so. Even during 
the 2002–2008 boom, LDCs faced an employment challenge because of lopsided growth concentrated in resource-
extractive sectors which resulted in weak job creation. This also resulted in growing informality in LDCs, even when 
rates of open unemployment did not increase. 
The longer it takes for GDP growth to return to its pre-crisis level, the greater the likelihood of long-term 
unemployment and underemployment, with all of their detrimental effects on the population. Governments should 
thus bear in mind that additional measures are needed to minimize the adverse effects of the global crisis, and that 
employment creation should be at the top of their national development agendas. 
Gross fixed capital formation increased slightly from 20.7 per cent of GDP in 2005–2007 to 21.6 per cent in 2008–
2010. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, it has increased slowly but surely (by three GDP percentage 
points). While this is positive, it compares less favourably with other developing countries (ODCs), whose gross fixed 
capital formation reached 30.1 per cent of GDP in 2010. If current investment trends continue, it is unlikely that LDCs 
will be able to catch up with ODCs in the near future. The gross domestic saving rate for the LDCs as a group was 
18.9 per cent of GDP in 2005–2007, and fell to 17.7 per cent in 2008–2010. 
The LDCs’ trade balance improved from a deficit equivalent to 6.1 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 5.7 per cent in 
2011. The value of merchandise exports from LDCs increased by 23 per cent in 2011, surpassing the pre-crisis 
level. The total value of merchandise exports in 2011 ($204.8 billon) was twice as high as five years ago. On the 
downside, merchandise exports for LDCs as a group have remained highly concentrated in a few countries. The top 
five exporters (Angola, Bangladesh, Equatorial Guinea, Yemen and Sudan) account for 62 per cent of all exports from 
LDCs. The value of merchandise imports rose sharply in 2011 (20.6 per cent) to $202.2 billion, also doubling in the 
last five years. 
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Overall trends in merchandise trade shifted the merchandise trade balance into surplus in 2011 after two years 
of deficits. This is important to emphasize since prior to 2006, LDCs had continuously recorded merchandise trade 
deficits. Yet the positive result for the group was due entirely to the African LDCs and their surplus of $21.4 billion – 
which in turn is driven by only a small number of countries, most notably Angola. Asian LDCs, by contrast, recorded a 
merchandise trade deficit of $17.5 billion in 2011, and island LDCs a deficit of $1.2 billion. Merchandise exports have 
continued to be dominated by petroleum, at slightly over 46 per cent of total exports. 
Improved export performance by many LDCs in 2010 and 2011 was largely due to higher international commodity 
prices. After slumping in 2009, prices recovered rapidly, in some cases to levels higher than before the crisis. For 
example, food prices started to rise again in 2010 and 2011, topping pre-crisis levels. In the summer of 2012, 
food prices, in particular for maize and wheat, were once again on the rise due to drought in major producing 
countries. This will affect many poor people in LDCs, who generally spend 50 to 80 per cent of their income on 
food. The situation in some parts of Africa is critical, as food insecurity threatens the lives of hundreds of thousands. 
Governments in LDCs and their development partners must act urgently to prevent rising food prices from spiralling 
out of control, risking the sort of crisis experienced in 2008. In the long term, the root causes of food price increases 
and the issue of agricultural production in LDCs must be tackled by increasing investment in the sector and designing 
policies to improve productivity, in particular among small-scale farmers. 
Regarding foreign investment, UNCTAD recently revised the data on inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
LDCs, which show that in the last decade, FDI inflows have been smaller than remittances. Unlike FDI, remittances 
kept increasing even during the crisis and are forecasted to grow in the medium term. In 2011, remittances to LDCs 
reached $26 billion. The decline in FDI inflows to LDCs for three consecutive years (from a little less than $19 billion 
in 2008 to $15 billion in 2011) has been largely due to disinvestment trends in Angola, tied to the oil investment cycle 
in that country. In the rest of the LDCs, FDI has remained relatively stable.
Official development assistance (ODA) disbursements, together with net debt relief to LDCs from all donors 
reporting to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD/DAC), reached a record level of $44.8 billion in 2010, an 11 per cent increase over 2009. In nominal terms, 
aid inflows to the LDCs were 3.5 times higher in 2010 than in 2000. As noted in The Least Developed Countries 
Report 2011, ODA has played an important countercyclical role in the wake of the global crisis, cushioning the 
impact of retreating private financial flows. While data for 2011 are still not available, there are signs of a decrease in 
ODA from some donor countries.
The LDCs’ total debt stock reached $161 billion in 2010, only marginally higher than in 2009. Their debt service 
decreased slightly from $8.2 billion in 2009 to 7.6 billion in 2010. The experience of the LDCs in the last ten years 
shows that the key to debt sustainability is development of productive capacities. High, sustainable GDP growth and 
rapid expanding exports increased the debt-servicing capacity of many LDCs. While external financial resources, 
in particular ODA and remittances, have recently been increasingly available to LDCs, there is no guarantee that 
this will continue to be the case. The recent sharp decrease in FDI is instructive in this respect. Consequently, a 
progressive shift from reliance on external sources of finance to domestic ones to reduce their external dependence 
and vulnerability to external shocks and uncertainties is a major challenge for LDCs.
Sadly, given the fragile global economy, the outlook for 2013 is highly uncertain. As of mid-2012, economic 
activity was decelerating in a synchronized fashion in many parts of the world. The downside risks are numerous and 
include escalation of the Eurozone debt crisis, a rise in global energy prices due to geopolitical risks, deceleration of 
growth in large developing countries and fiscal retrenchment in the United States scheduled for 2013, which could 
have a strong negative impact on overall growth.
Against this background, the outlook for LDCs in the short- to medium-term is not encouraging. Given the growing 
danger that the world economy might be entering a lengthy period of stagnation and deflation, LDCs have to prepare 
for a relatively prolonged period of uncertainty, with possible escalation of financial tensions and real economic 
downturn. Trade and investment of developing countries, which are often intermediated by US and European banks, 
have already suffered setbacks. Prices of some commodities started to fall, in some cases abruptly, in the second 
quarter of 2012, partly due to slowing demand for commodities from emerging economies. If the current tendency 
of economic deceleration continues, commodity prices could suffer pronounced falls. Thus, LDCs may once again 
be exposed to external economic shocks and have to deal with a crisis that originates elsewhere. Recognizing this 
may allow for more effective preparation. It also lends added urgency to the need for rethinking remittances policies 
and the role that diasporas could play in knowledge transfer and as catalysts of industrial development and structural 
transformation in home countries.
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 Patterns of LDC emigration
Emigration from LDCs grew rapidly in 1990–2010. With 27.5 million emigrants in 2010, LDCs as a whole accounted 
for 13 per cent of global emigration stocks, or some 3.3 per cent of the LDC population. Over 2000–2010, the 
increase in emigrant stocks was fastest for African LDCs. The destination of LDC emigrants varies across regions, 
but most go to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. High migration within sub-Saharan Africa probably reflects the 
facts that (a) much of African migration is forced (refugee flows) and by poor people, as a result of which proximity is 
crucial; and (b) Africans generally face great difficulty entering other countries. Among the high-income regions, only 
the Gulf States have a high share of South Asians, and no country has a high share of Africans. The evidence shows 
that some 80 per cent of LDC migrants migrate within the South, as a result of which LDCs and ODCs are important 
countries of destination. 
In fact, refugees constitute a significant but declining share of total immigrants residing in LDCs. Their share of the 
total migrant stock in LDCs peaked at 44 per cent in 1995 but then declined rapidly, reflecting improved governance 
structures in many African countries and lessened conflict and political instability. As with conventional economic 
migration, when mass forced migration occurs, there is a significant loss of human and financial capital, of labour and 
skilled workers in the country of origin. The main countries of emigration in 2010 were Bangladesh, with 4.9 million 
emigrants, and Afghanistan, with two million.
Globally, developed countries tend to accept skilled immigrants but increasingly erect barriers to exclude the 
unskilled unless there is high demand for their labour in particular sectors (e.g. agriculture or construction). LDC 
migrants tend to be younger than those from other countries, with a median age of 29 years, compared with 34 in 
other developing countries and 43 in the developed countries. 
Therefore, contrary to the general perception that LDC migration is a South–North phenomenon, the pattern of 
migration emerging has acquired a South–South dimension in recent decades. In 2010, high-income OECD countries 
(namely North America and Europe) accounted for 20 per cent of the LDC emigrant stock, while some 80 per cent 
were in the South. Moreover, most LDC South–South migration tends to take place between neighbouring countries, 
where wage differentials are in general much smaller than in South–North migration. Thus, the main LDC emigration 
corridors are in the South. 
Concerning high-skilled migration, the majority of emigrants who have attained tertiary education tend to migrate 
to developed countries. In fact, Haiti (83 per cent), Samoa (73 per cent), the Gambia (68 per cent) and Tuvalu (65 per 
cent) have the highest emigration rates of tertiary-educated LDC population. 
There are several reasons and motivations driving migration from LDCs. However, the following patterns and 
observations are worth noting:
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adults. This is partly due to life-cycle differences between age groups and educational levels.
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of particular gender roles in most rural societies where women have primary responsibility for child-rearing and 
domestic tasks. This often limits opportunities for women to migrate, the key exceptions perhaps being young, 
unmarried women from households where they can be absent (i.e. households where several older women 
already reside) or women migrating to join their partners at the destination. However, female migration has been 
increasing recently. When they do migrate, women migrant workers are generally employed in service activities 
(including the care economy), while male migrants are more likely to be found in manufacturing production and 
construction sectors, in addition to some services. 
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(seasonal or circular) migration. The migrant remains part of the household, and is expected to send remittances 
home. 
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strategy to take advantage of regional or international wage differentials, irrespective of conditions at home. 
Educational qualifications and skills make such migration more feasible for youth.
The LDCs with the highest share of emigrants as a percentage of total LDC emigrant stocks in 2010 were 
Bangladesh (19 per cent), Afghanistan (8 per cent), Burkina Faso (6 per cent) and Mozambique (4 per cent). These 
countries were also part of the main migration corridors: Bangladesh — India, Afghanistan — Iran, Burkina Faso - 
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Côte d’Ivoire, Yemen — Saudi Arabia and Nepal — India. Asian LDCs like Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen and 
Nepal tend to have India or the Middle East as a first or second country of destination. For African LDCs, the key 
emigration corridors are within Africa.
Inhabitants of Asian and Pacific LDCs appear to have higher propensities to migrate to non-LDCs than those 
of African LDCs, which recorded the highest share of emigrants residing in other LDCs in 2010. The main sources 
of intra-LDC migration during 2010 were in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Sudan.
Improved international cooperation on migration and development in LDCs is needed to optimize migrant 
contributions at all levels. Thus, at the bilateral and regional levels, further progress is required to strengthen 
international cooperation.
Remittances to LDCs: Magnitude, impact and cost
Worldwide, the value of remittances began to accelerate markedly, nearly doubling between 1990 and 2000, 
and then tripling once again in the following decade, touching $489 billion in 2011 despite the global financial crisis. 
While all regions have witnessed significant expansions in remittance receipts, the rise in global remittances is chiefly 
driven by the surge of inflows to developing countries. Correspondingly, the developed economies’ share of world 
remittances has been steadily declining. 
As for LDCs, remittance receipts climbed from $3.5 billion in 1990 to $6.3 billion in 2000, subsequently accelerating 
further to nearly $27 billion in 2011. These inflows are unevenly distributed across LDCs, even more so than FDI and 
export revenues. Over the past decade, the top recipient, Bangladesh, expanded its share of total LDC remittance 
inflows from 31 to 44 per cent. During the same period, the top three LDC recipients (Bangladesh, Nepal and 
Sudan) also increased their overall share from 44 per cent to 66 per cent of LDC total inflows. Besides these well-
known large recipients, other LDCs obtaining sizeable sums through remittances include Cambodia, Ethiopia, Haiti, 
Lesotho, Mali, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Yemen.
Notwithstanding the uneven distribution, the sustained dynamism of remittance inflows to LDCs was quite general. 
In all but a handful of LDCs for which data are available, remittance inflows increased markedly over the last decade, 
growing at an annual average of 15 per cent in the median LDC. Admittedly, in the wake of the global financial crisis 
of 2009, remittance receipts slowed in most LDCs, even though they continued to increase with a few exceptions.
Despite some heterogeneity across countries, the value of remittances relative to GDP or export revenues has 
historically been much greater in LDCs than in other regions. In the median LDC, they account for as much as 2.1 
per cent of GDP and 8.5 per cent of export earnings, as compared with 1.6 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively 
for ODCs. This prominence is noticeable for an array of LDCs, ranging from small economies like Lesotho or Samoa, 
where remittances represent over 20 per cent of GDP, to traditionally large recipients such as Nepal and Haiti, where 
they largely exceed export earnings.
Similarly, for a number of LDCs, remittances constitute a key source of foreign financing. Over 2008–2010, 
recorded remittances exceeded both ODA and FDI inflows in nine LDCs, and surpassed FDI but not ODA in another 
eight LDC economies. Whereas by their very nature remittances are distinct from capital flows, they clearly play a 
significant role in providing foreign exchange for a large number of LDC countries. Consequently, it is important that 
LDC development strategies fully reflect the relevance of these resource flows, their intrinsic characteristics, and their 
underlying potential.
South–South remittance flows are particularly important for LDCs, consistent with the fact that the majority of 
LDC migrants actually move to other developing countries, often neighbouring ones. In 2010, it was estimated that 
as much as two-thirds of recorded remittances to LDCs originated in other Southern countries. Distinct regional 
patterns emerge, however, with respect to remittance corridors. India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries represent key sources of remittances for Asian LDCs; “subregional hubs” (such as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya or 
South Africa) play a similar role for African LDCs, along with former colonial powers; while Pacific Islands derive the 
bulk of their remittances from neighbouring developed economies.
There is a compelling body of research documenting the positive impact of remittances at the household level, 
both in terms of poverty reduction and as a risk mitigation strategy to diversify income sources. However, evidence 
of their developmental impact at a macroeconomic level is far less clear-cut. The relationship between remittances 
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and economic growth is complex and multifaceted. On the negative side, the adverse effect of remittances on labour 
market outcomes may reduce economic growth, especially if a culture of dependency on foreign transfers becomes 
gradually entrenched. Moreover, unless properly addressed, the tendency of remittances to trigger appreciations 
in the real exchange rate may give rise to “Dutch disease” effects, hindering much-needed structural change by 
undermining the competitiveness of non-traditional tradable sectors.
On the positive side, remittances may support economic growth and productive capacity development through 
two channels: investment and financial deepening. Indeed, remittances provide a much-needed source of foreign 
financing that could enhance the pace of physical and human capital accumulation (the “investment channel”). 
In addition, they tend to increase the availability of funds for the domestic financial system, paving the way for 
recipient households to demand and gain access to other financial products and services which they might not have 
otherwise. Besides, remittances may possibly relax financial constraints on recipient households, particularly those in 
rural areas, which are poorly served by existing financial intermediaries.
Even though the literature is still somewhat inconclusive on how remittances ultimately affect economic growth, 
there appears to be general agreement that complementary policies and sound institutions play an important role in 
enhancing their development impact. Governments typically have only limited room to directly affect the allocation of 
remittance income, since taxation or mandatory remittance requirements have historically proved rather ineffective 
and in most cases have simply led migrants to use informal channels to remit. Accordingly, effective mobilization 
of remittances for productive purposes depends on an array of policy and institutional improvements, aimed at 
reinforcing both the “investment channel” and remittances’ impact on financial deepening.
Overall, the scope for remittances to stimulate both physical and human capital accumulation and financial 
development tends to be fairly positive, all the more so when a large share of remittance income is received by poor 
and otherwise credit-rationed households. Here, capital-scarce LDCs clearly have much to gain from remittances’ 
potential developmental impact. Yet LDCs’ structural weaknesses make it more difficult to successfully mobilize 
these sources of external financing for productive purposes. It is therefore essential to design appropriate strategies 
and policy frameworks for harnessing remittances for economic development.
Moreover, the relative stability and lower procyclicality of remittances compared with other sources of external 
financing is worth stressing. Due to these characteristics, an increase in the share of remittances to GDP tends 
to reduce the volatility of GDP growth, even after controlling for other possible determinants of growth volatility. 
Similarly, remittances appear to reduce the probability of sharp current account reversals, especially when they are 
larger than three per cent of GDP. These features may be particularly relevant in an LDC context, given that these 
economies have traditionally been characterized by relatively recurrent growth accelerations but nearly as frequent 
growth collapses, coupled with heightened balance of payments vulnerability and debt overhang.
At household level, a large body of empirical studies typically show that remittances reduce poverty. The impact 
of remittances on inequality is less clear-cut, especially given the selectivity underlying the migration process. As 
prospective migrants incur upfront costs, which are largely dependent on the destination, those belonging to the 
poorest households are typically unable to afford long-distance international movement or the costly bureaucratic 
procedures usually required to migrate to developed economies. So it is precisely the poorest who are unable to 
benefit from the largest differentials in terms of expected wages and consequently remit larger sums.
Migrants typically utilize a whole range of formal and informal channels for remitting, chosen on the basis of cost, 
reliability, accessibility and trust. Though resorting to informal remittance channels may seem a rational choice from an 
individual migrant’s standpoint, policy-wise, formal remittance systems are preferable, even leaving aside concerns 
related to security, regulation or supervision. The prevalence of informal flows limits the ability of recipient countries to 
make optimum use of the foreign exchange sent by overseas migrants. This may limit the effects remittances have 
on a country’s creditworthiness or in stimulating financial deepening, and encourage informal (black market) currency 
transactions.
Worldwide evidence shows that, as of the first quarter of 2009, the cost of remittances averaged nine per cent of 
the amount sent. For LDCs, the average cost of remitting was close to 12 per cent of the amount sent, 30 per cent 
higher than the global average. If North–South remittance costs are high, South–South remittance costs are often 
significantly higher. The most expensive channels for remitting transfers to LDCs are found within Africa, whereas the 
least expensive are from Singapore and Saudi Arabia to Asian LDCs. The implications of such high remittance costs 
may be significant: it is estimated that in 2010, annual remittances sent to sub-Saharan Africa could have generated 
an additional $6 billion for recipients if the costs of remitting money had matched the global average.
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Average remittance costs naturally mask a wide range of elements that vary by corridor and remittance service 
provider (RSP). In general, lack of competition among RSPs appears to be a significant factor in explaining the high 
costs of remittances. The regulatory challenges that RSPs face vary by LDC and region, and have led to different 
characteristics in the respective remittance markets. For example, for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, 65 per cent 
of all remittance payout locations are controlled by two money transfer operators (MTOs), namely MoneyGram and 
Western Union. Similarly, African governments have put into place several RSP exclusivity arrangements limiting the 
type of institutions able to offer remittance services to banks, thereby reducing RSP competition.
Remittance transfer payments systems in LDCs are evolving and new channels and technologies are emerging. 
With improving LDC infrastructure and growth in mobile bank branches and branchless banking, both urban and 
rural clienteles should enjoy better access to financial services. Yet despite the potential of these emerging systems, 
more traditional forms of RSP provision still dominate in most LDCs.
In general, as shown in this Report, remittances offer LDCs some scope for sustaining the development of 
productive capacities, by increasing investment in human and physical capital and stimulating financial deepening. 
Yet the realization of such potential is contingent upon the policy and institutional framework recipient countries put 
into place. In other words, owing to the intrinsic specificities of remittances as private sector financial flows, their 
effective mobilization for productive purposes essentially depends on the State’s capacity to create a “development-
centred” macroeconomic environment while also supporting the establishment of a viable and inclusive financial 
sector. This, in turn, warrants active engagement by diasporas and support from host countries and international 
development institutions. 
Mobilizing the diaspora: From brain drain to brain gain
“Brain drain” generally refers to the emigration of high-skilled people with university-level education, such as 
physicians, engineers, scientists, managers and lawyers, as well as entrepreneurs. The main drivers of brain drain 
are higher income, better working conditions, career prospects in a host country, the latter’s selective migration 
policies, adverse political and economic situations in one’s home country, and lower migration costs. Worldwide, 
brain drain has been increasing in absolute terms. The number of high-skilled international migrants climbed from 
16.4 million in 1990 to 26.2 million in 2000 (the latest year for which data are available). When the 2010 figures are 
finally released, they are expected to show a sharp increase in the volume of high-skilled international migration. 
International immigration is skewed towards highly educated people. Twenty-six per cent of all international migrants 
are tertiary-educated (according to data for 2000), while only 11.3 per cent of the world labour force have tertiary 
education. In developing countries, university-level workers account for a much lower five per cent of the labour force.
In 2000 (the year for which data are available for LDCs), high-skilled migrants accounted for one-fourth of total 
emigration from LDCs. This is 11 times higher than their share in the total labour force of these countries, namely, 
2.3 per cent. International migration is selective (i.e. it favours high-skilled over low-skilled people), which explains 
this huge discrepancy. An estimated 1.3 million persons with university-level education had emigrated from LDCs 
by 2000, and this figure has continued to grow since then. Almost two-thirds of all LDC high-skilled emigrants live 
in developed countries (especially the United States), while one-third moved to other developing countries (mainly 
oil-exporting and neighbouring countries). The major regional source of high-skilled LDC emigrants is Asia, home to 
45.9 per cent of tertiary educated migrants from LDCs, followed by African LDCs, which account for 40.4 per cent 
of LDC brain drain.
Brain drain can have both adverse and beneficial effects on home countries, the balance of which primarily 
depends on the extent of brain drain. This is measured by the brain drain rate, i.e. the number of high-skilled 
emigrants as a share of all nationals with the same education level. Collectively, LDCs have the highest brain drain 
rate among the world’s major country groups, averaging 18.4 per cent, much higher than other developing countries 
(10 per cent). Regionally, the worst affected LDCs are Haiti, Pacific Islands and African LDCs. Six LDCs have more 
high-skilled professionals living abroad than at home: Haiti, Samoa, the Gambia, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Sierra Leone.
The “optimal” level of brain drain (where the net balance of positive and negative effects on the domestic home 
economies reaches its maximum) has been estimated at 5–10 per cent. Only five LDCs are in this range. By contrast, 
beyond 15–20 per cent, the likelihood increases that the negative impacts of brain drain will exceed the positive 
consequences. The actual brain drain rate is “high” in 30 of the 48 LDCs.
What are the main likely adverse impacts of brain drain on LDCs? First, it results in a reduction of their human 
capital stock and the externalities generated by highly skilled people. This can lead to lower economic and productivity 
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growth, as well as reduced activity in science, technology and innovation (STI). Second, brain drain is especially 
acute in some sectors, above all health, education and scientific research. LDCs form the country group with the 
lowest number of doctors per population but have the world’s highest medical brain drain rates. These are usually 
associated with higher infant and child mortality, lower vaccination rates and generally poor health-care services 
and national health systems. Third, through brain drain, LDC governments forego the taxes that these professional 
would have paid if they had stayed and worked at home. Fourth, shrinking the skilled human capital base tilts LDCs’ 
relative endowments and comparative advantage away from skill-intensive sectors towards low-skilled activities and, 
possibly, natural resources. Fifth, some LDC high-skilled emigrants hold jobs with educational requirements below 
their training, in what is termed “brain waste”, since part of their skills are not used. Sixth, the departure of the most 
skilled persons impairs institution-building in LDCs. 
The question is: can LDCs turn brain drain into brain gain? There is evidence to show that notwithstanding the 
short-term adverse impacts, over the long run, countries can benefit from the additional knowledge acquired by their 
nationals residing and working abroad. First, it has been argued that emigration prospects may encourage people to 
obtain further education, which may result in brain gain, i.e. larger human capital endowments. Second, part of the 
remittances are used to pay for the education of family members, thereby generating brain gain. Third, high-skilled 
emigrants form a knowledge pool which can be organized as diaspora knowledge networks (DKNs), facilitating flows 
of knowledge and technology to home countries. These flows work through programmes and initiatives launched by 
diaspora organizations, international organizations and governments of home and host countries. They generally have 
positive effects, but the effectiveness of knowledge-sharing initiatives is sometimes hampered by the dispersions of 
projects, their failure to join actors and efforts, a dearth of resources leveraging and synergy creation, as well as little 
coherence with national development policies. Harnessing diaspora knowledge by creating networks has huge but 
still relatively unfulfilled potential for LDCs.
Fourth, the presence of diasporas can strengthen business flows between host and home countries through 
trade and investment links. In LDCs, diasporas have driven growth of home country goods in what has been termed 
“ethnic trade” or “nostalgia trade”, i.e. goods exported to be consumed by the diaspora but which can potentially 
spread to wider markets. LDC diapora members have also propelled the growth of tourism service exports, by 
visiting the home country or helping to attract other tourists. 
Fifth, permanent return migrants can bring with them accumulated savings, knowledge, experience and business 
networks, although this may depend on their motivation for return, time spent abroad, and local conditions. LDCs 
that are more advanced in economic diversification, structural transformation and growth have typically been more 
successful in attracting the voluntary return of qualified migrants who have founded new businesses and introduced 
economic and social innovation in the fields of science, health, education, services and industry. 
Yet benefiting from a diaspora is not automatic. Tapping the potential depends on a series of institutional, 
economic and political conditions, still absent in most LDCs. Therefore, policy action by home and host countries and 
by the international community is crucial for fostering or strengthening positive diaspora effects on LDCs. Brain drain 
from LDCs will likely continue in the foreseeable future, due to very strong push and pull forces. These diasporas are 
a pool of knowledge, human and financial resources on which LDCs can draw to have them contribute to national 
development to a much greater extent than previously. LDC governments are at the initial stages of realizing this 
potential and taking action to harness it. Stronger, more systematic policy action is required in order to strengthen 
diasporas’ contribution to LDCs. To succeed, such policy action requires mobilization and coordination of the efforts 
and resources of different stakeholders, especially home country institutions and firms, host country government and 
agents, diaspora organizations and NGOs, international organizations, and bilateral donors. Ideally, such coordination 
should take place upstream, i.e. at the planning stage, so as to ensure the engagement and coherence of all relevant 
stakeholders from the start. 
Unlocking the LDCs’ diaspora potential:
A policy agenda for harnessing remittances and diaspora knowledge
DIASPORAS AND CAPACITY-BUILDING
Clearly, migration and its varied consequences have become increasingly significant for developing countries 
in general and LDCs in particular, and these trends are likely to continue into the medium-term future. The main 
recommendation of this Report for policymakers is to improve the current policy framework on remittances and 
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diaspora knowledge in LDCs in order to better harness them for the development of productive capacities. 
Furthermore, policies on migration, remittances and diaspora engagement should not be formulated in isolation, but 
as an integral part of national development strategies. This will require an agency, ideally at ministerial level, to reflect 
the cross-cutting nature of these issues; ensure policy coherence and consistency across the board; and coordinate 
potential actors around a set of identified priorities. Governments in LDCs also need to be aware of the actual extent 
and pattern of cross-border migration, the location, spread and nature of diaspora activities, and the extent and 
pattern of remittances. Here, the current state of knowledge in most LDCs is relatively poor. Therefore, part of the 
problem is statistical in nature. There is hardly any official apparatus to report on and monitor many of the facets of 
migration and its results, and existing mechanisms deal mainly with remittances.
While the specific mix of policies and concrete measures for diaspora engagement will vary for each country, the 
overall direction should be to provide an enabling environment for development. Also, the issue of trust is crucial. 
While it is true that diaspora members are not motivated exclusively by commercial interests, their engagement will 
fail if they are only expected to contribute and receive nothing in return. This applies, for example, if LDCs wish to 
encourage diaspora entrepreneurs to use their savings or raise capital externally to establish productive activities in 
home countries. Studies on the role of the diasporas show that in some middle-income countries, entrepreneurial 
diasporas have been instrumental in developing the productive capacities of their home countries. For example, 
migrant entrepreneurs have played an important role in building knowledge-based industries in India, China, 
Taiwan Province of China, Israel and Ireland in the last two decades or so. A lesson from these experiences is that 
entrepreneurs abroad can help to develop firms at home and also serve as a two-way link for market knowledge, 
connections and technology transfer across countries. In LDCs, this process may be less promising in the short run 
because of their more limited base of human capital and venture capital to develop high-tech industries at home. 
Nevertheless, their entrepreneurial diasporas operating in light industry can help develop similar industries at home 
through contacts, know-how and other valuable inputs and capabilities developed in the host countries. They can 
also contribute to upgrading managerial and innovating capabilities at home. 
In general, there are at least two conditions that would determine the possibilities of migrants to succeed in 
establishing thriving firms upon their return. The first is whether they return with more advanced knowledge and 
skills than before. This Report argues that this probability will increase the longer they stay as migrants in foreign 
countries and the more entrepreneurial experience they accumulate. The second is the existence of a favourable 
policy framework in their home country. They would probably need suitable financial support to start a new firm, 
even if they have accumulated some savings. At the very least, they should be able to obtain a loan from the financial 
sector under normal conditions. 
Yet given the reluctance of financial institutions to extend credit to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
a national development bank with special lines of credit for return migrants might be needed. In addition, return 
migrants might have accumulated some but not necessarily all of the requisite skills for successful entrepreneurial 
activity. In this case, they would need technical assistance to upgrade their managerial, technical, financial or other 
skills required for successfully managing an SME. Governments could provide this type of technical assistance and/
or education. They could also extend support to these entrepreneurs by lowering tariffs on imports of machinery and 
equipment and raw materials to help them start up their businesses. 
Facilitating trade-related links with host countries is another channel though which diasporas can help develop 
home country production and supply capacities. A positive empirical correlation has been found between the degree 
of international trade in source and destination countries and the size of the migrant community in both nations. The 
dominance of language, culture and knowledge of customer and supplier markets are all factors that help develop 
trade relations among nations, and the diaspora communities can be well placed for performing this role. Initially, a 
distinct niche for LDCs could be to seek an advantage in supplying so-called “ethnic products” or “nostalgia trade”. 
Studies show, for example, that there is a very high participation of migrants in the United States in the market for 
home-country goods that are difficult to find in the host country. Each migrant spends almost $1,000 per year on 
nostalgia products, and the total may amount to over $20 billion annually. LDC policies could be designed to help 
producers become and stay competitive by upgrading their products and adapting them to changes in the final 
markets, and to enlist diaspora members to help with branding and marketing in the host country. Education and 
training of producers is crucial if they are to become competitive in foreign markets. 
DIASPORAS AS SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE AND LEARNING
Diasporas could also further structural change and economic development, by strengthening the knowledge base 
in home countries. A useful mechanism in this respect is the diaspora knowledge network (DKN), which consists of 
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groups of highly skilled expatriate professionals who are interested in maintaining contacts and helping to develop 
their countries of origin. As knowledge is neither costless nor easily transferrable, for this to occur, proactive policies 
are required that incorporate this potentially key function of diasporas into governments’ strategic developmental 
frameworks.
DKNs are understood as subsets of international knowledge networks governing the transfer of various types 
of knowledge, such as intellectual property, know-how, software code or databases, between dependent parties, 
across the economy. As such, DKNs include a platform for knowledge flows and interaction between a diaspora and 
local actors in a home country.
There is ample evidence from numerous case studies indicating that DKNs have played a critical role in 
technological upgrading, industrial development and building of productive capacities in source countries. LDCs 
should learn from countries that have benefited most from DKNs by designing their diaspora strategy as an integral 
part of industrial policy and the broader national development strategy. DKNs have effectively operated as agents of 
change in both developed and developing countries. There are successful cases of diaspora networks such as those 
formed by Indian, Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Turkish and Bangladeshi emigrants, to name but a few.
Yet such transfer of knowledge and learning does not happen automatically: it requires an organized and 
coordinated diaspora network and a home-country national development strategy backed by industrial policy and 
active government engagement in diaspora affairs. A proactive diaspora policy is essential for ensuring that DKNs, 
which are in essence private voluntary networks, gain the trust and confidence needed to remain engaged and 
ensure that their activities exert a positive impact. As latecomers to industrial development and given their recent 
experience with deindustrialization, LDCs need to formulate innovative industrial policies that are compatible with 
both their current conditions and requirements and the rapidly evolving global context. Some LDCs have already 
designed industrial policies to accelerate economic diversification and structural change. 
There are many reasons for promoting networks, not least of which is knowledge diffusion. DKNs can supply 
new technologies and inform government and other residents of the latest technological developments and those 
appropriate for domestic industrial needs. They can assist in matching the needs of local productive sectors with 
specific FDI needed for upgrading local skills and capacities. The significance of the diaspora network for industrial 
policy is that it makes the shift from hierarchy to search networks an essential component of industrial policy. DKNs 
help to link up those who want to learn with those that are already learning. Indeed, this shift from hierarchy to 
horizontal networks has a profound impact on global supply chains and hence on new industrial strategies, where 
“learning to learn” becomes an essential objective of industrial policy. However, DKNs should not be perceived as 
a panacea or a substitute for local efforts to build endogenous productive capabilities; rather, their role is that of 
additional actor in the story of growth based on domestic productive capacities.
In recent years, UNCTAD has repeatedly argued that progressive transformation in economic structure is a 
prerequisite for LDCs to achieve accelerated and sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. The policies and 
strategies needed to attain structural transformation will involve, inter alia, (a) the development of a new industrial policy 
based on a strategic approach that reflects the specific needs and conditions of LDCs; (b) a catalytic developmental 
State to compensate for the incipient and weak private sector in LDCs; (c) measures to encourage private investment 
in productive activities and public investment in basic infrastructure, including the development of skills and support 
institutions; and (d) the promotion of domestic technological learning and innovation and improvements in productivity 
in both agricultural and manufacturing sectors.
This Report reinforces the case for a new industrial policy in LDCs, arguing further that such a policy should reflect 
the role of DKNs because they carry a potentially transformative impact on knowledge accumulation, especially in 
accelerating technological change and direct investment. Failure to recognize this fact may mean that DKNs will 
remain an untapped resource and a missed opportunity. 
DIASPORAS AS SOURCES OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
As noted above, one reason for the predominant use of informal channels for remitting to LDCs is the high cost 
of remitting through formal channels, primarily due to lack of competition. Possible policy actions to open up the 
remittance market to competition could include the following:
t %JSFDUMZJODSFBTJOHUIFSBOHFPGýOBODJBMBDUPSTJOWPMWFE
FTQFDJBMMZJOSVSBMBSFBT
CZDIBOHJOHSFHVMBUJPOTUPBMMPX
participation, particularly of microfinance institutions, savings and loans cooperatives, credit unions and post offices; 
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t 1SPNPUJOHQBSUOFSTIJQTBNPOHCBOLTBOENJDSPýOBODFJOTUJUVUJPOT
t 4USFOHUIFOJOHQPTUPGýDFJOWPMWFNFOUCZJNQSPWJOHUIFJS*OUFSOFUDPOOFDUJWJUZ
JODSFBTJOHUIFJSUFDIOJDBMDBQBCJMJUJFT
and cash resources, and promoting a wider selection of savings products; 
t *NQSPWJOHUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTJOGSBTUSVDUVSF
t )BSNPOJ[JOHCBOLJOHBOEUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTSFHVMBUJPOTUPFOBCMFCBOLTUPQBSUJDJQBUFJONPCJMFSFNJUUBODFT
t "DUJWFMZQSPNPUJOHDPNQFUJUJPOUISPVHITQFDJBMJ[FESFNJUUBODFTUSBEFGBJST
t %JTDPVSBHJOHFYDMVTJWJUZBHSFFNFOUTCFUXFFOBMMNBSLFUQBSUJDJQBOUT
FTQFDJBMMZCBOLTBOE.50T
These conventional measures could be accompanied by other, more innovative approaches. For example, 
competition could be intensified by allowing a public sector remittance service provider to operate and compete with 
private sector providers. This could be done by establishing a public corporation or using existing institutions like 
a development bank or the central bank. Such an institution would provide the same service as the private sector 
but would charge a lower cost for remitting. Instead of opening up its own branches, the public corporation could 
team up with the postal service, helping reach customers in remote areas where private financial institutions have no 
branches.
Use of new technologies, particularly Internet-based and mobile telephony-driven methods of transmitting funds, 
can be further exploited. Since the cost of remitting is highest within Africa, there is also scope for regional initiatives 
to bring it down, for example by coordinating measures via formal regional integration initiatives, or through the good 
offices of regional development banks (for example, the African Development Bank). While this could be a regional-
driven process, it could also be linked to the international goal of reducing remittance costs known as the “5 x 5” 
initiative.
While policies to increase ease of remitting money and reduce the costs involved are clearly necessary and 
desirable, they need to be part of a broader macroeconomic framework to enhance the developmental role of 
remittances. A consistent set of trade, industrial and macroeconomic policies that sustainably foster growth and 
economic diversification will be crucial in ensuring that remittance flows also boost development rather than simply 
enhance consumption in recipient families.
At household level, governments could enhance the developmental impact of remittances by giving migrants 
additional incentives. For example, they could be allowed to open foreign currency accounts in the home country, and 
the interest rate on deposits denominated in foreign currencies could be exempted from wealth and income taxes; 
an option to use foreign currency deposits as collateral for obtaining preferential loans could be offered; incentives to 
migrants to return to the home country once they retire could be provided via double-taxation avoidance treaties with 
the main host countries where the majority of its migrants work; the creation of education and housing accounts at 
home for migrants and their families, combined with a higher rate of return on these deposits than on ordinary ones, 
would provide an incentive to save more out of remittances, for purposes that would encourage productive use of 
remittances. The appropriate mix of measures would have to be decided by competent authorities depending on the 
size and degree of diapora engagement. 
Diaspora bonds could be attractive options for LDCs because they would increase the pool of sources for 
development financing. Patriotic motives for investing in diaspora bonds make these instruments at least somewhat 
less procyclical than other external capital flows, allowing governments to issue them in not only good but also bad 
times, such as natural disasters or external economic shocks.
Since remittance flows have proved fairly stable over the medium to longer term, these future-flow receivables 
can be used as collateral for securitization or long-term loans. For some LDCs, this could even represent the only 
possible access to international capital markets, increasing funds available for development, and could become a 
stepping stone to establish or improve international creditworthiness.
Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi
Secretary-General of UNCTAD
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A. Introduction
This chapter analyses recent macroeconomic trends in LDCs and their 
performance in terms of economic growth, international trade and external 
finance. It shows that their economic performance has been substantially 
worse in the last three years than in the previous boom period and that some 
indicators have not yet reached pre-crisis levels. In addition, the current world 
economic situation and its implications for LDCs are analysed briefly. The main 
conclusion is that the growth of LDCs in the medium term will be constrained by 
the fragile recovery in the global economy and its negative impact on the growth 
of developing economies, which have been the main drivers of LDC growth in 
recent years. Finally, there is a small statistical annex at the end of the chapter 
which served as a basis for the analysis provided and which presents more 
detailed data at the level of national economies or different groupings of LDCs.
B. Recent macroeconomic trends in the LDCs
1. TRENDS IN THE REAL SECTOR
The real GDP of the LDCs as a group grew by 4.2 per cent in 2011 (table 1), 
which is lower by 1.4 percentage points than the preceding year. This downward 
trend mirrors the slowdown of growth worldwide (5.3 per cent in 2010 and 3.9 
per cent in 2011). While the coordinated fiscal and monetary easing in most 
developed and some developing countries provided a major stimulus for growth 
in 2010, the winding down of these measures in many countries, coupled with 
gradual intensification of fiscal austerity in most European countries, resulted in 
slower growth of GDP in 2011.
Given their high dependence on external economic conditions, LDCs could 
not escape this broad-based slowdown. Indeed, the rate of deceleration of their 
GDP growth in 2011 was broadly similar to that of developing countries (1.3 
percentage points) and advanced economies (1.6 percentage points). It is thus 
evident that LDCs’ recovery in terms of real GDP growth in 2010 was short 
lived. As shown in table 1, the GDP growth rate for LDCs in 2011 was slightly 
lower than the result in 2009, when, despite global recession, LDCs were the 
best-performing group of countries. Also, the growth rate of LDCs in 2011 was 
about two percentage points lower than that of other developing countries. 
Most importantly, it was 3.7 percentage points below the average annual growth 
rate attained during the 2002–2008 boom period.
In terms of country group performance, both African and Asian LDCs 
experienced a slowdown in 2011, and both grew by similar rates at around 
four per cent. However, in the case of the Asian LDCs, the slowdown of GDP 
growth, which was larger than two percentage points, was more pronounced. 
In contrast, GDP growth of the island LDCs at 7.1 per cent was much higher, 
compared with both the previous year and the average for the LDCs. The 
relatively high rate of growth of this group of LDCs was largely due to the 
extraordinary performance of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.1 The 
development of oil and gas resources in offshore waters has lifted the economic 
growth of the country to around 10 per cent in the last three years, and similar 
growth is expected in the next two years. The growth rate of GDP of the island 
LDCs excluding the performance of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 
was 5.4 per cent in 2011.  
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An analysis of real GDP growth rates by country grouping according to export 
specialization shows that the performance of oil-exporting LDCs in 2011 (-1.6 
per cent) represented an important drag on the overall performance of LDCs. 
This is partly a consequence of political instability which affected two of the 
five oil-exporting LDCs in 2011 (Sudan and the Republic of Yemen). But more 
generally, the performance of oil-exporting LDCs has been more erratic than the 
performance of other groups of LDCs in the last three years, even leaving aside 
political instability. This suggests that reliance on a single export sector, however 
dynamic it might be in some periods, has serious drawbacks.
In contrast, LDCs specialized in the export of manufactures (6.0 per cent), 
services (5.7 per cent), minerals (5.8 per cent), agriculture and food (5.9 per cent) 
and mixed exporters (5.4 per cent) all fared better in 2011 than oil-exporting 
LDCs. In addition, most of these groups have experienced less fluctuation in real 
GDP growth rates in the last three years than the oil-exporting LDCs, suggesting 
that more diversified economies have been less affected by the global downturn.
If the slow global recovery continues, it may lead to underutilization of 
resources and may also cause widespread damage to employment prospects 
in LDCs. Global unemployment started to rise again in 2011, and it has been 
estimated by the ILO (IILS and ILO, 2012) that some 202 million people will 
be unemployed in 2012. The global rate of unemployment is projected to 
reach 6.2 per cent in 2013, its level at the height of the 2009 financial crisis. 
Equally worryingly, youth unemployment rates have increased in most advanced 
economies and in two-thirds of the developing countries. The combination of 
slower economic growth and higher unemployment has resulted in an increase 
of the ILO’s Social Unrest Index for 2011. The most heightened risk of social 
unrest has been estimated for sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of LDCs 
are located, and the Middle East and North Africa.
The significance of the issue of employment for LDCs cannot be 
overemphasized. The relatively young demographic structure of LDCs means 
that increasing cohorts of young people are entering the labour market and will 
Table 1. Real GDP and real GDP per capita growth rates for LDCs,
developing economies and advanced economies, selected years
(Annual weighted averages, percentages)
Real GDP Real GDP per capita growth
2002–
2008
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2002–
2008
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total LDCs 7.9 4.9 5.6 4.2 5.1 5.5 5.4 2.5 3.3 1.9 2.8 3.2
  African LDCs and Haiti 7.8 4.2 5.0 4.1 4.9 5.3 5.1 1.5 2.4 1.5 2.3 2.6
  Asian LDCs 7.5 5.9 6.4 4.2 5.4 5.9 5.5 4.1 4.6 2.5 3.6 4.1
  Island LDCs 5.4 2.4 5.5 7.1 6.3 5.9 3.2 0.2 3.3 4.8 4.1 3.7
LDCs by export specializationa
Oil-exporting LDCs 9.9 3.0 4.6 -1.6 1.8 3.4 7.0 0.3 1.8 -4.2 -0.9 0.7
Manufactures-exporting LDCs 6.2 5.3 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.4 4.6 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.6 5.0
Services-exporting LDCs 6.8 5.6 5.8 5.7 4.8 5.3 4.3 3.2 3.5 3.4 2.6 3.0
Mixed-exporting LDCs 9.5 6.6 6.1 5.4 6.4 6.0 6.9 4.2 3.6 3.1 4.0 3.6
Other primary commodity-exporting LDCs 6.1 4.6 5.9 5.8 6.3 6.2 3.2 1.7 3.0 2.8 3.4 3.3
Minerals-exporting LDCs 5.9 4.0 6.1 5.7 7.8 6.9 3.1 1.2 3.2 2.9 4.9 4.0
Agriculture & food-exporting LDCs 6.4 5.6 5.8 5.9 4.3 5.3 3.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 1.2 2.2
Memo Items:
Advanced economies 2.5 -3.6 3.2 1.6 1.4 2.0 1.8 -4.2 2.7 1.0 0.9 1.5
Developing countries 7.6 2.8 7.5 6.2 5.7 6.0 6.0 1.4 6.1 5.4 4.3 4.7
World 4.6 -0.6 5.3 3.9 3.5 4.1 3.2 -1.9 4.0 3.1 2.3 2.9
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2012.
Notes: LDCs’ growth is calculated as the weighted average of each country's real growth (base year 2000); data for 2011 are preliminary 
and are forecasted for 2012–2013.
a Classification of LDCs by export specialization is provided at the beginning of the Report (page xii).
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continue to do so for some time in the future. Even during the 2002–2008 boom 
period, LDCs faced an employment challenge because of the lopsided pattern 
of growth concentrated in resource-extractive sectors, which resulted in weak 
job creation. This also led to growing informality in the LDCs, even when rates of 
open unemployment did not increase. 
The ability of LDCs to create more jobs has been hampered by the effects of 
the ongoing crisis because of the slowdown in export-oriented activities as well 
as fiscal pressures constraining public expenditure. The longer the GDP growth 
stays below potential, the greater the likelihood of long-term unemployment 
and underemployment, with long-run detrimental effects on the population. 
Accordingly, governments should bear in mind that additional measures are 
needed to minimize the adverse effects of the global crisis and that employment 
creation should be at the top of their national development agendas. Lack of 
jobs could put additional pressure on migration, an issue that is explored in 
more detail in chapter 2 of this Report.
Gross fixed capital formation for the LDCs as a group increased slightly from 
20.7 per cent of GDP in 2005–2007 to 21.6 per cent in 2008–2010 (chart 1). 
Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, gross fixed capital formation in 
LDCs increased slowly but steadily, so that by 2010 it was three GDP percentage 
points higher than in 2000. While that is a positive performance, it compares 
less favourably with other developing countries (ODCs). In 2000, gross fixed 
capital formation in ODCs had already equalled 23.4 per cent of GDP. Moreover, 
their progress in the last ten years was much faster than in the LDCs, reaching 
30.1 per cent of GDP by 2010. Thus, if the current investment trends continue, 
it is unlikely that LDCs will be able to catch up with other developing countries 
in the near future. In fact, the current level of investment is below the value of 
25 per cent of GDP which is considered necessary to reach growth rates of real 
GDP of 7 per cent — one of the main goals of the Istanbul Programme of Action 
for LDCs.
Gross domestic saving rates have shown the opposite trend in the same 
period. The average saving rate for the LDCs as a group was 18.9 per cent 
of GDP in 2005–2007, declining to 17.7 per cent in 2008–2010. The biggest 
decline was in 2009, when it reached only 14.5 per cent of GDP. In comparison 
with the saving rate in 2000, however, the improvement is still significant, higher 
by 5.5 GDP percentage points in 2010.
As a result of these tendencies for saving and investment rates, the resource 
gap, indicating reliance on external resources to finance domestic investment, 
fell from 6.5 per cent of GDP in 2000 to only 3.9 per cent in 2010 for the LDCs 
as a group. For non-petroleum-exporting LDCs, however, the opposite picture 
emerges. Their resource gap was around 10 per cent of GDP in 2000, increasing 
to over 13 per cent before the crisis and averaging 14.8 per cent from 2008 to 
2010. Therefore, the supply of external financial resources remains crucial for 
capital formation in most LDCs. Even more worrying, dependence on external 
resources increased in many LDCs, even during the boom period of 2002–2008. 
In other words, progress in domestic resource mobilization was insufficient even 
when average annual growth rates of GDP surpassed seven per cent.
One result of the increasing resource gap in non-petroleum-exporting LDCs 
has been growing vulnerability of the balance of payments, which is staggering 
in some cases. In 2011, thirteen LDCs had current account deficits of more than 
10 per cent of GDP, while five had deficits of more than 20 per cent of GDP. At 
the other extreme, only five LDCs recorded current account surpluses.
The fiscal situation of LDCs was only slightly better. Ten LDCs registered 
fiscal surpluses in 2010, while the rest had deficits of different magnitudes. In 
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Chart 1. Investment, saving and resource gap in LDCs, 1990–2010
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six LDCs, the fiscal deficit surpassed 10 per cent of GDP. As shown in chart 2, 
the majority of LDCs display “twin deficits” of both fiscal balance and current 
account, and are located in the third quadrant,2 which is the most vulnerable 
to external shocks such as sharp changes in commodity prices. Some small 
island LDCs (Guinea, Kiribati, Sao Tome and Principe, Tuvalu) combine very 
large deficits on both fiscal and current account. 
Many LDCs display “twin deficits” 
of both fiscal balance and current 
account, which makes them 
vulnerable to external shocks
such as sharp changes in 
commodity prices. 
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2. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The trade balance of LDCs as a group in 2011 shows that these economies 
recorded a deficit of $39.8 billion, up from $37.5 billion in 2010. This was a result 
of a small surplus in the trade of goods ($2,639 million), which offset somewhat 
a much larger deficit in trade in services ($42,460 million).
In terms of share of GDP, however, the trade balance improved somewhat 
from a deficit equivalent to 6.1 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 5.7 per cent in 2011. 
While this is still slightly higher than the trade deficit recorded during the boom 
period, it is also a substantial improvement over the result in 2009, when it had 
widened to the equivalent of 10.2 per cent of GDP because of the sharp drop in 
exports from LDCs.
The value of merchandise exports from LDCs increased by 23 per cent in 
2011, thus surpassing the pre-crisis level (annex table 4). The total value of 
merchandise exports in 2011 ($204.8 billion) was twice as high as five years 
previously. The change in 2011 was greatest for island LDCs, for which exports 
expanded by 50.8 per cent. On the downside, however, the merchandise exports 
of LDCs as a group have remained highly concentrated in a few countries: the 
top five exporters (Angola, Bangladesh, Equatorial Guinea, Yemen and Sudan) 
account for 62 per cent of all exports from LDCs.
Chart 2. Current account and fiscal balances of individual LDCs, 2010
(Percentage of GDP)
Afghanistan
Angola
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Central
African
Rep.
Chad
ComorosDR Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Kiribati
Lao PDR
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Niger
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Vanuatu
Yemen
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-20 -10 10
C
ur
re
nt
 a
cc
ou
nt
 b
al
an
ce
C
ur
re
nt
 a
cc
ou
nt
 b
al
an
ce
Fiscal balance
Source: UNCTAD calculations based on IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2012.
The value of merchandise exports 
from LDCs increased by 23 per cent 
in 2011, thus surpassing
the pre-crisis level. 
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The value of merchandise imports also increased considerably in 2011 (20.6 
per cent) to reach $202.2 billion. The value of imports has also doubled in the 
last five years. An analysis of imports of goods by country grouping according to 
export specialization reveals that mixed-exporting LDCs recorded the strongest 
increase (36.3 per cent), followed by minerals-exporting LDCs (30.3 per cent) 
in 2011. In contrast, imports of goods by agriculture- and food-exporting LDCs 
increased by only 11.9 per cent, slightly better than the 8.6 per cent rise in 2010.
Overall trends in merchandise trade shifted the merchandise trade balance 
into surplus in 2011 for the LDCs as a group, after two years of deficits. This is 
important to emphasize since prior to 2006, LDCs had continuously recorded 
merchandise trade deficits. Nevertheless, the positive result for the group as a 
whole masks significant heterogeneity, since it was due entirely to the African 
LDCs and their surplus of $21.4 billion – which in turn is driven by only a 
handful of countries, most notably Angola. Asian LDCs, by contrast, recorded 
a merchandise trade deficit of $17.5 billion in 2011, while island LDCs posted a 
deficit of $1.2 billion. 
Merchandise exports have continued to be dominated by petroleum, at 
slightly over 46 per cent of total exports.  Since all but one of the LDC petroleum 
exporters are in Africa, the overall LDC trade surplus is also due to African LDCs. 
The list of non-petroleum export products from LDCs includes articles of apparel 
(5.5 per cent), clothing and textile fabrics (5 per cent), copper (4.1 per cent), 
natural gas (3.9 per cent) and gold (2.4 per cent). 
Exports of services by LDCs increased by 14.4 per cent in 2011 and also 
surpassed the pre-crisis level. However, at $25.3 billion they are still small 
compared with merchandise exports and account for just one-ninth of total 
exports. Imports of services expanded 15.6 per cent in 2011. The services trade 
deficit rose from $36.5 billion in 2010 to $42.5 billion in 2011.
The gradual shift in the main markets for exports of LDCs continued in 2011, 
reflecting the long-term recalibration of the global economy as well as the weak 
economic performance of key destination markets in the North (UNCTAD, 
2011a). As a group, LDCs exported more than 54 per cent of their total exports 
to other developing countries. China imported 26.4 per cent of total exports from 
LDCs, surpassing the European Union (20.4 per cent) and the US (19 per cent). 
Similar trends could be detected for LDC imports, with 67.8 per cent coming 
from other developing countries and only 29.8 per cent from developed ones. 
China has been growing in importance as a trade partner, and it is currently the 
second largest source of imports into LDCs (16.1 per cent of the total), behind 
the European Union (18.5 per cent).
The improving export performance of many LDCs in 2010 and 2011 was 
primarily due to the higher international commodity prices. After slumping in 
2009, prices recovered rapidly, in some cases to levels higher than before the 
crisis. The price index for minerals, ores and metals, for example, increased 
by 77 per cent from 2009 to 2011, when it was 44 per cent higher than the 
previous peak of 2008 (table 2). 
A similar trend can be observed for agricultural raw materials, whose prices 
were driven by very strong increases in prices of cotton, which increased nearly 
two and a half times from 2009 to 2011. While this clearly benefited those LDCs 
that are net exporters of these commodities, price volatility remains a major 
problem, creating vulnerability for exporters. This is evident from the last two 
columns of table 2 (percentage change and standard deviation), which point to 
high price volatility for most primary commodities of importance to LDCs.
Overall trends in merchandise trade 
shifted the merchandise trade 
balance into surplus in 2011 for the 
LDCs as a group, after two years
of deficits...
... but it was due entirely to the 
African LDCs and their surplus of 
$21.4 billion – which in turn is driven 
by only a handful of countries, most 
notably Angola.
LDCs exported more than 54 per 
cent of their total exports to other 
developing countries in 2011.
Similar trends could be detected 
for LDC imports, with 67.8 per 
cent coming from other developing 
countries and only 29.8 per cent 
from developed ones. 
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Food prices increased substantially during the boom and peaked in 2008, 
causing food shortages and even food riots in several LDCs. After easing 
somewhat in 2009, food prices started to rise again in 2010 and 2011, reaching 
higher levels than in the pre-crisis period. Accordingly, the food security outlook 
deteriorated in many LDCs since many are net food importers. The situation in 
some parts of Africa (mainly the Horn of Africa) was critical, as famine threatened 
the lives of hundreds of thousands.
Whereas food prices eased somewhat after peaking in February 2012, 
droughts in the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa could cause the food security 
situation to deteriorate further. In addition, adverse weather conditions in many 
parts of the world (widespread drought in the United States, poor monsoon 
in India, and so on) and depressed output expectations are already leading to 
renewed increases in food prices, causing further problems for food-importing 
LDCs. Globally, there is a continued absence of policies that tackle the root 
causes of recent food price spikes (financial speculation, irresponsible land 
investment, inadequate policies to build buffer stocks in developing countries, 
neglect of small holder cultivation, disregard of food security objectives, subsidy-
driven expansion of biofuel cultivation, etc.) (Wise and Murphy, 2012). In this 
context, there is a real possibility of renewed increases in global food prices that 
could once again cause widespread suffering and even famine. 
3. TRENDS IN EXTERNAL FINANCE
One of the long-standing characteristics of LDCs is their dependence on 
external finance resulting from the gap between investment and domestic 
saving. With the exception of the petroleum-exporting LDCs, which have a 
negative resource gap (they invest less than they save), LDCs need external 
resources equivalent to almost 15 per cent of GDP to finance their current levels 
of investment. This leaves them vulnerable to mood swings of private capital 
flows. 
Table 2. Price indices for selected primary commodities of importance to LDCs, 2008–2012 (Q1)
(Price indices 2000 = 100)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (Q1)
Standard 
deviation
% change
2000–2011 2000–2011
All food 236 216 232 273 284 62.3 172.8
Wheat 288 197 204 276 292 63.9 175.6
Rice 344 289 256 271 257 89.6 170.9
Sugar 156 222 260 318 348 76.6 217.9
Fish meal 274 298 409 372 421 102.8 272.3
Coffee, Arabica 162 167 228 321 322 70.7 209.6
Coffee, Robusta 254 179 200 275 262 69.5 160.5
Cocoa beans 291 325 353 336 377 84.1 235.7
Tea 109 127 125 140 141 22.1 39.5
Agricultural commodities 198 163 226 289 315 59.3 189.1
Tobacco 120 142 144 150 147 22.5 49.8
Cotton 121 106 175 258 350 50.4 158.1
Non-coniferous woods 154 154 161 158 159 23.9 58.2
Minerals, ores and metals 337a 274a 424a 486a 435a 104.9 248.9
Iron ore 494 643 1178 1348 1139 431.4 1247.7
Aluminium 166 107 140 155 161 31.9 54.8
Copper 384 283 416 487 532 149.7 386.6
Gold 312 349 440 562 496 149.3 462.2
Memo Items:
Crude petroleum 344 219 280 368 353 99.4 268.3
Unit value index of manufactured goods exports 131 122 126 138 124a 14.4 37.7
Source: UNCTADstat, Commodity Price Bulletin; IMF, International Financial Statistics for Iron Ore Prices, World Bank, Development Pros-
pect Group.
a Estimated.
After easing somewhat in 2009, food 
prices started to rise again in 2010 
and 2011, reaching higher levels 
than in the pre-crisis period and the 
food security outlook deteriorated
in many LDCs.
With the exception of the petroleum-
exporting LDCs, all other LDCs 
need external resources equivalent 
to almost 15 per cent of GDP 
to finance their current levels of 
investment.
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The varying composition of external resources that finance the resource 
gap has very different economic effects and is thus of particular interest to 
LDCs. Overall trends show that private financial flows to LDCs have continued 
to decline for the third year in a row, mostly as a result of a further decline of 
FDI inflows, offset by an increase in official flows. Within private flows, however, 
the remittance flows have been much more stable than flows of FDI, whereas 
portfolio flows to LDCs are negligible. Private flows to other developing countries, 
in turn, have recovered to pre-crisis levels much more rapidly (portfolio inflows 
and remittances in 2010, and FDI in 2011). The point should also be made that 
ODA represents roughly half of overall external finance to LDCs, while in the 
case of other developing countries it is less than eight per cent of the total.
UNCTAD recently revised the data on FDI inflows to LDCs (UNCTAD, 2012a). 
According to the new data, inflows of FDI were much smaller than remittances 
for most of the last decade. Since remittances are one of the main topics of this 
Report, chapter three provides a detailed discussion of the magnitudes of these 
flows. It is sufficient to emphasize here that remittances have been growing 
even during the crisis and that they are forecasted to grow in the medium term 
(Mohapatra et al., 2011). In contrast, FDI inflows to LDCs have declined for three 
consecutive years after peaking in 2008 at a little less than $19 billion, and in 
2011 amounted to only $15 billion. This is very different from the trends in other 
developing countries, where FDI inflows have increased steadily since 2009 
(chart 3). The recent decline in FDI inflows to LDCs as a group is mainly due to 
disinvestment trends in Angola, tied to the oil-investment cycle in that country. In 
the rest of the LDCs, FDI has remained stable.
Whereas FDI inflows to LDCs are still predominantly to Africa, some shifts 
have occurred recently. Of the total FDI flows to LDCs of $15 billion in 2011, 79 
per cent went to Africa, a slight decrease from the previous year. Meanwhile, 
Asian LDCs received $2.8 billion in 2011, up marginally from the previous year. 
The concentration of FDI inflows appears to have diminished. In 2009, there 
were only five countries with inflows greater than $1 billion, whereas in 2011 
there were nine such countries. 
When analysed from the point of view of country groupings according to 
export specialization, FDI inflows show that all groups except the petroleum-
exporting LDCs received more FDI in 2011 than in 2010. The largest increase 
was in the case of mineral-exporting LDCs, from $6.4 billion in 2010 to 7.2 
billion in 2011. This group of LDCs received the largest share of total FDI in both 
2010 and 2011. In previous years, however, petroleum-exporting LDCs were 
the biggest beneficiaries of FDI inflows. That changed precipitously in 2010, 
when they received only $2.1 billion, and FDI inflows in 2011 became negative 
to the tune of $1.8 billion as a result of disinvestment.
One key emerging trend is the recent rise of FDI outflows from LDCs. These 
are investments of firms based in LDCs to other countries. In 2009, FDI outflows 
from all LDCs amounted to $1.1 billion, nearly tripling to $3.1 billion in 2010 and 
continuing to increase to $3.3 billion in 2011. However, only Angola and Zambia 
had sums larger than $1 billion, and they accounted for three-quarters of all FDI 
outflows from LDCs.
Data from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) show that net Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements, together with net debt relief to 
the LDCs from all donors reporting to the OECD/DAC, reached a record level 
of $44.8 billion in 2010 (chart 4). This represents an 11 per cent increase in 
comparison with ODA disbursements in 2009. In nominal terms, aid inflows to 
LDCs in 2010 were 3.5 times higher than in 2000. As noted in LDCR 2011, ODA 
has played an important countercyclical role in the wake of the global crisis, 
cushioning the impact of the retreat of private financial flows. 
Private financial flows to LDCs have 
continued to decline for the third 
year in a row, mostly as a result of a 
further decline of FDI inflows, offset 
by an increase in official flows.
FDI inflows to LDCs have declined 
for three consecutive years after 
peaking in 2008 at a little less than 
$19 billion, and in 2011 amounted to 
only $15 billion.
All groups except the petroleum-
exporting LDCs received more FDI 
in 2011 than in 2010. 
Net ODA disbursements, together 
with net debt relief to the LDCs from 
all donors, reached a record level of 
$44.8 billion in 2010.
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Preliminary data for net official development assistance from DAC and other 
OECD members to all developing countries show a drop of almost three per cent 
in 2011. It is highly likely that continuing tight budgets in OECD countries will put 
pressure on aid levels in coming years, thus adversely affecting development 
finance in LDCs. 
Additional net debt relief to the LDCs accounted for nearly half of the increase 
in total ODA disbursement in 2010. This came to five per cent of total ODA 
disbursement in 2010, up from 1.6 per cent in 2009. Excluding net debt relief, 
previous trends towards a decline in the proportion of loans and increase in 
grants were even more pronounced in 2010. The share of grants out of net 
ODA flows was 98.7 per cent in 2010, whereas concessional loans accounted 
for a scant 1.3 per cent, down from 8.5 per cent in 2009 and 20 per cent over 
2000–2005.
The LDCs’ total debt stock reached $161 billion in 2010, only marginally 
higher than in 2009. Although the data for 2011 are not final, it is estimated to 
have increased to around $170 billion. LDCs’ debt service decreased slightly 
from $8.2 billion in 2009 to 7.6 billion in 2010. External debt in relation to GDP 
fell from 29.9 per cent in 2009 to 26.7 in 2010. Compared with the situation 
at the beginning of the decade, when the ratio was 79.2, this is a substantial 
improvement. However, it is still more than eight percentage points of GDP 
higher than the average of developing countries. While part of this improvement 
was due to various debt relief initiatives, the decrease in the debt/GDP ratio was 
mostly due to rapid GDP growth during the boom. Similarly, debt service as a 
share of exports declined from 13.2 per cent in 2000 to 4.8 per cent in 2010, 
primarily as a result of very strong export growth.
While debt sustainability indicators for the LDCs as a group have been 
gradually improving, in 2011 they indicated debt distress for three of them 
Chart 3. Inward foreign direct investment flows to LDCs and other developing countries (ODCs), 2000–2011
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Preliminary data for net official 
development assistance from DAC 
and other OECD members to all 
developing countries show a drop of 
almost three per cent in 2011. 
Although the data for the LDCs’ total 
debt stock for 2011 are not final, it 
is estimated to have increased to 
around $170 billion. 
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(Comoros, Guinea and Sudan). In addition, a debt sustainability analysis shows 
that there were nine LDCs at high risk of debt distress in 2011. Thus, the number 
of LDCs in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress in 2011 remained the 
same overall as in 2010.
The experience of the LDCs in the last ten years shows that the key to debt 
sustainability is development of productive capacities. High and sustainable 
growth of GDP and rapid expansion of exports increased the capacity of many 
LDCs to service debt. While external financial resources, in particular ODA and 
remittances, were increasingly available to LDCs in the previous decade, there 
is no guarantee that this will continue to be the case in the future. The recent 
sharp decrease in FDI is instructive in this respect. Thus, a progressive shift from 
reliance on external sources of finance to domestic ones is a big challenge for 
LDCs. This will reduce their external dependence and vulnerability to external 
shocks and uncertainties.
C. Current world economic situation and
the short-term outlook for the LDCs
1. CURRENT WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION
Following coordinated efforts by policymakers to stimulate the world 
economy and avert a new Great Depression in 2009, the rebound in real global 
GDP growth (at 5.3 per cent) in 2010 was strong. However, this “recovery” was 
mainly due to fiscal stimulus programmes and inventory reposition. By 2011, it 
was already apparent that the measures taken were not adequate to sustain the 
Chart 4. Official development assistance to LDCs, 2000–2010 
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(nine) in 2011 remained the same 
overall as in 2010.
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recovery, and the crisis spread to different geographic epicentres like Europe. As 
a result, the growth of world GDP decelerated to 3.9 per cent in 2011.
While the stimulus measures successfully compensated for weaknesses in 
the private sector and averted a deeper downturn in the short run, they also 
created new sources of fragility. In particular, the strategy of passing on private 
sector losses to the public sector (by bailing out financial institutions), as well 
as the inevitable but necessary public sector spending to offset private sector 
deleveraging, has rapidly reached its limits, especially in Europe. The resulting 
increase in sovereign debt has brought some developed countries to the brink 
of default. The policy reaction of many countries faced with increasing sovereign 
debt has been to implement fiscal austerity measures, which have adversely 
affected aggregate demand and amounted to a drag on economic growth 
(UNCTAD, 2011b). Just as the Keynesian stimulus in 2009 and early 2010 
supported economic growth, fiscal austerity from mid-2010 onwards worked 
in the opposite direction. As a result, several European economies entered a 
double-dip recession in 2012.
The present crisis in the developed world is deflationary in nature, and 
so most central banks in developed countries have been vigorously trying to 
offset these deflationary tendencies. Interest rates are at historic lows, and 
additional measures of quantitative easing have been adopted in attempts to 
turn the situation around. Yet flooding the financial sector with cheap funds has 
not resulted in increased lending to the real sector. Rather, banks have used 
cheap funds to repair their balance sheets and dispose of the sovereign bonds 
of the distressed European economies. Part of these cheaply acquired funds 
has also been invested in speculative activities on commodity futures markets, 
thereby inflating their prices. Thus, a combination of monetary easing and fiscal 
tightening has so far not resulted in a sustainable and robust recovery.
Many indicators suggest that the crisis in developed countries is nowhere 
near resolution. In 2011, the unemployment rate averaged 8.6 per cent in 
OECD countries, well above the pre-crisis level of 5.6 per cent. The employment 
situation has worsened significantly in 2012. Unemployment rates in some 
OECD countries are now at levels of 20 per cent or more, not seen since the 
Great Depression. The unemployment rate in the eurozone has surpassed 11 
per cent, the highest since the introduction of the euro. The unemployment rate 
in the US has been persistently above eight per cent for five years, suggesting 
that a different macroeconomic strategy is required in order to return to more 
normal levels of unemployment. The only bright spots in the world economy 
in the last three years have been some developing countries. Yet this may not 
last long, since growth in developing countries is intrinsically linked to growth 
and demand from developed countries: indeed, China, Brazil and India among 
others are already showing signs of growth deceleration. 
2. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE LDCS
According to IMF forecasts, real GDP worldwide will expand by 3.5 per 
cent in 2012, down from 3.9 per cent in 2011. If the downside risks do not 
materialize, real global GDP is set to grow by 4.1 per cent in 2013. For the LDCs 
as a group, the IMF currently forecasts growth rates of 5.1 per cent in 2012 and 
5.5 per cent in 2013. Developing countries, in turn, should attain growth rates of 
5.7 per cent in 2012 and 6.0 per cent in 2013 (see again table 1).
However, given the fragility of the global economy, the outlook for 2012 and 
2013 is subject to a high degree of uncertainty (UNDESA, 2012a). The downside 
risks are numerous and include an escalation of the eurozone debt crisis, a rise 
in global energy prices due to current geopolitical risks, a deceleration of growth 
Following coordinated efforts by 
policymakers to stimulate the world 
economy and avert a new Great 
Depression in 2009, the rebound in 
real global GDP growth in 2010 was 
strong. However, this “recovery” 
was mainly due to fiscal stimulus 
programmes and
inventory reposition.
A combination of monetary easing 
and fiscal tightening has so far 
not resulted in a sustainable and 
robust recovery and many indicators 
suggest that the crisis in developed 
countries is nowhere near resolution.
Given the fragility of the global 
economy, the outlook for 2012 and 
2013 is subject to a high degree of 
uncertainty.
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in large developing countries, and a fiscal retrenchment in the United States, 
scheduled for 2013, which could have a strong negative impact on overall 
growth. Thus, the IMF forecasts should be considered as a best-case scenario, 
and policymakers should be prepared for a possible deterioration in the global 
economic situation.
As of mid-2012, economic activity is decelerating in a synchronized way in 
many parts of the world. Apart from the recession in the eurozone and the UK, 
economic activity is also decelerating in the US. Growth rates in India, Brazil and 
South Africa are also lower in 2012 than in 2011. The Chinese economy, for its 
part, has seen a deceleration of growth rates in the last eight quarters, as its 
investment-led growth falters.3
The divergence in growth rates during and after the financial crisis has been 
interpreted in many circles as an indicator that the economies of the South are 
“decoupling” from the economies of the North. This interpretation, however, 
overlooks the reasons for the growth surge during the 2000s. International 
economic conditions were exceptionally conducive to growth from 2002 to 
2008 (UNCTAD, 2012b). Consumption in developed economies was fuelled by 
cheap credit and positive wealth effects from property bubbles. This generated 
favourable economic conditions for developing countries, with rapidly increasing 
exports and remittances and surges of capital flows in the form of FDI, portfolio 
investment and cheap credit. Terms of trade for commodity exporters also 
improved.
However, that model was associated with increasing global imbalances, 
where surplus countries (including several developing countries) accumulated 
trillions in reserves while deficit countries accumulated trillions in debts. The 
financial crisis of 2009 reduced these imbalances, which are now at about half 
of their pre-crisis peak (UNDESA, 2012a). But one “cost” of this reduction of 
global imbalances has been less dynamic growth of GDP worldwide. Reduced 
demand for consumption goods in developed economies translates into fewer 
exports from China and other manufacturing hubs in developing countries, which 
in turn generates less demand for commodities. The vulnerability of developing 
countries to changes in developed economies suggests that the “decoupling” 
thesis is not on solid ground.
In case the downward trajectory of the global economy intensifies, the key 
question is what policymakers can do to counteract it. Unfortunately, the policy 
space today, in both developed and developing countries, is smaller than in 2009. 
Larger budget deficits and increased public debt in developed countries have 
severely limited the perceived scope for additional fiscal stimulus. Further use 
of monetary policy is constrained by proximity to zero interest rates, and in any 
case becomes ineffective in “liquidity trap” conditions. Overcoming the risks to 
the global economy in this context requires globally coordinated countercyclical 
policies and many other bolder reforms (UNCTAD, 2011b; UNDESA, 2012a).
Against this background, the outlook for LDCs in the short- to medium-
term is not bright. Given the growing danger that the world economy might be 
entering a lengthy period of stagnation and deflation, LDCs have to prepare for 
a relatively prolonged period of uncertainty, with possible escalation of financial 
tensions and a real economic downturn. Trade and investment of developing 
countries, which are often intermediated by US and European banks, have 
already suffered setbacks. Prices of some commodities started to decrease, 
in some cases abruptly, in the second quarter of 2012. If the current tendency 
towards economic deceleration continues, commodity prices could suffer 
pronounced falls. The pace of economic growth in China, in particular, will have 
a major impact on the prices of many commodities.
As of mid-2012, economic activity is 
decelerating in a synchronized way 
in many parts of the world.
Reduced demand for consumption 
goods in developed economies 
translates into fewer exports from 
China and other manufacturing 
hubs in developing countries, which 
in turn generates less demand for 
commodities. 
Against this background, the outlook 
for LDCs in the short- to medium-
term is not bright.
The pace of economic growth in 
China, in particular, will have a 
major impact on the prices of many 
commodities.
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The countries most vulnerable to a deterioration of external economic 
conditions are LDCs with high twin deficits (Figure 2). The resource gap of 
many LDCs is so large that even a partial drying up of financing options would 
represent a major shock to these economies. If, additionally, they have an 
export structure heavily dependent on one or a few commodities, the short-
term economic outlook might be particularly challenging. Further challenges, 
stemming from political unrest in Northern Africa and the Middle East, have 
already directly or indirectly affected some LDCs (Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, 
Niger, Republic of Yemen).
Contingency planning in LDCs should include anticipating the financing needs 
of governments for the current and next year, if possible, and preparations to 
provide emergency support for national financial systems, as need be. Additional 
loans, such as those announced by China at the China-Africa meeting in July 
2012, could help some LDCs cope with this difficult period.
For predominantly export-led economies, some reorientation to domestic 
demand may be needed. While curtailing dependence on foreign markets might 
be extremely difficult even in the medium term, it should certainly be a goal 
for most LDCs. Commodity exporters need to diversify their production and 
exports, and try to develop new products or upgrade existing ones. Countries 
running large current account deficits have to reduce them to manageable 
proportions. 
Such diversification could be facilitated through the expansion of South–
South ties and regional integration schemes that allow for productive 
reorientation. Reductions in external financing could be countered by innovative 
financial arrangements, including through regional development banks and 
sovereign wealth funds, along the lines of the proposal contained in LDCR 2011. 
Strengthening domestic resource mobilization is another important strategy, 
despite the constraints posed by decelerating GDP growth. 
In sum, the short-term outlook for LDCs, as indeed for the world economy as 
a whole, is challenging. The world economy may be entering a more turbulent 
and uncertain phase, in which LDCs may once again be exposed to external 
economic shocks and have to deal with a crisis that originates elsewhere. 
Recognizing this may allow for more effective preparation.
 Notes
 1 The growth rates reported in table 1 in the text as well as annex table 1 are from the 
International Monetary Fund. As such, they could differ, at times even substantially, 
from growth rates reported by individual LDCs. The use of the IMF data instead of the 
data reported by countries themselves is to assure consistency across all LDCs, as 
well as to present forecasts for individual LDCs.
 2 Data for some LDCs are missing from chart 2. One of them is Somalia, which is 
not reflected in the WEO database. Also, some countries with extreme values were 
excluded to obtain a more easily understandable picture. For example, the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste was excluded since it had a fiscal surplus of 50.4 percent of 
GDP and a current account surplus of 48.1 percent of GDP in 2010.
 3 The study of fast-growing economies and their subsequent slowdowns by 
Eichengreen et al. (2011) indicates that Chinese fast growth may come to an end in 
the next three to five years.
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Statistical annex
Annex table 1. Real GDP growth rates for individual LDCs, selected years
(Annual weighted averages, percentages)
2002–2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Fuel exporters 9.9 3.0 4.6 -1.6 1.8 3.4
Angola 16.6 2.4 3.4 3.4 9.7 6.8
Chad 8.9 -1.2 13.0 1.6 6.9 0.1
Equatorial Guinea 15.0 5.7 -0.8 7.1 4.0 6.8
Sudan 7.6 3.0 4.5 -3.9 -7.3 -1.5
Yemen 4.0 3.9 7.7 -10.5 -0.9 2.9
Manufactures exporters 6.2 5.3 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.4
Bangladesh 6.2 5.9 6.4 6.1 5.9 6.4
Bhutan 8.5 6.7 10.6 5.9 7.0 9.9
Cambodia 10.4 0.1 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.4
Haiti 0.9 2.9 -5.4 5.6 7.8 6.9
Lesotho 3.9 3.6 5.7 4.2 5.2 2.2
Services exporters 6.8 5.6 5.8 5.7 4.8 5.3
Comoros 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.5 4.0
Djibouti 4.1 5.0 3.5 4.5 4.8 5.0
Eritrea -0.5 3.9 2.2 8.7 7.5 3.4
Ethiopia 10.3 10.0 8.0 7.5 5.0 5.5
Gambia 3.4 6.7 5.5 3.3 -1.7 9.7
Liberia 1.3 2.8 5.0 6.4 8.8 5.1
Madagascar 5.9 -4.1 0.5 0.5 2.9 5.1
Nepal 4.0 4.4 4.6 3.5 4.2 3.8
Rwanda 7.7 4.1 7.5 8.8 7.6 7.0
Samoa 3.9 -5.4 0.2 2.1 1.4 1.9
Sao Tome and Principe 5.8 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.5 6.0
Timor-Leste 5.0 12.8 9.5 10.6 10.0 10.0
Tuvalu 0.9 -1.7 -0.5 0.4 1.5 1.3
Vanuatu 5.7 3.5 2.2 3.3 4.0 4.0
Other primary commodity exporters 6.1 4.6 5.9 5.8 6.3 6.2
Minerals 5.9 4.0 6.1 5.7 7.8 6.9
Democratic Republic of the Congo 6.4 2.8 7.0 6.9 6.5 6.7
Guinea 2.6 -0.3 1.9 3.6 4.7 4.8
Mali 4.9 4.5 5.8 2.7 6.0 5.8
Mauritania 5.6 -1.2 5.1 3.6 5.3 6.1
Mozambique 7.8 6.3 6.8 7.1 6.7 7.2
Sierra Leone 7.2 3.2 5.0 5.3 35.9 9.1
Zambia 5.7 6.4 7.6 6.6 7.7 8.3
Agriculture and food 6.4 5.6 5.8 5.9 4.3 5.3
Benin 3.8 2.7 2.6 3.1 3.5 4.7
Burkina Faso 5.8 3.2 7.9 5.6 5.0 6.4
Guinea-Bissau 2.8 3.0 3.5 5.3 4.5 4.7
Kiribati 0.6 -2.4 1.4 1.8 2.5 3.0
Malawi 5.1 9.0 6.5 5.5 4.3 4.1
Solomon Islands 7.6 -4.7 7.0 9.3 6.0 4.0
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 8.0 7.2 5.9 6.7 4.2 5.4
Mixed exporters 9.5 6.6 6.1 5.4 6.4 6.0
Afghanistan 7.7a 21.0 8.4 5.7 7.2 5.8
Burundi 4.4 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.8 5.0
Central African Republic 1.6 1.7 3.3 3.1 4.1 4.2
Lao People's Democratic Republic 7.5 7.6 7.9 8.3 8.4 7.1
Myanmar 12.1 5.1 5.3 5.5 6.0 5.9
Niger 5.2 -0.9 8.0 2.3 14.0 6.6
Togo 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.6
Senegal 4.8 2.1 4.1 2.6 3.8 4.5
United Republic of Tanzania 7.2 6.7 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.7
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations, based on IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April, 2012. 
Note:  Data for 2011 are preliminary and are forecasted for 2012–2013.
a 2003–2008.
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Annex table 2. Real GDP per capita growth rates for individual LDCs, selected years
(Annual weighted averages, percentages)
2002–2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Fuel exporters 7.0 0.3 1.8 -4.2 -0.9 0.7
Angola 13.3 -0.2 0.4 0.4 6.5 3.6
Chad 5.5 -3.6 10.3 -0.8 4.3 -2.3
Equatorial Guinea 11.7 2.8 -3.6 4.1 1.1 3.8
Sudan 5.1 0.4 1.9 -6.3 -9.5 -3.9
Yemen 0.8 0.8 4.6 -13.1 -3.8 0.0
Manufactures exporters 4.6 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.6 5.0
Bangladesh 4.6 4.5 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.9
Cambodia 8.5 -1.6 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.3
Haiti -0.7 1.2 -4.8 3.9 6.2 5.3
Lesotho 4.3 2.9 5.0 3.4 4.4 1.4
Bhutan 6.0 5.2 10.1 5.7 6.9 9.7
Services exporters 4.3 3.2 3.5 3.4 2.6 3.0
Comoros -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.4 1.8
Djibouti 2.0 2.4 1.0 1.9 2.2 2.5
Eritrea -4.1 0.7 -0.9 5.4 4.3 0.4
Ethiopia 7.4 7.2 5.5 5.0 2.6 3.0
Gambia 0.4 3.9 2.7 0.5 -4.3 6.8
Liberia -2.0 -1.4 0.7 3.7 6.1 2.4
Madagascar 3.0 -6.6 -2.0 -2.0 0.3 2.5
Nepal 2.7 3.4 3.5 2.5 3.2 2.8
Rwanda 5.8 2.0 5.3 6.6 5.4 4.8
Samoa 3.5 -5.4 -0.3 1.5 1.4 1.3
Sao Tome and Principe 4.2 2.1 3.2 2.5 3.7 4.2
Timor-Leste 2.4 10.2 6.8 8.0 7.4 7.5
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. ..
Vanuatu 3.3 1.2 0.1 0.8 2.0 1.5
Other primary commodity exporters 3.2 1.7 3.0 2.8 3.4 3.3
Minerals 3.1 1.2 3.2 2.9 4.9 4.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo 3.3 -0.2 3.9 3.8 3.4 3.6
Guinea 0.5 -2.7 -0.6 1.0 2.1 2.3
Mali 1.7 1.3 2.7 -0.4 2.8 2.6
Mauritania 3.2 -3.5 2.6 1.2 2.8 3.6
Mozambique 5.7 4.2 4.7 5.0 4.7 5.1
Sierra Leone 3.6 0.7 2.3 2.7 32.4 6.3
Zambia 3.3 3.8 5.0 4.0 5.1 5.7
Agriculture and food 3.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 1.2 2.2
Benin 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.7 1.9
Burkina Faso 3.2 0.8 5.5 3.2 2.6 4.0
Guinea-Bissau 0.5 0.7 1.3 3.0 2.2 2.5
Kiribati -1.3 -5.3 -0.6 -0.1 1.5 1.1
Malawi 2.6 6.0 3.5 2.5 1.4 1.2
Solomon Islands 5.4 -7.0 4.6 6.8 3.5 1.7
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 4.5 3.5 2.2 3.0 0.5 1.7
Mixed exporters 6.9 4.2 3.6 3.1 4.0 3.6
Afghanistan 4.0a 17.3 5.2 2.7 4.0 2.7
Burundi 2.3 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.0
Central African Republic -0.4 -1.9 0.8 0.6 1.5 1.7
Lao People's Democratic Republic 5.6 5.6 6.0 6.3 6.4 5.1
Myanmar 9.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.9 3.8
Niger 2.0 -3.9 4.7 -0.8 10.6 3.4
Togo 0.1 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0
Senegal 2.3 -0.3 1.7 0.2 1.4 2.1
United Rep. of Tanzania 5.1 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.3 4.6
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations, based on IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April, 2012. 
Note:  Data for 2011 are preliminary and are forecasted for 2012–2013.
a 2003–2008.
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Annex table 3. Gross fixed capital formation in LDCs: share of GDP and annual average growth rates
(Percentage)
Country
Share of GDP (current dollars) Annual average growth rate (constant 2005 dollars)
1980 1990 2000 2008 2009 2010
1980–
1990
1990–
2000
2000–
2009
2008 2009 2010
Afghanistan 13.2 13.4 14.3 27.6 17.5 26.5 -1.6 -3.0 11.3 -5.5 -0.2 -7.3
Angola 22.8 11.7 11.7 15.8 17.1 10.3 -4.0 8.9 16.1 67.2 -15.8 -22.9
Bangladesh 21.3 20.2 23.0 24.2 24.4 24.9 3.1 9.2 7.6 1.8 6.2 5.8
Benin 21.9 13.4 18.0 20.3 21.0 20.5 -4.7 6.3 4.9 8.3 2.7 -5.9
Bhutan 32.5 31.8 50.0 38.7 41.3 42.3 6.5 9.5 -0.1 -3.9 24.0 -0.5
Burkina Faso 19.2 17.7 21.2 20.4 22.0 27.1 4.9 4.2 8.7 8.2 11.0 8.3
Burundi 17.0 21.8 13.2 14.4 14.4 13.4 4.9 -10.5 3.1 0.2 3.4 -3.1
Cambodia 9.3 8.3 18.3 17.3 20.1 16.0 5.5 15.3 12.9 15.9 18.8 -10.8
Central African Republic 6.9 11.8 11.1 11.6 11.3 11.4 7.0 -1.5 4.9 24.9 5.3 8.9
Chad 8.1 7.2 15.2 15.1 21.4 22.5 6.1 4.4 8.4 -4.7 27.6 34.0
Comoros 28.5 12.2 10.1 13.7 11.9 16.5 -6.6 -1.6 5.1 29.1 -11.6 42.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 20.0 12.8 3.5 21.5 19.1 26.4 0.0 -8.7 14.3 6.4 2.1 7.2
Djibouti 12.9 27.2 12.2 16.9 17.7 17.3 3.1 -9.4 23.8 16.4 -15.2 -26.3
Equatorial Guinea 13.0 58.1 61.9 30.5 70.5 61.1 11.6 54.3 16.4 28.2 38.7 -14.0
Eritreaa _ _ 22.0 12.7 9.1 12.3 - 14.1 -20.9 -0.5 -37.0 92.9
Ethiopiab _ _ 20.3 22.4 22.7 22.3 - 5.7 10.5 15.7 15.0 -0.5
Ethiopia (former) 10.0 12.5 .. .. .. .. 4.2 .. .. .. .. ..
Gambia 14.4 18.0 4.6 29.1 28.3 27.5 -3.4 2.3 23.2 4.5 -0.8 3.0
Guinea 20.1 34.3 35.4 21.3 16.4 18.0 8.1 2.3 14.4 34.5 19.9 11.1
Guinea-Bissau 25.1 14.7 11.3 8.6 8.4 7.2 1.7 -10.4 3.3 -13.4 7.0 -15.9
Haiti 17.9 14.3 14.3 15.1 14.3 13.1 -0.1 5.6 1.2 2.8 3.2 -6.5
Kiribati 44.0 55.9 33.2 57.8 57.6 58.6 2.6 -0.4 8.5 3.1 -2.7 1.3
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 7.4 11.3 28.3 37.1 31.1 37.1 10.7 14.8 13.3 -2.7 -11.6 33.7
Lesotho 40.3 53.0 43.2 28.5 27.8 29.9 3.8 1.5 1.4 18.0 -5.0 10.1
Liberia 21.4 10.5 7.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 -11.7 2.2 17.6 7.1 4.5 5.2
Madagascar 22.8 17.0 16.2 40.3 31.7 18.8 4.9 3.4 11.3 52.8 -26.1 -12.6
Malawi 31.6 24.4 17.5 22.6 22.6 22.3 -3.3 -4.2 18.4 23.6 9.0 26.8
Mali 17.4 20.0 18.9 18.3 20.4 21.2 4.2 2.1 7.0 -0.8 13.3 7.7
Mauritania 18.7 13.6 16.2 25.5 28.4 30.6 -3.3 2.2 17.6 -6.8 13.3 28.5
Mozambique 7.6 14.7 31.0 16.5 16.5 21.9 2.3 10.1 6.2 17.8 5.4 38.0
Myanmar 18.7 14.7 11.8 15.7 19.3 22.8 -2.7 14.5 24.0 19.6 36.7 31.7
Nepal 15.9 16.6 19.5 21.9 21.4 20.2 4.5 6.4 4.1 1.9 0.5 5.3
Niger 25.3 12.8 15.1 30.9 32.9 40.2 -10.1 3.0 11.3 19.8 5.2 32.6
Rwanda 10.8 10.9 14.2 22.7 21.6 21.0 5.0 1.1 15.3 32.1 2.6 7.3
Samoa 25.9 22.4 13.9 8.5 9.0 8.8 0.3 -4.6 -2.5 -8.5 4.3 -0.7
Sao Tome and Principe 11.4 31.3 35.8 26.7 23.4 26.1 3.1 3.6 4.3 4.1 -8.4 16.6
Senegal 16.3 16.1 22.4 27.1 23.7 27.3 4.3 6.2 6.3 7.8 -7.4 12.0
Sierra Leone 14.0 9.6 6.9 6.2 6.2 8.1 -3.7 -11.6 15.0 -3.5 4.4 25.0
Solomon Islands 22.0 17.4 18.3 18.3 18.1 19.3 1.9 0.7 21.2 14.2 -12.6 169.9
Somalia 9.8 23.0 20.4 20.1 20.0 19.9 4.7 -4.7 1.6 2.2 3.3 2.3
Sudan 19.3 16.1 9.7 18.4 18.8 18.5 -5.3 21.8 16.7 -0.3 19.8 3.2
Timor-Lestec .. .. .. 23.5 21.6 21.9 .. .. -0.9 26.2 3.5 7.9
Togo 29.4 14.5 15.1 14.3 16.7 17.7 -1.3 0.3 5.5 12.2 21.8 9.6
Tuvalu 74.9 68.6 11.7 77.3 76.6 77.4 6.5 -6.4 11.9 -6.7 0.6 2.7
Uganda 6.9 13.5 17.8 20.1 21.0 21.4 7.4 9.5 11.5 6.7 5.8 5.2
United Rep. of Tanzania 22.0 41.1 16.3 29.0 28.2 27.7 1.1 -1.2 12.6 7.4 10.0 8.3
Vanuatu 23.7 32.3 24.6 33.0 27.0 27.8 6.2 4.2 11.2 48.6 -15.0 8.1
Yemend 31.1 11.8 16.7 19.5 20.9 17.9 -6.8 14.1 0.6 -6.2 -8.0 -7.4
Zambia 18.2 13.5 17.2 19.7 20.2 22.5 -9.0 21.0 11.7 12.1 -0.6 9.8
All developing countries 24.9 22.8 23.3 28.0 29.7 29.8 1.8 6.0 9.0 6.8 5.8 10.4
Other developing countries 25.1 23.0 23.4 28.2 29.9 30.1 1.8 6.0 9.0 6.6 5.8 10.5
LDCs 18.6 17.0 18.5 21.1 22.0 21.6 0.6 6.5 10.2 12.4 5.1 3.7
  LDCs: Africa and Haiti 18.0 16.7 16.9 20.5 21.7 20.5 0.5 5.1 11.6 18.8 4.2 1.8
  LDCs: Asia 20.1 17.5 20.5 22.3 22.4 23.2 0.7 8.9 8.1 2.2 6.8 6.8
  LDCs: Islands 24.5 23.6 19.4 22.2 20.3 21.8 0.8 0.2 10.7 20.3 -7.6 35.3
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat database, July 2012.
a  For Eritrea data start in 1992.
 b  For Ethiopia data start in 1992.
 c  For Timor-Leste data start in 2003.
 d  Yemen prior to 1990 includes Yemen (former Arab Republic) and Yemen (former Democratic).
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Annex table 4. Exports and imports of merchandise and services in LDCs, by country groups (geographic), 2006–2011
(Millions of dollars and percentage changes)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
change in 
2010 (%)
change in 
2011 (%)
Merchandise exports
Least developed countries 102,351 128,318 169,315 130,871 166,586 204,834 27.3 23.0
    LDCs: Africa and Haiti 72,901 95,045 130,618 94,654 119,445 145,490 26.2 21.8
    LDCs: Asia 29,181 32,930 38,317 35,902 46,755 58,762 30.2 25.7
    LDCs: Islands 269 343 379 314 386 582 22.7 50.8
Merchandise imports
Least developed countries 101,183 123,768 161,095 153,052 167,628 202,195 9.5 20.6
    LDCs: Africa and Haiti 64,454 80,179 107,030 101,857 105,099 124,089 3.2 18.1
    LDCs: Asia 35,652 42,348 52,504 49,784 60,881 76,273 22.3 25.3
    LDCs: Islands 1,077 1,242 1,561 1,410 1,648 1,833 16.9 11.2
Merchandise trade balance
Least developed countries 1,168 4,550 8,219 -22,181 -1,042 2,639 95.3 353.2
    LDCs: Africa and Haiti 8,448 14,866 23,588 -7,203 14,346 21,402 299.2 49.2
    LDCs: Asia -6,471 -9,418 -14,187 -13,882 -14,126 -17,512 -1.8 -24.0
    LDCs: Islands -809 -898 -1,182 -1,096 -1,262 -1,252 -15.2 0.9
Service exports
Least developed countries 13,283 16,562 20,811 19,748 22,141 25,338 12.1 14.4
    LDCs: Africa and Haiti 8,773 10,896 13,839 12,772 13,786 15,985 7.9 15.9
    LDCs: Asia 4,077 5,152 6,439 6,408 7,508 8,391 17.2 11.8
    LDCs: Islands 433 514 534 568 848 962 49.3 13.5
Service imports
Least developed countries 33,281 43,095 58,824 53,373 58,638 67,798 9.9 15.6
    LDCs: Africa and Haiti 26,494 35,140 49,065 44,057 47,634 55,035 8.1 15.5
    LDCs: Asia 6,240 7,237 8,811 8,303 9,917 11,536 19.4 16.3
    LDCs: Islands 547 718 949 1,012 1,088 1,227 7.5 12.8
Service trade balance
Least developed countries -19,998 -26,533 -38,013 -33,624 -36,497 -42,460 -8.5 -16.3
    LDCs: Africa and Haiti -17,721 -24,244 -35,226 -31,285 -33,848 -39,050 -8.2 -15.4
    LDCs: Asia -2,163 -2,085 -2,372 -1,895 -2,409 -3,145 -27.1 -30.6
    LDCs: Islands -114 -204 -414 -444 -240 -265 46.0 -10.2
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTADstat database, August 2012.
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Annex table 5. Exports and imports of merchandise and services in LDCs, by country groups (export specialization), 2006–2011
(Millions of dollars and percentage changes)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
change in 
2010 (%)
change in 
2011 (%)
Merchandise exports
Oil-exporting LDCs 54,776 72,327 102,267 68,069 85,130 105,631 25.1 24.1
Manufactures-exporting LDCs 16,870 19,201 22,488 21,907 27,975 35,899 27.7 28.3
Services-exporting LDCs 3,447 4,168 5,010 4,237 5,069 6,563 19.6 29.5
Mixed-exporting LDCs 10,678 13,090 15,878 15,242 19,268 21,985 26.4 14.1
Other Primary Commodity-exporting LDCs 16,580 19,531 23,671 21,415 29,145 34,756 36.1 19.3
   Minerals-exporting LDCs 12,915 14,372 17,344 14,384 21,492 26,287 49.4 22.3
Agriculture & Food-exporting LDCs 3,665 5,159 6,327 7,031 7,653 8,469 8.8 10.7
Merchandise imports
Oil-exporting LDCs 27,073 35,452 46,646 48,742 44,237 47,267 -9.2 6.8
Manufactures-exporting LDCs 24,099 26,980 34,012 31,188 39,361 50,274 26.2 27.7
Services-exporting LDCs 12,330 14,732 20,772 19,798 20,925 23,013 5.7 10.0
Mixed-exporting LDCs 17,001 20,921 26,126 24,936 29,417 40,084 18.0 36.3
Other Primary Commodity-exporting LDCs 20,680 25,683 33,539 28,388 33,687 41,556 18.7 23.4
  Minerals-exporting LDCs 13,073 15,800 20,573 16,706 21,003 27,358 25.7 30.3
  Agriculture & Food-exporting LDCs 7,606 9,883 12,966 11,682 12,684 14,198 8.6 11.9
Merchandise trade balance
Oil-exporting LDCs 27,703 36,876 55,621 19,327 40,893 58,364 111.6 42.7
Manufactures-exporting LDCs -7,230 -7,779 -11,524 -9,281 -11,386 -14,376 -22.7 -26.3
Services-exporting LDCs -8,883 -10,564 -15,761 -15,560 -15,856 -16,450 -1.9 -3.7
Mixed-exporting LDCs -6,323 -7,831 -10,248 -9,693 -10,150 -18,100 -4.7 -78.3
Other Primary Commodity-exporting LDCs -4,100 -6,152 -9,868 -6,973 -4,543 -6,800 34.9 -49.7
  Minerals-exporting LDCs -159 -1,428 -3,229 -2,322 489 -1,070 121.0 -319.1
  Agriculture & Food-exporting LDCs -3,941 -4,724 -6,639 -4,651 -5,031 -5,729 -8.2 -13.9
Service exports
Oil-exporting LDCs 1,039 1,683 2,336 2,758 3,162 3,597 14.6 13.8
Manufactures-exporting LDCs 2,914 3,521 4,078 4,077 4,517 5,294 10.8 17.2
Services-exporting LDCs 3,525 4,340 5,917 5,125 5,521 6,690 7.7 21.2
Mixed-exporting LDCs 3,319 4,178 4,669 4,190 4,728 5,339 12.8 12.9
Other Primary Commodity-exporting LDCs 2,484 2,835 3,826 3,633 4,322 4,797 19.0 11.0
   Minerals-exporting LDCs 1,505 1,626 2,314 2,037 1,972 2,257 -3.2 14.5
   Agriculture & Food-exporting LDCs 980 1,210 1,511 1,596 2,350 2,540 47.3 8.1
Service imports
Oil-exporting LDCs 15,183 20,325 30,637 27,105 27,489 32,517 1.4 18.3
Manufactures-exporting LDCs 4,151 4,921 5,922 5,647 7,365 8,481 30.4 15.1
Services-exporting LDCs 4,622 5,969 7,831 7,052 7,135 8,170 1.2 14.5
Mixed-exporting LDCs 3,687 4,437 5,259 5,134 5,710 6,505 11.2 13.9
Other Primary Commodity-exporting LDCs 5,633 7,436 9,213 8,435 10,881 12,738 29.0 17.1
   Minerals-exporting LDCs 3,717 5,068 6,332 5,473 7,026 8,265 28.4 17.6
   Agriculture & Food-exporting LDCs 1,915 2,368 2,881 2,961 3,854 4,473 30.2 16.0
Service trade balance
Oil-exporting LDCs -14,144 -18,641 -28,301 -24,347 -24,328 -28,919 0.1 -18.9
Manufactures-exporting LDCs -1,237 -1,400 -1,843 -1,570 -2,848 -3,187 -81.4 -11.9
Services-exporting LDCs -1,097 -1,629 -1,914 -1,927 -1,614 -1,479 16.3 8.3
Mixed-exporting LDCs -368 -259 -590 -944 -982 -1,166 -4.0 -18.7
Other Primary Commodity-exporting LDCs -3,148 -4,600 -5,387 -4,801 -6,559 -7,942 -36.6 -21.1
  Minerals-exporting LDCs -2,212 -3,442 -4,018 -3,436 -5,055 -6,009 -47.1 -18.9
  Agriculture & Food-exporting LDCs -936 -1,159 -1,370 -1,365 -1,504 -1,933 -10.2 -28.5
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTADstat database, August 2012.
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Annex table 6. Foreign direct investment inflows to LDCs, selected years
(Millions of current dollars)
Country 1985 1990 2000 2009 2010 2011
Afghanistan .. .. 0.2 75.7 211.3 83.4
Angola 278.0 -334.5 878.6 2,205.3 -3,227.2 -5,585.5
Bangladesh -6.7 3.2 578.6 700.2 913.3 1,136.4
Benin -0.1 62.4 59.7 134.3 176.8 118.5
Bhutan .. 1.6 0.0 18.3 16.3 13.9
Burkina Faso -1.4 0.5 23.1 100.9 34.6 7.4
Burundi 1.6 1.3 11.7 0.3 0.8 1.7
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 148.5 539.1 782.6 891.7
Central African Republic 3.0 0.7 0.9 120.5 91.7 109.2
Chad 53.7 9.4 115.2 1,105.5 1,939.7 1,855.0
Comoros .. 0.4 0.1 13.8 3.9 6.8
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 69.2 -14.5 72.0 663.8 2,939.3 1,686.9
Djibouti 0.2 0.1 3.3 99.6 26.8 78.0
Equatorial Guinea 2.4 11.1 154.5 1,636.2 1,369.0 737.1
Eritrea .. .. 27.9 0.0 55.6 18.5
Ethiopia 0.2 12.0 134.6 221.5 288.3 206.1
Gambia -0.5 14.1 43.5 39.6 37.2 36.0
Guinea 1.1 17.9 9.9 140.9 101.4 1,210.8
Guinea-Bissau 1.4 2.0 0.7 17.6 33.2 19.4
Haiti 4.9 8.0 13.3 38.0 150.0 181.0
Kiribati 0.2 0.3 0.7 3.2 3.7 3.9
Lao People's Dem.Rep. -1.6 6.0 33.9 318.6 332.6 450.0
Lesotho 4.8 16.1 31.5 48.0 54.7 52.0
Liberia -16.2 225.2 20.8 217.8 450.0 508.0
Madagascar -0.2 22.4 83.0 1,066.1 860.4 907.4
Malawi 0.5 23.3 39.6 54.7 58.2 56.3
Mali 2.9 5.7 82.4 748.3 405.9 177.8
Mauritania 7.0 6.7 40.1 -3.1 130.5 45.2
Mozambique 0.3 9.2 139.3 892.5 989.0 2,093.5
Myanmar 0.0 225.1 208.0 963.3 450.2 850.0
Nepal 0.7 5.9 -0.5 38.6 86.7 95.5
Niger -9.4 40.8 8.4 790.8 940.3 1,013.6
Rwanda 14.6 7.7 8.1 118.7 42.3 106.0
Samoa 0.4 6.6 -1.2 9.6 1.1 12.0
Sao Tome and Principe .. 0.0 3.8 15.5 24.6 18.0
Senegal -18.9 56.9 62.9 320.0 266.1 286.1
Sierra Leone -31.0 32.4 38.9 74.3 86.6 48.7
Solomon Islands 0.7 10.4 13.0 119.8 237.9 146.4
Somalia -0.7 5.6 0.3 108.0 112.0 102.0
Sudan -3.0 -31.1 392.2 1,816.2 2,063.7 1,936.0
Timor-Leste 0.0 0.0 0.0 49.9 26.9 20.0
Togo 16.3 22.7 41.5 48.5 85.8 53.8
Tuvalu 0.0 0.0 -0.9 2.2 1.5 1.8
Uganda -4.0 -5.9 180.8 841.6 543.9 792.3
United Rep.of Tanzania 14.5 0.0 282.0 952.6 1,022.8 1,095.4
Vanuatu 4.6 13.1 20.3 31.7 41.1 58.2
Yemen 3.2 -130.9 6.4 129.2 -93.3 -712.8
Zambia 51.5 202.8 121.7 694.8 1,729.3 1,981.7
LDCs 444.3 572.8 4,133.3 18,342.5 16,899.2 15,010.9
LDCs: Africa and Haiti 442.8 431.0 3,122.4 15,313.8 13,858.8 11,935.7
LDCs: Asia -4.4 111.0 975.1 2,783.0 2,699.6 2,808.1
LDCs: Islands 6.0 30.8 35.8 245.7 340.8 267.1
Other developing countries 13,548.7 34,570.1 248,516.7 456,513.8 547,002.5 629,911.3
All developing economies 13,993.1 35,142.9 252,650.0 474,856.3 563,901.7 644,922.2
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012, July 2012.
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Annex table 7. Foreign direct investment outflows from LDCs, selected years
(Millions of current dollars)
Country 1985 1990 2000 2009 2010 2011
Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. ..
Angola .. 0.9 .. 6.8 1,340.4 1,300.0
Bangladesh .. 0.5 2.0 29.3 15.4 9.2
Benin .. 0.3 3.6 31.2 -17.9 2.9
Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. ..
Burkina Faso 0.0 -0.6 0.2 8.5 -3.5 4.1
Burundi -1.1 0.0 0.0 .. .. ..
Cambodia .. .. 6.6 18.9 20.6 23.6
Central African Republic 0.6 3.8 .. .. .. ..
Chad 0.3 0.1 .. .. .. ..
Comoros .. 1.1 .. .. .. ..
Democratic Republic of the Congo .. .. -1.8 34.8 7.2 90.9
Djibouti .. .. .. .. .. ..
Equatorial Guinea .. 0.1 -3.6 .. .. ..
Eritrea - - .. .. .. ..
Ethiopia .. .. .. .. .. ..
Gambia .. .. .. .. .. ..
Guinea 0.0 0.1 .. .. .. 5.2
Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. -2.5 5.5 1.1
Haiti .. -8.0 .. .. .. ..
Kiribati .. .. 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5
Lao People's Democratic Republic -0.2 0.2 9.9 1.3 5.7 7.0
Lesotho .. .. .. .. .. ..
Liberia 255.0 5.9 779.9 363.6 369.4 371.7
Madagascar .. 1.3 .. .. .. ..
Malawi .. .. -0.6 .. .. ..
Mali .. 0.2 4.0 -1.0 7.4 2.4
Mauritania .. .. .. 4.3 4.1 4.2
Mozambique .. .. 0.2 -2.8 0.8 -3.4
Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nepal .. .. .. .. .. ..
Niger 1.9 0.0 -0.6 59.3 59.7 48.4
Rwanda .. .. .. .. .. ..
Samoa .. .. .. -1.1 .. -0.6
Sao Tome and Principe .. .. .. 0.2 0.1 0.1
Senegal 3.1 -9.5 0.6 77.1 2.2 66.4
Sierra Leone .. 0.1 .. .. 5.0 ..
Solomon Islands .. .. 0.1 3.0 2.3 3.6
Somalia .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sudan .. .. .. 89.2 66.1 84.5
Timor-Leste - - - .. .. ..
Togo .. .. 0.4 37.4 37.2 20.4
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda .. .. .. .. -3.4 ..
United Republic of Tanzania .. .. .. .. .. ..
Vanuatu .. .. .. 1.2 1.2 0.9
Yemen 0.5 .. -8.8 66.4 70.3 76.6
Zambia .. .. .. 269.6 1,095.4 1,150.2
LDCs 260.1 -3.4 792.3 1,094.8 3,091.3 3,270.0
LDCs: Africa and Haiti 259.8 -5.2 782.4 975.4 2,975.5 3,149.1
LDCs: Asia 0.3 0.7 9.7 115.9 112.0 116.3
LDCs: Islands .. 1.1 0.2 3.5 3.8 4.6
Other developing countries 3,660.5 13,685.8 92,627.0 232,373.5 331,771.7 324,223.1
All developing economies 3,920.6 13,682.4 93,419.4 233,468.3 334,863.0 327,493.1
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012, July 2012.
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Annex table 8. Total external debt and debt service payments of individual LDCs, selected years
(Millions of dollars)
Country External debta Debt serviceb
1990 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 1990 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010
Afghanistan .. .. .. 2,088.9 2,222.6 2,297.2 .. .. .. 7.7 10.2 9.2
Angola 8,592.0 9,407.8 11,833.8 15,100.5 16,616.2 18,562.0 325.9 1,705.3 2,602.1 1,640.6 3,553.7 2,309.0
Bangladesh 12,285.3 15,534.7 18,381.5 22,879.8 23,801.6 24,962.6 735.5 766.5 799.5 888.3 954.4 1,012.7
Benin 1,119.7 1,387.8 1,537.7 916.8 1,072.4 1,221.3 37.1 74.3 47.3 58.3 36.9 42.5
Bhutan 83.5 203.8 649.2 685.5 751.9 898.2 5.2 6.7 6.8 81.5 75.5 84.2
Burkina Faso 832.0 1,422.2 1,994.2 1,669.8 1,821.6 2,053.3 34.3 46.5 45.3 45.0 42.4 50.6
Burundi 906.9 1,108.0 1,321.8 1,438.2 512.7 537.1 42.4 21.9 39.3 19.5 19.5 3.4
Cambodia 1845.0 2,627.9 3,515.3 4,215.0 4,364.0 4,676.1 30.0 31.5 31.0 42.1 49.5 62.2
Central African Republic 698.5 860.0 1,019.6 954.0 394.1 384.8 29.1 14.1 6.5 25.7 31.2 2.3
Chad 514.2 1,088.4 1,584.1 1,750.1 1,746.0 1,733.5 11.8 24.4 54.2 137.2 78.4 73.2
Comoros 187.8 226.1 278.8 279.4 277.6 485.4 1.1 3.2 4.0 12.3 11.8 4.3
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 10,258.6 11,692.4 10,600.3 12,210.5 12,276.0 5,773.7 348.1 24.8 214.2 591.9 622.9 267.6
Djibouti 155.3 258.1 406.4 698.5 755.3 751.3 11.0 13.3 15.6 29.6 35.0 33.9
Equatorial Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Eritrea - 299.9 724.5 961.4 1,018.9 1,009.8 0.0 3.0 20.2 15.6 21.6 22.4
Ethiopiac 8,645.2 5,494.9 6,208.1 2,879.0 5,029.5 7,147.1 236.2 137.9 93.4 111.4 103.2 191.9
Gambia 369.1 483.4 659.8 365.1 459.6 470.2 37.7 21.5 28.5 17.0 18.8 19.6
Guinea 2,478.3 3,066.4 2,898.3 3,093.7 2,915.7 2,923.0 168.3 156.7 163.5 140.6 127.1 87.4
Guinea-Bissau 694.5 947.3 1,013.0 1,085.6 1,117.6 1,094.6 8.4 5.2 6.3 9.6 10.0 17.3
Haiti 916.8 1,172.7 1,327.0 1,950.9 1,325.2 491.8 36.1 44.3 57.2 57.8 44.7 130.9
Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 1,766.0 2,501.3 2,843.8 5,008.2 5,458.1 5,558.8 8.9 40.1 132.3 207.4 219.8 305.2
Lesotho 395.6 671.8 662.0 688.8 704.8 725.9 23.3 61.5 79.5 37.5 38.1 34.5
Liberia 2,055.6 2,792.1 3,897.6 3,128.1 1,655.6 228.0 3.2 0.7 0.9 934.4 64.0 5.5
Madagascar 3,688.9 4,691.2 3,493.5 2,075.6 2,203.2 2,295.2 222.7 116.7 78.8 32.8 50.2 55.8
Malawi 1,556.8 2,704.9 3,183.2 893.7 1,033.3 921.6 132.6 62.9 75.7 31.9 35.7 18.7
Mali 2,468.0 2,960.4 3,200.8 2,031.3 2,070.7 2,326.4 67.8 92.8 99.3 69.0 68.2 61.1
Mauritania 2,113.3 2,377.7 2,308.0 1,985.6 2,047.6 2,461.3 145.7 83.1 65.1 63.2 77.6 109.1
Mozambique 4,600.3 7,205.2 4,152.9 3,392.5 4,045.7 4,123.8 78.5 95.9 78.6 37.3 43.3 89.8
Myanmar 4,695.0 5,974.9 7,013.9 8,001.7 8,185.9 6,351.8 60.4 36.1 71.2 33.3 28.8 687.1
Nepal 1,626.9 2,867.3 3,179.6 3,685.2 3,683.0 3,702.3 67.8 101.7 117.4 161.9 176.6 186.9
Niger 1,757.6 1,708.4 2,017.4 1,002.1 1,102.7 1,126.8 98.7 26.0 40.3 29.5 45.3 27.0
Rwanda 708.0 1,270.3 1,508.9 662.8 748.9 794.6 19.8 35.6 27.6 14.3 11.3 14.5
Samoa 91.8 137.7 167.5 205.6 235.5 308.0 5.4 5.5 5.8 8.0 8.5 10.6
Sao Tome and Principe 150.0 304.0 334.7 130.8 148.8 170.2 2.8 4.3 6.6 2.3 2.1 1.6
Senegal 3,753.9 3,621.6 3,830.5 2,819.6 3,499.0 3,676.9 324.1 224.3 202.5 180.1 199.6 301.8
Sierra Leone 1,176.4 1,189.8 1,750.8 607.1 701.0 778.0 21.1 46.7 17.6 5.7 7.9 11.1
Solomon Islands 120.5 155.4 166.5 165.9 155.9 215.5 11.6 9.1 14.0 15.1 10.0 20.7
Somalia 2,370.3 2,547.9 2,730.3 2,921.6 2,943.7 2,942.4 10.7 0.0 0.1 1.7 0.0 0.0
Sudan 14,762.0 15,983.0 17,474.2 20,105.9 20,746.3 21,845.9 49.7 244.7 398.1 368.1 490.7 492.2
Timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Togo 1,280.6 1,429.6 1,673.3 1,627.3 1,632.9 1,727.8 85.7 29.8 20.8 196.3 55.3 35.1
Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Uganda 2,605.8 3,496.8 4,394.7 2,221.4 2,465.2 2,993.7 144.7 74.0 170.4 73.7 71.1 64.2
United Rep. of Tanzania 6,446.1 7,142.0 8,354.9 5,963.5 7,323.9 8,664.1 179.0 166.6 131.8 64.6 164.2 198.7
Vanuatu 38.2 74.5 82.1 125.8 129.8 148.3 2.4 1.9 2.6 4.5 5.6 5.9
Yemen 6,354.0 5,125.0 5,459.5 6,274.4 6,370.1 6,324.0 169.1 243.3 212.2 284.1 262.7 259.5
Zambia 6,904.8 5,722.5 5,373.2 2,974.5 3,038.9 3,688.8 200.7 185.4 281.4 166.3 169.1 147.4
LDCsd 124,069.3 141,937.0 155,207.0 153,921.4 160,808.6 161,572.8 4,234.9 5,089.9 6,565.6 6,954.9 8,152.5 7,568.5
LDCs: Africa and Haitid 94,825.1 106,204.5 113,134.9 100,175.4 105,024.0 105,474.5 3,134.6 3,840.0 5,162.2 5,206.3 6,337.1 4,918.5
LDCs: Asiad 28,655.8 34,834.9 41,042.7 52,838.6 54,837.0 54,771.0 1,076.9 1,225.9 1,370.3 1,706.3 1,777.5 2,607.1
LDCs: Islandsd 588.3 897.6 1,029.5 907.4 947.6 1,327.3 23.4 24.0 33.1 42.4 38.0 43.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on World Bank, World Development Indicators database, online, July 2012.
a External debt covers both long-term and short term debt as well as the use of IMF credit.
b Debt service on total external debt. 
c Ethiopia includes Eritrea up to 1992.
d LDC aggregates exclude missing data for Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, and for Afghanistan from 1990 to 2005.
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A. Rationale for addressing remittances
and diaspora issues
Remittances have attracted increasing attention in the international 
discourse, partly owing to their remarkable growth over the last decade (Ratha, 
2003; Solimano, 2005; UNECA, 2007; UNDESA, 2012b; UNDP, 2009). A 
growing consensus is emerging that remittances constitute a significant source 
of external financing, whose availability, if managed through appropriate policies, 
could prove particularly valuable for capital-scarce developing countries 
(especially those with larger diasporas). The jury is still out on whether or not 
they are the most stable and predictable source of development finance. While 
some unresolved questions remain as to their macroeconomic impact, a large 
body of evidence suggests that remittances contribute to poverty reduction and 
improved health care and education.
Similarly, there is growing interest in the role that migrants can play as 
“development agents” linking home and destination countries (Melde and 
Ionesco, 2010; World Bank, 2011a). While concerns about the adverse impact 
of “brain drain” remain valid, the recent debate has to some extent shifted 
to how to engage with the diaspora and maximize its potential contribution 
to development, “turning the brain drain into brain gain”. In this respect, the 
emphasis has been placed not only on the saving and investment potential 
of diasporas but also on their latent role as “knowledge brokers” who could 
facilitate the emergence of new trade patterns, technology transfer, skills and 
knowledge exchange.
In this context, the rest of this Report addresses three main issues. 
t 'JSTU
JUQSPWJEFTBCBTFMJOFBTTFTTNFOUPGDVSSFOUQBUUFSOTPGNJHSBUJPOBOE
remittances to LDCs, analysing their importance and economic significance, 
the transaction costs involved, and the associated opportunities and 
challenges. 
t 4FDPOE
JUBTTFTTFTEJBTQPSBFOHBHFNFOUJO-%$TJOSFMBUJPOUPUIFQSPDFTT
of knowledge acquisition and diffusion, shedding light on not only the risks 
stemming from brain drain but also on the potential scope for greater 
knowledge circulation. 
t 'JOBMMZ
 JU QSPWJEFT TQFDJýD QPMJDZ QSPQPTBMT BJNFE BU CFUUFS NPCJMJ[JOH
remittances and engaging diaspora communities for the development of 
LDCs’ productive capacities.
The Istanbul Programme of Action for LDCs (IPoA) identified “Mobilizing 
financial resources for development and capacity-building” as one of the 
priority areas for LDCs for the decade 2011–2020. The programme stresses 
that “Remittances are significant private financial resources for households in 
countries of origin of migration. There is a need for further efforts to lower the 
transaction costs of remittances and create opportunities for development-
oriented investment, bearing in mind that remittances cannot be considered 
as a substitute for foreign direct investment, ODA, debt relief or other public 
sources of finance for development” (para 126).1
With this in mind, it is useful to approach these issues from the perspective of 
the long-standing structural weaknesses that constitute the raison d’être of the 
LDC category. The discussion of remittances (and diaspora savings) can best 
be related to two key macroeconomic constraints hampering the expansion of 
productive capacities in LDCs, namely the low level of investment and persistent 
balance of payments vulnerability.2 Indeed, LDCs’ long-standing need to 
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strengthen skill formation and knowledge creation provides the most appropriate 
entry point to embark on an analysis of the multiple roles that diasporas can play 
in catalysing knowledge circulation and technology transfer.
Capital accumulation in the LDCs has continued to proceed at a 
comparatively slow pace despite the growth acceleration of the last decade. 
With an average investment ratio of 21 per cent of GDP over the last decade 
compared with 26 per cent in other developing countries, LDCs’ long-standing 
infrastructural and productivity gaps are likely to persist if not widen.3 Similarly, 
since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, most LDCs have witnessed 
tangible improvements in terms of literacy rates and primary school enrolment 
but still lag far behind other developing countries in terms of secondary and 
tertiary enrolment.4 Moreover, the limited mobilization of investment in physical 
and human capital has traditionally been compounded by lopsided production 
structures largely focused on primary products and low value-added activities. 
This has typically resulted in heightened dependence on primary commodity 
exports and on imports of foreign manufactures and capital goods, leading — 
with a few exceptions — to chronic current account deficits and heavy reliance 
on foreign savings to finance capital accumulation.5
Moreover, even in the early and mid-2000s, when the constraints posed 
by a lack of investment and foreign exchange had eased somewhat, growth 
translated only weakly into the development of LDCs’ productive capacities, 
which means that its benefits were short-lived. The growth experienced by many 
LDCs (including some of the fastest-growing ones) has been accompanied by 
limited economic diversification — if any — and insufficient employment creation 
outside traditional sectors. This, in turn, has hindered the emergence of high 
value-added activities, since large numbers of workers have remained confined 
to low-productivity jobs in the agriculture and informal sectors. As a result, the 
potential benefits for a very young and increasingly educated population have 
been largely unrealized in most LDCs (Valensisi and Davis, 2011).
Consequently, improved development finance and economic diversification 
towards higher value-added activities continue to pose major challenges for 
the world’s poorest countries. In pursuit of these objectives, all sources of 
financing for development — whether traditional or emerging, private or public 
— should be mobilized in order to sustain the expansion and diversification of 
LDCs’ productive capacities. Accordingly, it is essential that LDC development 
strategies begin to take full cognizance of the development potential underlying 
migration and remittances (as in the case of FDI, aid and other external 
financing flows that have traditionally received far greater attention). Harnessing 
remittances for increasing productive capacities requires that these resources be 
considered pragmatically, with the recognition that these are ultimately private 
sector resources, and taking into account each country’s specificities, while 
avoiding characterizations of this phenomenon as either a “curse” or a “new 
development mantra” (Kapur, 2004; De Haas, 2005).6 Remittances should be 
regarded as one facet of a multi-pronged effort to mobilize adequate sources of 
development finance; as financial inflows which could prove all the more critical 
in times of uncertainty and heightened volatility in the global economy. 
On the other hand, and as stated in the IPoA, the growing attention paid to 
remittances should in no way obscure the fact that, by their very nature, they 
cannot be considered as a substitute for foreign direct investment, ODA, debt 
relief, internal resource mobilization or other sources of finance for development. 
Unlike other types of private capital flows, remittances typically appear to be 
driven primarily by altruistic/solidarity considerations or implicit contracts with 
family members remaining at home (Solimano, 2005; Grabel, 2008).7 They do 
not entail a corresponding accumulation of external debt and, unlike FDI or 
portfolio investment, are not subject to profit repatriation or sudden liquidation in 
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times of crisis. Besides, contrary to public sources of development finance, they 
are comprised of a myriad of (typically small-sized) household-to-household 
transfers, often taking place through informal or quasi-formal channels. However, 
remittance flows are not without potential problems or risks (e.g. the so-called 
“Dutch disease”), which are discussed in chapter 3.
From a policy perspective, the distinctive features of remittances potentially 
provide opportunities for capital-starved economies but also present challenges 
in terms of their mobilization for productive purposes. Governments typically 
have only limited policy space to affect the allocation of remittance income, as 
taxation or mandatory remittance requirements have been largely ineffective 
(Lucas, 2008). Therefore, realizing the benefits of these additional resources for 
investment mainly depends on the ability of the State to create a sustainable and 
development-friendly institutional and macroeconomic environment, to crowd in 
private investment (including on behalf of remittances recipients).
When sent through formal channels, remittances can offer some scope for 
fostering financial deepening, by simultaneously supplementing the availability of 
funds to the financial system and linking up otherwise unbanked households to 
the financial sector. Yet many migrants resort to informal channels precisely as 
a reaction to lack of trust in the financial sector and the often excessive costs 
of formal remittance service providers. The prevalence of informal remittance 
systems limits the ability of recipient countries to make best use of the additional 
hard currency sent by overseas migrants and may have adverse effects on 
monetary and exchange rate variables.
The need for a pragmatic and context-specific policy approach also applies 
to diaspora engagement. While it is true that “brain drain” deprives the world’s 
poorest countries of much-needed human capital and skilled professionals, the 
overwhelming majority of LDC migrants are not highly educated and often move 
to neighbouring countries with a similar level of development as their country of 
origin. This being so, it should be evident that the onus of transferring specialized 
knowledge and technology, when nurturing high-productivity high-value-added 
sectors, cannot (and should not) be placed wholly on the diaspora. Rather, the 
latter should be viewed as a potentially important complement to a country’s 
development strategy — one which could be mobilized strategically within the 
framework of broader policy initiatives to support the development of productive 
capacities. 
In this respect, overseas migrants can play multiple roles in relation to their 
country of origin. Chart 5 provides a schematic representation of the possibilities 
and the multiplicity of roles that diasporas can play in contributing to productive 
capacities in their home countries. For instance, with reference to the expansion 
of productive resources, overseas migrants may provide additional physical 
or financial capital and/or make use of their skills and talents to strengthen 
knowledge accumulation in the home country. This latter aspect may be 
particularly relevant in countries with a sufficiently large pool of specialized 
professionals overseas, and may offset some of the losses stemming from brain 
drain. On the other hand, diaspora communities can enhance entrepreneurial 
capabilities in the home country by actively supporting technology transfer, 
knowledge circulation and diffusion, through virtual, temporary or permanent 
return. Finally, owing to their better knowledge of foreign markets and business 
practices, overseas migrants are well placed to facilitate the establishment of 
new international business and production linkages. Through their networks, 
they may effectively reduce the costs of carrying out market intelligence and 
cost discovery in foreign markets, integrating domestic firms into international 
business networks. 
When sent through formal channels, 
remittances can offer some scope 
for fostering financial deepening.
The need for a pragmatic and 
context-specific policy approach 
also applies to
diaspora engagement.
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to a country’s development strategy 
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broader policy initiatives to support 
the development of productive 
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In view of the high coordination costs involved in engaging with small-scale 
overseas organizations, the effective mobilization of a diaspora for development 
usually depends on the existence of a critical mass of migrants in a given 
destination. Moreover, policies for diaspora engagement must also factor in the 
country-specific patterns of out-migration, in terms of the time horizon (seasonal, 
temporary, circular, or permanent migration), the skill profile of migrants, the 
age groups targeted (for instance overseas students with advanced degrees, 
professionals, or pensioners), and so on. Policies to engage with the diaspora 
are likely to be more promising if they adopt a strategic approach that supports 
the overall developmental objectives of the country.
On the whole, both the effective mobilization of remittances and the 
successful engagement of the diaspora for the development of productive 
capacities warrant a combination of policies at multiple levels. These range from 
“development-friendly” macroeconomic policies aimed at stimulating greater 
use of remittances for productive purposes and broadening the scope for a 
favourable transfer of skills, knowledge and technologies to prudential financial 
and regulatory reforms aimed at reducing transaction costs for remittances 
and providing stable and secure financial contexts, and meso-level policies to 
promote innovation in productive sectors. All this in turn requires a coherent policy 
framework related to migration and remittance issues, and the establishment 
of strategic partnerships to engage diaspora communities in the promotion of 
business linkages, technology transfer, and skills and knowledge circulation.
The rest of this chapter introduces the discussion on remittances and 
diaspora issues by briefly reviewing LDC migration trends. It is important to 
emphasize that the main interest of this Report is not migration per se but rather 
Chart 5. Basic elements of productive capacities in the context of diaspora investment and knowledge
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the potential economic impact of migrants and the policies or measures that 
home countries can introduce to translate this potential into concrete economic 
benefits for society as a whole. 
B. Overview of LDC migration
There is no universally accepted definition of international migration. This 
Report adopts the definition of international migration (IOM, 2008) as “the 
movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual 
residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another 
country”.8 This section aims to explore the nature and extent of contemporary 
LDC migratory patterns, especially those linked to economic factors. 
On a global level, South–North migration is the fastest-growing component 
of permanent international migration in both absolute and relative terms.9 The 
United States remains the most important migrant destination in the world, 
home to one-fifth of the world’s migrants and the top destination for migrants 
from sixty sending countries. Migration to Western Europe remains largely from 
elsewhere in Europe. The oil-rich Gulf States have emerged as major destinations 
for migrants from the Middle East, North Africa and South and Southeast Asia.
Although LDC migration is often assumed to be a South–North phenomenon, 
it has taken on a South–South dimension in recent decades. Only 20 per cent of 
migrants from LDCs emigrated to high-income OECD countries (namely North 
America and Europe) in 2010; around 80 per cent of LDC emigrants migrate 
within the South (see chart 8). While migration from the African LDCs is mostly 
an intraregional phenomenon and often constitutes forced migration, in the 
case of the Asian LDCs, economic motives are more important, and migrants’ 
preferred destinations are India and the Gulf States.
LDC migration has the potential to generate welfare gains for migrants and 
their countries of origin and to reduce poverty (Ratha, 2006). The benefits to 
countries of origin arise mainly through remittances sent home by migrants. 
This Report argues that there may be considerable untapped potential for 
leveraging remittances and other diaspora resources for the benefit of the 
home countries. Nevertheless, migration should not be considered a substitute 
for economic growth and employment generation at home. Indeed, there are 
potential socioeconomic costs of international migration, both for countries of 
origin (e.g. potential loss of skilled human capital, or so-called “brain drain”) and 
destination countries (e.g. social cohesion). Moreover, LDC migrants may be 
adopting increasingly risky strategies to move, often exploring new and diverse 
destinations through formal and informal channels such as human traffickers 
(Adepoju, 2009; Hammar et al., 1997).
As of 2010, the 48 LDCs had a combined population of 832.6 million, almost 
14 per cent of the world population. Some 63 per cent of the LDC population 
lives in Africa (526 million), 36 per cent in Asia (303 million), 0.4 per cent in island 
LDCs (3.4 million). 
1. MAIN TYPES OF LDC MIGRATION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Table 3 lists some of the generic terms and definitions related to migration 
used in this report. Migration may be categorized according to location, type of 
migration and migrant. The seasonality and circularity of LDC migration has been 
Although LDC migration is often 
assumed to be a South–North 
phenomenon, it has taken on
a South–South dimension
in recent decades.
Around 80 per cent of LDC 
emigrants migrate within the South.
In 2010, high-income OECD 
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stressed in several studies (Russell, 1990; Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Vertovec, 
2007, Cali, 2010). Seasonal movements are typically those of adult males seeking 
off-season (i.e. post-harvest) work. Circular migration mainly involves people 
who migrate to augment household income with the clear intention of returning 
to the country of origin. An interesting distinction arises between seasonal and 
transhumance10 movements. In the latter, migrants have established livelihoods 
in two distinct areas, and have access to land and other rural productive assets 
in both. However, seasonal migrants mainly move to work for others, and their 
primary asset is their labour. In some LDCs where migrants are recruited to work 
abroad, contractual arrangements governing this migration require return to the 
country of origin at the end of the contract. Some instances of this include the 
Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Worker’s Programme (for Mexico and the West 
Indies) and LDC emigration to South Africa, where there is a requirement that 
after two years of working in a mine, the migrant workers must return home, 
often repeating the process for several years if their labour remains in demand 
(Tati, 2008). Nonetheless, it is very difficult to estimate the extent of temporary 
migration or to distinguish between it and permanent migration because of 
limited data availability. Most accounts which exist have to be pieced together 
from household surveys mainly conducted at the village level. Yet this distinction 
is likely to be relevant in policy terms for LDCs. For example, the incentives for 
skill development as well as remittance flows would differ between temporary 
and permanent migration.
Making comparisons is difficult owing to the varying definitions used in the 
extensive migration research literature and empirical surveys, but one thing is 
clear: in LDCs, cross-border migration is an important livelihood strategy for 
many households (Ratha, Mohapatra and Saheja, 2011). There are several 
examples of different types of LDC migration, but some general trends can be 
identified. First, given the youthful demographic structure of most LDCs, young 
adults typically move more than older adults (see box 2). This is in part due to 
life-cycle differences between age groups and levels of education (see Leliveld, 
1997). 
Second, in LDCs, men migrate more on average than women (particularly 
in Asian LDCs) due to the persistence of particular gender roles in most rural 
societies where women have primary responsibility for child-rearing and 
domestic tasks. This often limits opportunities for women to migrate, perhaps 
with the key exceptions being young, unmarried women from households where 
they can be absent (i.e. households where several older women already reside) 
or women migrating to join their partners at the destination. Notwithstanding, 
female migration has been increasing recently (Ghosh, 2009). When they do 
migrate, women migrant workers are generally employed in service activities 
(including the care economy), whereas male migrants are more likely to be found 
in the manufacturing, production and construction sectors, in addition to some 
services. 
Third, in LDCs migration is an important livelihood strategy and largely 
operates within a context of temporary migration. The migrant remains part 
of the household and is expected to send remittances home. Fourth, some 
migration occurs as a survival strategy, while some is based on a rational 
income-maximizing strategy to take advantage of regional or international wage 
differentials, irrespective of conditions at home. Educational qualifications and 
skills make such migration more feasible for young people. Indeed, different 
types of migration coexist in the same location, with for example well-educated 
youth moving to urban conurbations for well-paid jobs and unskilled labourers 
looking for any kind of job, whether in a rural or urban locality (Thakur, 1999; 
Hammar et al., 1997).
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2. MIGRATION TO THE LDCS
The global matrices of international migrant stocks spanning the period 
1960–2010, disaggregated by gender and based primarily on the foreign-born 
concept (United Nations, 2011),11 are the main source of globally comparable 
international migration data. As this reflects the stock of migrants living in a given 
foreign country, it is a measure of immigration (this is not the same as a measure 
of emigration, i.e. data for which both the source and destination of migration 
are known, which is based solely on World Bank (2011) estimates in a bilateral 
matrix of 212 countries).12 The global stock of international migrants increased 
from 92 million in 1960 to about 214 million by 2010, with LDCs currently hosting 
some five per cent of the global stock of international migrants.
Between 1990 and 2010, the stock of international immigrants within LDCs 
grew very little. During this time, the migrant stock in the LDCs increased by four 
per cent compared with a global average of 27 per cent and increases of 20 per 
cent in other developing countries and 55 per cent in developed countries.
Refugees constitute a significant but declining share of the total number of 
immigrants residing in LDCs. In 2010, the number of refugees worldwide was 
16.3 million, around eight per cent of the total number of international migrants. 
Refugees accounted for a higher share of the international migrant stock 
hosted in LDCs: their share of the total migrant stock in LDCs peaked at 44 per 
cent in 1995 but then declined rapidly thereafter, reflecting an improvement in 
governance structures in many African countries and a reduction in the level of 
conflict and political instability. The refugee population by country or territory of 
asylum in LDCs was 2.1 million in 2010 (see chart 6), accounting for 18 per cent 
of LDC immigrants.
Females represent about half of the global migrant stock, a share that has 
remained relatively stable over time. Compared with the worldwide distribution 
Table 3. Typical migration definitions
Term Definition Type of migrant
Rural Living in, or characteristic of the countryside — areas where human settlement is 
not the main feature of the landscape.
Unskilled labour
Urban An area of dense settlement, usually dominated by buildings, roads and other 
infrastructure. In population data, urban may be defined by the size of contiguous 
settlement. Periurban: an area close to and surrounding the urban.
Mainly young men
Skilled vs unskilled 
labour
White collar ‘brain 
drain’
Circular migration Migration that is temporary, which is not tied to seasonal factors of agricultural 
production (Ellis1998). Implies that the migrant returns to the area of origin.  Period 
away may be short or long.
Guest worker
Company transfer
Seasonal migration Temporary migration which occurs in slack/off-season of farm work.  Implies 
migration for no more than a few months at a time.
Step migration Migrants first move to a staging point, before moving further afield. For example, 
movement from village to small town to large city, to international destination. 
Chain migration Migration where one member of the household first moves, later to be joined by 
others from the household.
Guest worker
Company transfer
Bi- and multi-locality 
households
A household involving two or more geographical locations. One part of the 
household may live in a rural area (e.g. wife and children) while the other (e.g. 
husband) may live in a regional city or international destination. Stresses interaction 
and mobility between the two areas.
Internal/international 
migration
Internal migration describes people on the move within a country;
international migration involves crossing a recognized international border.
Forced migration This refers to refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and asylum seekers. 
Refugee status is conferred on international migrants when a particular set of 
conditions linked to oppression and fear of persecution in one’s home country are 
satisfied. Asylum seekers are those awaiting the award of refugee status.
Refugees
Source: Adapted from Toit, 1990; McDowell and de Haan, 1997; Widgren and Martin, 2002.
Refugees constitute a significant but 
declining share of the total number 
of immigrants residing in LDCs. 
Their share of the total migrant stock 
in LDCs peaked at 44 per cent
in 1995 but then declined
rapidly thereafter.
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(49 per cent), the share of female migrants resident in LDCs is slightly lower, 
but has stayed the same at 5.4 million (47.6 per cent) over the past decade 
(see chart 6). The number of female migrants resident in LDCs rose by five per 
cent during the period 2000–2010. It also appears that the pattern of female 
migration is changing, as women increasingly migrate alone, rather than primarily 
as dependents of male migrants (United Nations, 2008). The topic of gender 
and LDC migration is also discussed in box 1.
Chart 6. The international migrant stock resident within LDCs 1990–2010
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Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2011). Trends in International Migrant Stock: 
Migrants by Age and Sex (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2011). 
Box. 1 Gender and LDC migration
Female migration has risen mainly due to pull factors, especially growing demand for female labour in high-income countries. 
This can be linked to globalization, particularly the globalization of the care economy (including domestic service and health 
services), via the restructuring of the labour force and the generation of job opportunities specifically for women migrant 
workers. In Europe and North America, many migrant women find employment as domestic workers or the broader service 
sector. Some enter the entertainment sector, including the sex trade (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003). Given that most 
high-income OECD households are now dual income (around 65 per cent), in 2007, an estimated six out of 10 women with 
dependent children (aged 0-16) were in paid employment (OECD, 2011a). This has generated an increase in the outsourcing 
of domestic work, creating job opportunities for LDC migrants as nannies and housekeepers. North America and Europe 
have ageing populations, creating more demand for elderly care and public health related services, which is increasingly 
being addressed through female migrant labour (Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Mahler and Pessar, 2001). A unique element of 
this pattern of female migration concerns what has been called “diverted mothering” — the creation of transnational families 
and potentially new deficits of care and nurturing in LDCs resulting from the separation of mothers and spouses from their 
families; often, another female member of the extended family (mother, sister, eldest daughter, etc.) takes over the care of the 
female migrant’s children (Jones, 2008).
Migration can provide women with employment opportunities and the ability to improve their living standards in their 
country of origin. For example, Goldstein et al, (2000) and Essim et al., (2004) find that in Ethiopia, women migrate more than 
men, primarily for work-related reasons (mainly in domestic service). Migration can also provide occupational and educational 
opportunities for women that are often unavailable in their country of origin (Ghosh, 2009).
As previously noted, women from LDCs migrate less than men on average (particularly in Asian LDCs) due to the persistence 
of gender roles in most societies, whereby women have primary responsibility for child-rearing and domestic tasks. This 
often limits opportunities for women to migrate, with typical exceptions being young, unmarried women from households 
where they can be absent because of the presence of older women members, or women migrating to join their partners at 
the destination. Most female migrants are concentrated in low-paid care, health and light manufacturing assembly sectors.
The pattern of female migration is 
changing, as women increasingly 
migrate alone, rather than primarily 
as dependents of male migrants.
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Box. 2 Rural–urban drift and demographic factors driving LDC migration
The world’s main migrations have been predominantly from rural to urban areas, and internal migration has been a major 
issue in development policy since the last century. Some of the world’s most populous countries such as India, as well as the 
LDCs, are still predominantly rural, but this too is changing with more rapid urbanization.
The LDC population is projected to grow rapidly from around 850 million in 2011 to 1.2 billion by 2030 (United Nations, 
2011). The economically active population (15 to 64 year old) is forecast to nearly double between 2011 and 2030. As a 
consequence, LDCs may need to create an estimated 170 million new jobs by 2030 in order to absorb new labour market 
entrants. This is a challenging task: although GDP in LDCs grew at nearly seven per cent per year during the 2000s, the rate 
of job creation was a mere 2.9 per cent (ILO, 2011). Most LDCs experienced jobless growth, with open unemployment at an 
average of six per cent during this decade (ILO, 2011). 
Demographic dynamics in the LDCs appear to be sluggish and the youthful population structure is set to persist in the 
medium term (Valensisi and Davis, 2011). These demographic dynamics, together with high labour force participation rates, 
are likely to put increased pressure on domestic labour markets. Most LDCs continue to be characterized by a large rural 
population, with the notable exception of a few mostly small countries (Angola, Djibouti, Gambia, Liberia, Sao Tome and 
Principe). In 2010, less than one-third of the LDC population lived in urban areas.
The share of rural to total population in LDCs has steadily declined since 1980, and Asia has seen a particularly rapid 
decline since 1995. On average, annual growth of the urban population during 2000–2010 was four per cent for all LDCs, 
compared with 1.7 per cent for the rural population. In Africa, the figures were 4.3 per cent and 2.1 per cent respectively, as 
against 3.6 per cent and 1.1 per cent for Asia. 
Where the incidence of migration has been recorded, the evidence is that migration is quite common, with 10 to 50 per 
cent of surveyed households typically having an adult migrant (World Bank, 2011b). This tends to involve young men more 
than other older persons and females. Migration levels are often higher from areas of low potential for farming, but much also 
depends on opportunity to move and awareness of the possibilities, as well as social networks and other enabling features 
(United Nations, 2008; McDowell and de Haan, 1997). Migration does not always imply a definitive break, as an individual 
often departs as part of a household livelihood strategy, in which many migrants return.
3. PATTERNS OF LDC EMIGRATION
As previously noted, the main determinants of LDC emigration may be 
classified as distress-push or demand-pull drivers. Distress-push emigration may 
be described as following from constraint-related motives (e.g. environmental 
degradation, poverty, displacement, conflict); whereas demand-pull emigration is 
driven by a desire to exploit new economic opportunities (e.g. wage differentials 
or employment prospects).
Chart 7 shows that emigration from LDCs grew rapidly during the period 
1990–2010. With 27.5 million emigrants in 2010, LDCs as a whole accounted 
for 13 per cent of global emigration stocks or approximately 3.3 per cent of the 
LDC population (table 4). Over 2000–2010, the increase in emigrant stocks was 
most rapid for African LDCs. 
The LDC regions where emigrants account for the highest share of population 
are the Pacific Island regions at 13 per cent, and Haiti in the Americas at 10 per 
cent. Inhabitants of island LDCs appear to have a higher propensity to emigrate 
than other LDCs and developing countries, mostly in the form of temporary 
Table 4. LDC stock of emigrants, by regions, 1990–2010
LDC regions
Emigration stock
Regional share of
LDC total emigration 
stock
(%)
Regional emigrant 
stock as share of 
total population 
(%)
Percentage 
change in 
emigrant stock 
(%)
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 2000–2010
LDC Africa 7,676,309 9,934,059 15,183,115 47 51 55 3 3 3 53
LDC Americas 516,979 777,935 1,009,751 3 4 4 7 9 10 30
LDC Asia 7,991,115 8,521,202 11,147,518 49 44 41 4 3 4 31
LDC Pacific 87,379 121,642 136,124 1 1 0 13 14 13 12
LDC Total 16,271,782 19,354,838 27,476,508 3.2 2.9 3.3 42
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on Ratha and Shaw (2007) updated with additional data for 71 destination countries as 
described in World Bank (2011b).
Emigration from LDCs grew rapidly 
during the period 1990–2010. In 
2010, LDCs as a whole accounted 
for 13 per cent of global emigration 
stocks or approximately 3.3 per cent 
of the LDC population.
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labour migration for work (chart 7). LDC Pacific island emigrants mainly migrate 
to Australia and New Zealand, both of which have initiated temporary seasonal 
labour schemes that attract such migrants.
The destination of emigrants from LDCs varies across regions (chart 8a). 
Most LDC emigrants go to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. High 
migration within sub-Saharan Africa probably reflects the facts that (a) much 
of African migration is forced (refugee flows) and by poor people, as a result of 
which proximity is crucial; and (b) Africans generally face great difficulty entering 
other countries. Among the high-income regions, only the Gulf States have a 
high share of South Asians, and no country has a high share of Africans. Chart 
8b shows that around 80 per cent of LDC migrants migrate within the South, as 
a result of which LDCs and ODCs are important countries of destination. 
Globally, developed countries tend to accept skilled immigrants, but 
increasingly erect barriers to exclude the unskilled unless there is a high level 
of demand for their labour in particular sectors (e.g. agriculture or construction) 
(UNDP, 2009). LDC migrants tend to be younger than those from other 
countries, with a median age of 29 years, compared with 34 in other developing 
countries and 43 in the developed countries (Valensisi and Davis, 2011; Melde 
and Ionesco, 2010). This is closely associated with educational attainment, as 
the majority of emigrants who have attained at least tertiary education tend to 
migrate to developed countries (United Nations, 2010b). In fact, Haiti (83 per 
cent), Samoa (76 per cent), the Gambia (63 per cent) and Sierra Leone (53 per 
cent) have the highest emigration rates13 of tertiary-educated LDC populations 
(World Bank, 2011a). The main LDC emigration corridors are in the South (chart 
9). The main countries of emigration in 2010 were Bangladesh, with 4.9 million 
emigrants, and Afghanistan, with two million emigrants.
Chart 7. LDC stock of emigrants, 1990–2010
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Chart 8. Destination of emigrants from LDCs: (a) regional breakdown, (b) high-income OECD and ODCs, 2010
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on Ratha and Shaw (2007), updated with additional data for 71 destination countries as 
described in World Bank (2011b).
Note: The high-income OECD category is comprised of the United States of America, Canada and Europe.
The key determinants of LDC emigration appear to be socioeconomic 
circumstances, wage differentials (rural–urban as well as international), armed 
conflict and political unrest, along with natural disasters and climate-induced 
migration. Nonetheless, despite the LDCs’ relative lack of productive capacities 
and higher average rates of poverty, they have a similar emigration rate to the 
global average of three per cent, which is in fact lower than the South American 
emigration rate. 
Most LDC South–South migration tends to take place between neighbouring 
countries, where wage differentials are in general much smaller than in South–
North migration (see chart 9). Nonetheless, despite the wage differential, the 
welfare and income gains from this pattern of migration are estimated to be 
quite significant (Ratha, 2006; Ratha and Shaw, 2007).14
Inhabitants of Asian and Pacific LDCs appear to have higher propensities to 
migrate to non-LDCs than those of African LDCs, which recorded the highest 
share of emigrants residing in other LDCs in 2010. Chart 10 shows that the main 
sources of intra-LDC migration were in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Eritrea, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.
In 2010, the LDCs with the highest share of emigrants as a percentage of the 
total LDC emigrant stocks were Bangladesh (19 per cent), Afghanistan (eight 
per cent), Burkina Faso (six per cent) and Mozambique (four per cent). These 
countries were also part of the main migration corridors: Bangladesh — India, 
Afghanistan — Iran, Burkina Faso — Cote d’Ivoire, Yemen — Saudi Arabia and 
Nepal — India (table 5). Asian LDCs such as Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen 
and Nepal tend to have India or the Middle East as the first or second country 
The key determinants of 
LDC emigration appear to be 
socioeconomic circumstances, 
wage differentials (rural–urban 
as well as international), armed 
conflict and political unrest, along 
with natural disasters and climate-
induced migration.
Inhabitants of Asian and Pacific 
LDCs appear to have higher 
propensities to migrate to non-LDCs 
than those of African LDCs.
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of destination. For African LDCs, the key emigration corridors are within Africa, 
although 34 per cent of Sudan’s emigrants migrate to the Middle East, namely 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Most Haitians migrate to the USA (54 per cent) and 
the Dominican Republic (28 per cent).
4. CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of this chapter, we discussed key migration concepts such 
as circular, temporary or permanent migration, step, chain and forced migration. 
In the context of the LDCs, circular migration concepts may reflect the pattern 
of migration most commonly observed, namely, non-permanent (often seasonal) 
movements within and across national boundaries between the countries of 
destination and origin. 
It is worth noting that the vast majority of people in the LDCs do not migrate. 
The data presented in this chapter show that only some three per cent of the 
world’s population and in the case of LDCs 3.3 per cent are migrants living 
outside their country of birth (see also Ratha and Shaw, 2007). As previously 
noted, approximately 80 per cent of LDC migrants migrate within the South, 
as a result of which LDCs and ODCs are important countries of destination. 
Moreover, as far as LDCs are concerned, cross-border migration is a key 
livelihood strategy for many households (Ratha et al., 2011). For example, intra-
African LDC migration is significant in terms of scale and should be an important 
aspect of future African Union policy elaboration on labour markets, migration 
and refugee management.
Migration in some cases is a conscious household decision about the 
allocation of labour to where it earns its highest net returns, and some of these 
flows effectively overcome limitations in domestic insurance and capital markets. 
In general, economic motivations may be a strong determinant of migration; 
Chart 10. LDCs with highest numbers of emigrants residing in other LDCs, 2010
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For African LDCs, the key emigration 
corridors are within Africa.
Intra-African LDC migration is 
significant in terms of scale and 
should be an important aspect 
of future African Union policy 
elaboration on labour markets, 
migration and refugee management.
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however, it is important to note that migration is substantially influenced by 
information about opportunities, networks and by social contacts that facilitate 
it.
As previously noted, given high rates of population and labour force growth 
and declining agricultural productivity, rural-to-urban migration may continue 
to outpace the capacity of cities to absorb large influxes of new labour. This 
has the potential to generate more emigration abroad, especially among youth. 
Indeed, it could be argued that due to the lack of employment opportunities 
(what the ILO terms the “decent work deficit”) in LDCs, youth emigration has 
led to higher levels of irregular and undocumented international migration (IOM, 
2008). Accordingly, for LDCs it is essential that greater emphasis be placed on 
creating more domestic employment and educational opportunities to upgrade 
skill levels in order to help check the rising tendency of irregular migration.
However, migration has rapidly become a phenomenon that LDCs can no 
longer afford to ignore. South–South migration is also becoming more important 
for LDCs. For most LDCs (particularly in Africa), international migration is 
dominated by intraregional movements, often of refugees and seasonal (often 
undocumented) labour migrants. In addition, female migration is increasing and 
there is growing diversification of migration destinations.
A high proportion of migrants from LDCs (especially African LDCs) tend to 
fall into the refugee category, reflecting forced migration. As is the case with 
conventional economic migration, when mass forced migration occurs, there 
is significant loss of human and financial capital, of labour and skilled workers 
in the country of origin. In the case of LDCs, most of this forced migration is 
usually to neighbouring countries and can have damaging short-term effects, 
particularly in terms of strains on host resources (Lucas, 2008; Wahba and 
Zenou, 2011; World Bank, 2011a). Despite a declining trend, one out of five 
refugees worldwide still received asylum in an LDC — a disproportionate burden 
on national budgets and economic development that needs to be better shared 
with more developed countries.
Migration is increasingly an international policy priority for LDCs as well as 
ODCs and high-income OECD countries due to both social policy and economic 
concerns about managing both migrant labour flows and refugees. In the 
African context, for example, in July 2001 the Council of Ministers of the African 
Union met in Lusaka with the aim of addressing emerging migratory patterns 
and ensuring the integration of migration and related issues into national and 
regional agendas for security, stability, development and cooperation. The 
meeting also agreed to work towards fostering the free movement of people and 
strengthening intra- and inter-regional cooperation in migration matters (African 
Union, 2006; African Union Commission, 2004). Since 1996, both the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community 
(EAC) have successfully adopted full free movement of labour conventions. 
Several international initiatives and policies have also emerged around 
the need to develop effective migration policies on a global level. The Global 
Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) has to some extent promoted 
international dialogue. Similarly, the Global Migration Group (GMG)15 has played 
an important role in fostering better coordination and supporting the activities 
of Member States (for example, the collaboration between UNHCR and the 
International Organization for Migration in 2011 to evacuate foreign workers 
from Libya).
The improvement of international cooperation on migration and development 
in LDCs is required to optimize migrant contributions at all levels. Thus, at the 
bilateral and regional levels, there is a need for further progress to strengthen 
international cooperation.
For LDCs it is essential that greater 
emphasis be placed on creating 
more domestic employment 
and educational opportunities 
to upgrade skill levels in order to 
help check the rising tendency of 
irregular migration.
Despite a declining trend, one out 
of five refugees worldwide still 
received asylum in an LDC — a 
disproportionate burden on national 
budgets and economic development 
that needs to be better shared with 
more developed countries.
Migration is increasingly an 
international policy priority for LDCs 
as well as ODCs and high-income 
OECD countries due to both social 
policy and economic concerns 
about managing both migrant labour 
flows and refugees.
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Notes
  1 In contrast, in the early 2000s, remittances and diaspora engagement were 
overlooked in the Brussels Programme of Action for the LDCs in 2001 and were 
barely mentioned in the final document of the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for 
Development in 2002.
  2 On the analysis of economic development from the standpoint of balance of payments 
constrained economies refer, among others, to (Thirlwall, 2011, 1979; Chenery and 
Bruno, 1962; UNCTAD, 2006).
  3 Over the 2000–2010 period, the investment ratio barely reached 20 per cent of GDP 
for both the median LDC and the weighted average of the LDC group.
  4 In 2010, school enrolment rates for primary, secondary, and tertiary education were 
respectively 85 per cent, 32 per cent and 6 per cent in the LDCs, compared with 87 
per cent, 54 per cent and 20 per cent in other developing countries.
  5 Notwithstanding the recent commodity boom (2002–2008), over the past decade 
current account deficits in the median LDC averaged 6.5 per cent of GDP, with the 
LDC group as a whole posting a smaller but still negative balance (2.8 per cent).
  6 The two expressions are borrowed respectively from Abdih et al. (2012) and Kapur 
(2004).
  7 The explanation of remitting behaviour as an implicit intertemporal contract 
arrangement among family members goes as follows (Poirine, 1997; Brown, 1997). In 
a first stage, family members support the prospective migrant by covering the costs 
of migration (and possibly of specific human capital accumulation); expenditures 
which are typically paid upfront and may constitute a substantial share of his/her 
income. In general, the underlying “investment decision” on the part of the household 
may stem from the expectation of higher income streams once the migrant finds a job 
abroad or from the desire to diversify the sources of household income. In either case, 
once the migrant is settled abroad and has found a job, he/she will repay the implicit 
loan by transferring resources back to his/her family in the form of remittances. The 
enforcement of the implicit contract typically stems from family trust, solidarity and 
on the cost of retaliation by household and community members for breaching the 
agreement. 
  8 The importance of the concept of circular migration is clear, as it offers destination 
countries a steady supply of needed workers in both skilled and unskilled occupations 
without the requirements of long-term integration. Patterns of circular migration have 
the potential of providing “win-win” benefits for both countries of origin (which can 
benefit from the inflow of remittances while migrants are abroad and their investments 
and skills upon return) and countries of destination or safer legal migration).
  9 It may also be the case that temporary migration is faster for South–South (IOM, 
2008). 
10 Transhumance migration is the seasonal movement of people with their livestock 
between fixed summer and winter pastures. The term is also used to denote nomadic 
pastoralism, the migration of people and livestock over longer distances.
11 For most countries, the definition of the stock of international migrants is the stock of 
foreign-born residents (close to 80 per cent of the countries), but the stock of foreign-
nationals is used for some countries (close to 20 per cent of the countries). It includes 
refugees. The data used to estimate the international migrant stock at a particular 
time are obtained mainly from population censuses. The estimates are derived from 
the data on foreign-born population — people who have residence in one country 
but were born in another country. It does not account for all international migrants, 
as many are undocumented (illegal) and are thus not reflected in the data presented 
(United Nations, 2011).
12 In the World Bank data set, over one thousand census and population register 
records are combined to construct decennial matrices corresponding to the last five 
completed census rounds. It provides a comprehensive picture of bilateral global 
migration (i.e. the volume and rate of emigration between countries) since 1960. As 
previously noted, this data is available only on a decadal basis.
13 In this Report, we define the rate of emigration (or emigration rate) of a given country 
as the total number of emigrants expressed as a share of the total population.
14 In order to evaluate the potential gains from migration for developing countries 
and to illustrate key channels through which migration affects welfare, (Ratha and 
Shaw, 2007) undertook a model-based simulation of the economic impact of a three 
per cent rise in industrial countries’ labour force achieved through migration from 
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developing countries. The assumed increase, roughly one-eighth of a percentage 
point a year, is close to that observed over the 1970–2000 period. The assumed rise 
in migration — small relative to the labour force of high-income countries but large 
relative to the existing stock of migrants — would generate large increases in global 
welfare. Migrants’ real incomes roughly triple, while natives in industrial countries and 
those remaining in origin countries experience modest gains. By contrast, existing 
migrants in industrial countries experience significant losses, as they are assumed to 
be relatively close substitutes for the new migrants (Ratha and Shaw, 2007).
15 The Global Migration Group (GMG) is an inter-agency group bringing together heads 
of agencies to promote the wider application of all relevant international instruments 
and norms relating to migration, and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, 
comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue of international 
migration.
3CHAPTER
REMITTANCES AND THE LDCS:
MAGNITUDE, IMPACTS AND COSTS
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A. Introduction
In recent years, remittances as a potential source of development finance 
have received greater attention from international policymakers. There is also a 
growing body of economic and social research highlighting the determinants, 
impact and significance of remittances in developing countries. In addressing 
these issues in an LDC context, the present chapter starts from the perspective 
that remittances may have multifaceted and significant impacts on recipient 
households, as well as at a regional and macroeconomic level. Remittances 
should therefore be regarded as an additional facet of LDCs’ multi-pronged 
efforts to mobilize adequate sources of development finance.
Several empirical studies have shown that many of the effects remittances 
have — whether positive or negative — are contingent upon the financial, 
institutional and macroeconomic setting in recipient countries. Policy can 
therefore play a fundamental role in enhancing the developmental impact of 
remittances and harnessing resources for structural transformation.
Against this background, the primary objective of this chapter is to provide an 
evidence-based assessment of (a) current patterns of remittances to LDCs; (b) 
their importance for recipient LDC economies and the associated development 
opportunities and challenges; and (c) the transaction costs involved in remitting 
to LDCs. Finally, the chapter outlines some key policy issues related to 
remittances, which will be elaborated upon in chapter 4.
B. The magnitude of remittances for LDCs
1. LDCS FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Before entering into a detailed discussion of remittance flows, a few 
considerations are needed about the data used in this report. The lack of 
systematic and reliable data invariably constrains the analysis of international 
migration and remittances, as openly acknowledged in the literature (World Bank 
2006a, Grabel 2008, UNDP 2009, Melde and Ionesco 2010, among others). 
These data limitations, which are particularly pronounced in the LDC context, 
are discussed in detail in box 3. 
Even with the caveats of data problems, the international debate increasingly 
recognizes that remittances constitute a sizable and relatively stable source 
of external financing, whose availability could prove particularly valuable for 
developing countries. After FDI, recorded remittances constitute the second 
largest external financial flow to developing countries, and their value far outstrips 
total ODA, although, unlike the latter, they are not necessarily directed from rich 
to poor countries. 
The expansion of the global value of remittances accelerated markedly during 
the early and mid-2000s. They nearly doubled between 1990 and 2000 (chart 
11) and then tripled once again in the following decade, touching $489 billion in 
2011 notwithstanding the global financial crisis. Such a fast pace of growth is 
remarkable even when compared with corresponding trends of other financial 
flows.1 Moreover, with the rate of emigration hovering around three per cent 
worldwide for the last 25 years, a similar boom of recorded remittances reflects 
not only the increase in migrant stock proceeding in tandem with demographic 
dynamics but also a sharp rise in the average amount remitted per migrant.2
Remittances may have multifaceted 
and significant impacts on recipient 
households, as well as at a regional 
and macroeconomic level; they 
should therefore be regarded 
as an additional facet of LDCs’ 
multi-pronged efforts to mobilize 
adequate sources of development 
finance.
The international debate increasingly 
recognizes that remittances 
constitute a sizable and relatively 
stable source of external financing, 
whose availability could prove 
particularly valuable for developing 
countries. 
The global value of remittances 
doubled between 1990 and 2000 
and then tripled once again in the 
following decade, touching
$489 billion in 2011.
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Box 3. Remittances, definitional issues and data limitations
According to the IMF’s Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, remittances represent a source 
of household income from abroad arising from the temporary or permanent movement of people to foreign economies (IMF, 
2010). In line with common practice, in this chapter remittances are intended, unless otherwise specified, as the sum of three 
distinct items recorded in the balance of payment: 
(a) Workers’ remittances, which are recorded under the heading “current transfers” in the current account, and consist 
of “all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from nonresident households” 
(IMF 2011, A5.7 page 273);1
(b) Compensation of employees, recorded under the “primary income” subcategory of the current account, and referring 
to “the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not 
resident and of residents employed by nonresident entities” (IMF 2011, A5.6 page 272); and 
(c) Capital transfers between households which are reported in the capital account.
Though some empirical works focus only on the item “workers’ remittances”, the broader definition used here, which 
corresponds to IMF’s notion of “personal remittances” (IMF 2011), is believed to capture more adequately the size of workers’ 
remittances.
Leaving aside definitional issues, three main sets of problems limit the overall quality of existing remittances statistics, as 
openly acknowledged in the literature (World Bank, 2006a; Grabel, 2008; UNDP, 2009; Melde and Ionesco, 2010, among 
others). First, several countries do not report remittances data, thereby reducing the coverage of available statistics regardless 
of the definition of remittances used. This is the case, for instance, of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and Somalia, all of which are believed to receive significant remittance flows. As noted in Kapur 2004, these gaps 
in data availability refer in many instances to those countries, such as Afghanistan or Somalia, where persistent economic 
difficulties may render remittances even more critical to a household’s livelihood and economic activity.
Second, countries reporting data sometimes fail to implement in a standardized manner the IMF guidelines concerning 
the classification of remittances’ flows. The latter problem arises above all with the distinction between “workers’ remittances” 
and “compensation of the employees”. Although data coverage and comparability have significantly improved over the last 
decade, as a consequence of these persistent limitations they are still incomplete, particularly in the context of the LDCs. 
Another clear example of the poor data quality is the fact that the worldwide sum of remittance inflows does not match the 
sum of outflows: in 2009, they were respectively $416 billion and $282 billion (World Bank, 2011).2
Third, official statistics only record those sums which transit through formal intermediaries (banks, bureaux de change, 
money transfer operators, etc.); and not in-kind transfers or other informal channels such as “hawala” systems.3 In this 
regard, World Bank estimates suggest that informal flows could add at least 50 per cent to the reported remittances flows, 
with significant variation across regions (Maimbo et al., 2003 and World Bank 2006a). This measurement problem is likely to 
be particularly acute in the case of LDCs, given that informal channels tend to be used disproportionately where the financial 
sector is either absent — as in conflict and post-conflict countries — or in any case weak (World Bank 2006a). According 
to Freund and Spatafora (2005), for instance, informal remittances accounted for 54 per cent of the total in Bangladesh 
and an astounding 80 per cent of the total in Uganda. In the same vein, Maimbo et al. (2003) place the share of unreported 
remittances in Sudan and Tanzania at 55 and 58 per cent, respectively. 
1  According to IMF’s 2011 Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (6th edition), the traditional denomination 
“workers remittances” is now to be replaced by “personal transfers” (A5.7 page 273).
2  In the text below, unless otherwise specified the term “remittances” will be used to refer to “remittance inflows”.
3  While historically associated with the Middle East and South Asia, informal fund transfer systems are now widely used in the whole 
developing world. They go under different names in various regions: Hawala in Arab countries, Fei-Ch’ien in China, Padala in the Philippines, 
Hundi in India, Hui Kuan in Hong Kong, and Phei Kwan in Thailand.
In fact, all regions of the world have witnessed significant expansions in 
remittance receipts (chart 12), with generalized acceleration in the last decade.3
The increase in global remittances is chiefly driven by the surge of inflows to 
developing countries, which include many of the world’s largest remittances 
recipients. Indeed, since remittance inflows to transition economies and 
developing countries alike — whether LDCs or non-LDCs — have grown at 
a much faster rate in the past two decades than those directed to developed 
economies, the developed economies’ share of world remittances has 
been steadily declining (chart 13). At present, developed countries receive 
approximately 25 per cent of the world’s total remittances, down from 50 per 
cent of the total in the early 1990s. Conversely, developing countries excluding 
LDCs account for upwards of 60 per cent of the total, while LDCs and transition 
economies receive roughly six per cent each. 
The increase in global remittances is 
chiefly driven by the surge of inflows 
to developing countries. The fallout 
of the global financial crisis appears 
to have reinforced this prominence.
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Chart 11. Migrants’ remittances inflows, by region, 1980–2011 
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Source:  UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTADstat database.
Chart 12. Growth rate of remittances receipts, by decade and region
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Chart 13. Migrants’ remittances, 1980–2011
(Share of world total remittances by region)
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The fallout of the global financial crisis appears to have reinforced this 
prominence of developing countries. Remittances to LDCs continued their 
upward trend notwithstanding the global recession, albeit at a much slower pace, 
while inflows to other developing countries, as well as transition economies, 
suffered a slump in 2009 but quickly rebounded. Conversely, three years after 
the onset of the crisis, remittances inflows to developed economies remain 
significantly below their pre-crisis peak.
In addition, it is likely that the burgeoning importance of developing countries 
with respect to global remittances is even more pronounced than official figures 
indicate. World Bank estimates suggest that informal flows could add at least 
50 per cent to reported remittances flows, and developing countries are likely to 
account for the bulk of these unreported transfers (World Bank 2006a).
With regard to the LDCs, remittance receipts climbed from $3.5 billion in 
1990 to $6.3 billion in 2000, subsequently accelerating further to touch nearly 
$27 billion in 2011. A number of concurring factors explain such a rapid surge, 
especially when the notorious limitations of remittance data are taken into 
consideration (see box 2). The boom in LDC remittances partly reflects the 
steady increase in the stock of emigrants originating from LDCs, from 16 million 
people in 1990 to 19 million in 2000, and as many as 27 million in 2010 (i.e. 
a 42 per cent increase in the stock of LDC emigrants during the last decade). 
In part, it may also follow from a gradual rise in the importance of “economic 
migration” (especially to fast-growing developing countries) and since 1995 a 
corresponding decline in the number of refugees and forced migrants, who tend 
to remit much lower sums. In addition to these factors, as the number of LDCs 
reporting remittance data has grown from 22 in the year 1980 to 39 since 2006, 
the increase in total remittances also depends, at least to some extent, on the 
improved quality of the data.4 Nonetheless, the average amount remitted by each 
Remittance receipts to the LDCs 
climbed from $3.5 billion in 1990 to 
$6.3 billion in 2000, subsequently 
accelerating further to touch nearly 
$27 billion in 2011.
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Chart 14. Remittances, FDI and ODA inflows to LDCs
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LDC emigrant also appears to have increased over the period considered. This 
may be partly due to gradual improvements in migrants’ earnings translating into 
larger remittance streams; it is likely, however, that the rise in LDC remittances 
also reflects the increasing utilization of formal remittance channels. The latter, 
in turn, has been stimulated by the broadening of services provided, the slow 
but steady reduction in the associated costs, and the tightening of international 
financial controls.5
The magnitude of remittance inflows to the LDCs is particularly noteworthy in 
comparison with other financial inflows.6 Undoubtedly, net ODA disbursements 
(excluding debt relief) continue to represent the main source of external financing 
for the world poorest countries, having reached approximately $42 billion in 
2010 (chart 14). Yet since 2004 — and for most of the period considered here 
— remittances consistently represented the second-largest source of foreign 
financing for the LDCs. Preliminary data for 2011 suggest that they totalled 
$26 billion, that is, 1.8 times the corresponding value of FDI inflows ($15 billion) 
Moreover, as global recovery falters and austerity takes hold in donor countries, 
they may well prove more resilient than other capital flows.
The value of remittances relative to GDP has historically been much greater 
in the LDCs than in either developed or other developing regions (chart 15). In 
2010, remittances to the LDCs reached 4.4 per cent of their aggregate GDP, 
three times higher than for other developing countries and 14 times higher than 
for developed economies. Significantly, this ratio remained high throughout the 
2000s, when most LDCs were enjoying unprecedented GDP growth.7
Similarly, remittances to LDCs were equivalent to nearly 15 per cent of total 
export revenues in 2011, more than three times as much as in other developing 
countries (chart 16). Most of the decline in the trend for LDCs took place in 
the 1990s, while the ratio between remittances and total export revenues 
remained broadly constant in the 2000s. Thus, the recent dynamics of recorded 
remittances have roughly paralleled those of exports of goods and services, 
notwithstanding the well-known “commodity boom” and the eruption of the 
global crisis. 
Since 2004 — and for most of 
the period considered here — 
remittances consistently represented 
the second-largest source of foreign 
financing for the LDCs.
The value of remittances relative 
to GDP has historically been much 
greater in the LDCs than in either 
developed or other developing 
regions.
Remittances to LDCs were 
equivalent to nearly 15 per cent of 
total export revenues in 2011, more 
than three times as much as in
other developing countries. 
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Chart 15. Migrants’ remittances as a share of GDP, 1980–2011
(Percentage)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
P
er
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
ce
nt
ag
e
Developed economies Developing economies excluding LDCs LDCs
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTADstat database.
Chart 16. Migrants’ remittances as a share of total exports of goods and services, 1980–2011
(Percentage)
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Although LDC remittances form a relatively small share of the global total, 
they play a disproportionately important role in LDCs compared with other 
economies (Ratha 2003, IMF 2005). Remittances had become an important 
means of LDC integration into the world economy even during the period 
when they were relatively marginalized in terms of world trade and investment 
flows. Currently, while LDCs represent 12 per cent of global population, their 
contribution to world GDP and exports is only one per cent and their share of 
global FDI is just under three per cent, yet they account for six per cent of global 
cross-border remittances. 
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Chart 17. Distribution of remittances inflows across LDCs, 1999-2001 and 2009–2011
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2. REMITTANCES ACROSS LDC ECONOMIES
LDCs exhibit tremendous heterogeneity in terms of population, economic 
size, structural characteristics, geography and historical legacies; accordingly, a 
high degree of heterogeneity should also be expected with regard to remittance 
issues. The LDC group includes some of the world’s top remittance recipients 
(whether in nominal value or relative to GDP), as well as countries for which 
remittances are negligible. Against this background, this section provides a 
disaggregated assessment of the magnitude of remittances across LDCs, 
clarifying the extent to which country-specific characteristics affect their 
significance for the recipient economy. 
Remittance inflows to LDCs are unevenly distributed across countries, even 
more so than FDI and export revenues, a fact which partly reflects the varying 
size of each country’s stock of emigrants. Chart 17 shows the persistence and 
accentuation of skewed distribution over the last decade. Over this period, the 
top recipient, Bangladesh, expanded its share of total LDC remittance inflows 
from 31 to 44 per cent. The top three LDC recipients (Bangladesh, Nepal and 
Sudan) also increased their overall share from 44 per cent to 66 per cent of total 
LDC inflows. Besides these well-known large recipients, other LDCs obtaining 
sizeable sums through remittances include Cambodia, Ethiopia, Haiti, Lesotho, 
Mali, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Yemen.
Notwithstanding the uneven distribution, the sustained dynamism of 
remittance inflows to LDCs was quite general. In all but a handful of LDCs for 
which data are available, remittance inflows increased markedly over the last 
decade (chart 18), growing at an annual average of 15 per cent in the median 
LDC. Admittedly, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2009, remittance 
receipts slowed down in most LDCs, even though they continued to increase 
with a few exceptions (see box 4 below). 
As noted earlier, the sustained boom in remittance flows to the LDCs 
should be interpreted with caution in light of data limitations.8 Nonetheless, it is 
Remittance inflows to LDCs 
are unevenly distributed across 
countries, even more so than FDI 
and export revenues, over the 
last decade. The top three LDC 
recipients (Bangladesh, Nepal and 
Sudan) increased their overall share 
from 44 per cent to 66 per cent
of total LDC inflows.
In all but a handful of LDCs 
remittance inflows increased 
markedly over the last decade.
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Chart 18. Average annual growth rate in remittances 2002–2011
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noteworthy that remittances to LDCs have also increased in per capita terms, 
despite rapid demographic dynamics in the recipient countries. On a per capita 
basis, recorded remittance flows to the LDCs rose from an average of $7 in 
1990 to nearly $30 in 2010, with a doubling of this quantity since 2005. Table 
6 shows that a rising trend in per capita remittance receipts since 1990 holds 
for the overwhelming majority of the LDCs. It also reveals that remittances 
represent a sizeable inflow of resources relative to GDP per capita, not only in 
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Box 4. Remittances and the global financial crisis
Like other capital and trade-related flows, remittances have not been spared the adverse effects of the global financial 
crisis and the ensuing recession or the continuing difficulties of several developed countries. Migrant workers have shared 
the burden of gloomy labour market conditions, with faltering global recovery and double-dip recessions in some developed 
countries. In many ways, however, the fallout of the crisis has provided insight into the extent of remittances’ resilience 
compared with other sources of foreign exchange, and the reasons behind it.
To shed more light on this aspect, box table 1 compares recent trends, pre- and post-crisis, for private capital inflows to 
LDCs and to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Interestingly, in 2010, remittances were well above their 2007 levels 
in both developing regions, while inflows of FDI and portfolio investments remained below their corresponding value three 
years previously. More precisely, in the case of the LDCs, remittances indeed suffered a sharp growth slowdown in 2009, as 
a consequence of the downturn, but continued their upward trend, albeit at a modest rate. For LMICs, however, remittances 
inflows stalled in 2009 but picked up one year later, when they recovered the ground lost and actually surpassed the 2008 peak.1
This distinct behaviour of remittances, as opposed to other types of private capital flows, stands out and confirms their 
relative resilience to shocks. With regard to LDCs, this finding is corroborated by the evidence depicted in box chart 1, which 
compares three-year growth rates in remittances inflows to individual LDCs before and after the crisis (1 January 2009 being 
taken as the cut-off point). As a matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of LDCs lie below the red 45-degree line, showing 
that with a few exceptions the expansion of LDCs’ remittances receipts has indeed slowed down in the post-crisis period. 
Nonetheless, even in the post-crisis triennium, the value of migrants’ remittances continued to climb, albeit at a slower pace, 
in all but a dozen LDCs.
Equally interesting, countries whose remittances were worst hit by the crisis (Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Sao Tome, Sudan 
and Zambia) appear to be those whose diaspora communities are largely concentrated in developed economies at the 
epicentre of the crisis (United States, France, United Kingdom). In this respect, it can be argued that, given the very genesis 
of the global financial crisis, the predominantly South–South nature of LDC migration and remitting channels represented a 
factor of resilience. This finding is consistent with (UNCTAD, 2010a) and with the argument that countries with more diversified 
migration destinations are likely to have more resilient remittances.
1 Incidentally, the different behaviour of FDI and portfolio investment flows is also worth mentioning. FDI inflows rose at double-digit rates 
between 2007 and 2008, notwithstanding financial distress in developed economies, but then fell sharply both in LDCs and LMICs, and 
had not yet recovered their peak level by 2010. Conversely, the notorious flight to safety manifested itself right after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, triggering immediate outflows of portfolio investments from both LDCs and LMICs in 2008. Although by 2010 both regions were 
once again witnessing positive inflows of portfolio investments, neither had recovered to their pre-crisis level.
Box chart 1. Remittances to LDCs before and after the global recession
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Table 6. Remittances inflows to LDCs, 1990–2010
 (Decreasing rank in 2010)
Current $ per capita Share of GDP
per capita
 2010 (%)1990 2000 2005 2010
Samoa 265.73 254.89 609.90 783.51 23.44
Lesotho 261.03 243.44 292.16 343.53 35.03
Haiti 8.56 66.86 105.50 147.48 24.07
Nepal .. 4.57 44.42 115.79 21.65
Senegal 19.62 24.56 72.55 108.26 10.48
Kiribati 71.60 83.32 76.10 88.71 6.04
Bangladesh 7.40 15.18 30.69 72.97 10.88
Gambia 10.35 10.79 39.44 66.94 11.56
Yemen 125.39 72.67 62.12 62.44 4.34
Togo 7.33 7.14 35.60 55.26 10.53
Djibouti .. 16.79 31.98 36.73 2.86
Sudan 2.34 18.74 26.45 32.60 1.79
Guinea-Bissau 0.98 6.47 14.55 31.76 5.89
Mali 12.33 6.48 13.45 28.38 4.74
Benin 21.17 13.36 22.63 28.03 3.78
Uganda .. 9.83 11.32 27.36 5.37
Vanuatu 56.00 187.30 24.14 26.82 0.91
Cambodia .. 9.68 14.95 22.71 2.85
Comoros 22.69 21.33 18.66 16.33 2.22
Sao Tome and Principe 2.67 3.29 9.83 12.09 0.94
Sierra Leone 0.01 1.72 0.47 9.80 2.79
Rwanda 0.37 0.82 2.27 9.71 1.82
Liberia .. .. 10.01 7.87 3.60
Bhutan .. .. .. 7.80 0.38
Lao People's Democratic Republic 2.60 0.12 0.14 6.59 0.63
Guinea 3.12 0.14 4.60 6.05 1.42
Burkina Faso 14.98 5.48 3.99 5.77 1.11
Niger 1.78 1.32 5.11 5.67 1.59
Mozambique 5.20 2.02 2.84 5.64 1.38
Ethiopia 0.10 0.81 2.34 4.16 1.28
Zambia .. .. 4.62 3.34 0.27
Solomon Islands .. 10.58 15.25 3.10 0.26
Myanmar 0.15 2.30 2.82 2.77 0.32
United Republic of Tanzania .. 0.24 0.50 0.55 0.11
Mauritania 6.87 0.76 0.66 0.55 0.05
Madagascar 0.70 0.73 0.61 0.48 0.11
Angola .. 0.29 0.42 0.47 0.01
Burundi .. .. 0.01 0.43 0.25
Malawi .. 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02
LDCs 7.01 9.54 16.36 29.57 4.01
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTADstat database.
Box table 1. Private capital inflows in times of crisis
 (Value in 2007=100)
Type of private capital flow 2007 2008 2009 2010
To LDCs Remittances 100 132.5 135.1 141.7
FDI net inflows 100 116.5 112.6 92.6
Portfolio equity, net inflows 100 -101.8 -8.2 82.9
To LMICs Remittances 100 116.4 110.3 116.9
FDI net inflows 100 116.6 74.6 94.9
Portfolio equity, net inflows 100 -40.1 82.1 97.5
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on World Development Indicators online database.
LMIC = Low- and middle-income countries.
Box 2 (contd.)
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Chart 19. Remittances as a share of GDP and exports of goods and services, 1998–2011
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small economies such as Samoa, Lesotho, Kiribati, Gambia or Djibouti but also 
in large recipient countries.
As evident from chart 19, whether in relation to GDP (panel A) or to export 
earnings (panel B), remittances play a prominent role in the median LDC, 
accounting for as much as 2.1 per cent of GDP and 8.5 per cent of export 
earnings, as compared with 1.6 per cent and 4.5 per cent, respectively, for 
other developing countries. This prominence is noticeable for an array of LDCs, 
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Chart 20. Remittances inflows to LDCs compared with other capital flows
(2008–2010 period average)
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ranging from small economies like Lesotho or Samoa — where remittances 
represent over 20 per cent of GDP — to traditionally large recipients such as 
Nepal and Haiti, where they largely exceed export earnings.
For a number of LDCs, remittances constitute a key source of foreign 
financing (chart 20). Over 2008–2010, recorded remittances exceeded both 
ODA and FDI inflows in nine LDCs (Bangladesh, Haiti, Lesotho, Nepal, Samoa, 
Senegal, Sudan, Togo and Yemen). In addition, remittances surpassed FDI but 
not ODA in another eight LDC economies (Benin, Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati and Uganda). 
Whereas by their very nature remittances are distinct from other international 
financial flows, they clearly play a significant role in providing foreign exchange for 
a large number of LDC countries. It is therefore important that LDC development 
strategies take full account of the relevance of these flows of resources, of their 
intrinsic characteristics, and of their underlying potential.
Whether in relation to GDP  or to 
export earnings, remittances play a 
prominent role for an array of LDCs, 
and constitute a key source of 
foreign financing; over 2008–2010, 
they exceeded both ODA and 
FDI inflows in nine LDCs and they 
surpassed FDI but not ODA in 
another eight LDC economies.
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3. REGIONAL PATTERNS AND REMITTANCE CORRIDORS
The historical context (for example colonialism) and the “geography” of 
remittances represent additional elements from both the analytical and the 
policymaking point of view. A number of reasons explain this relevance. First, 
geographical and cultural proximity is one of the key determinants of migration 
costs, which in turn affect the size of migrant stocks from any given country 
to another. As a consequence, proximity factors, coupled with differences 
in economic development and labour market conditions in the origin and 
destination countries, concur to determine the size of bilateral remittance flows. 
Second, in the LDC context, proximity factors appear to influence the cost 
of remitting and possibly also the choice of channel for sending money back 
home, thereby affecting the amount of foreign exchange ultimately available 
to the receiving economy. Third, bilateral exchange rate movements, which 
are contingent upon the precise pattern of remittances either from or to any 
given country, may also determine variations in remittance receipts. Similarly, 
the geographical distribution of remittances may also affect their resilience to 
idiosyncratic shocks, to the extent that business cycles in the country of origin 
and in the destinations are not closely correlated.9 This highlights the importance 
of understanding the pattern of remittances to any given country (in the light of 
geographical and cultural factors) and their currency composition.
South–South flows are particularly important for LDCs, consistent with 
the fact that the majority of LDC migrants actually move to other developing 
countries, often to neighbouring ones (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). Even though 
workers migrating to developed economies are typically in a position to remit 
greater amounts of money, in 2010, it was estimated that as much as two-
thirds of recorded remittances to LDCs originated in other Southern countries 
(UNCTAD, 2011a). Arguably, the prominence of South–South remittances may 
well be even higher than the above estimates suggest, given that “hawala” 
channels may be expected to be prevalent among countries with less developed 
financial systems.
South–South remittance flows are particularly sizeable in the case of large 
LDC recipients. Seven of the top ten – or twelve of the top twenty – remittance 
corridors to the LDCs are South–South. These include several corridors linking 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and India to large recipients 
such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Sudan and Yemen, in addition to a few intra-African 
corridors to Lesotho and Uganda. Besides, corridors connecting destination 
countries in the developed world (notably the UK, the USA or France) to large 
LDC recipients also feature prominently in the list of top remitting corridors. 
There are distinct regional and subregional patterns of remittance corridors, 
as documented in chart 21 and table 7. 10 The significance of remittance flows 
from neighbouring countries is apparent in the case of African LDCs, where 
relatively large sums of money are sent from subregional “poles” such as Kenya 
and Uganda in East Africa, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire in West Africa, and South 
Africa. The weight of the corridors linking Saudi Arabia with Sudan, and Israel 
with Ethiopia, represent notable exceptions to the above sub-Saharan African 
pattern, but again they are largely driven by considerations of historical and 
cultural proximity. Other prominent corridors in sub-Saharan Africa typically 
include those linking African LDCs to developed economies with which they 
retain historical and cultural ties. This is particularly the case of corridors linking 
France, the UK, and other European countries with their former colonies, but 
also of those connecting the United States with countries such as Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. 
In the case of the Asian LDCs, conversely, India and GCC countries are by 
far the primary sources of remittances, whereas funds sent from developed 
LDC development strategies should 
take full account of the relevance 
of these flows of resources, of their 
intrinsic characteristics, and of their 
underlying potential.
From the analytical and policy-
making point of view, it is important 
to understand the pattern of 
remittances to any given country 
(in the light of geographical and 
cultural factors) and their currency 
composition.
Even though workers migrating to 
developed economies are typically in 
a position to remit greater amounts 
of money, in 2010, it was estimated 
that two-thirds of recorded 
remittances to LDCs originated
in other Southern countries
There are distinct regional and 
subregional patterns of remittance 
corridors.
 In the case of African LDCs, 
relatively large sums of money are 
sent from subregional “poles” such 
as Kenya and Uganda in East Africa, 
Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire in West 
Africa, and South Africa.
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Table 7. Top remittance corridors by recipient LDC
Recipient country
Main corridor Second main corridor Third main corridor Cumulative 
importance 
of the 3 main 
corridors for 
the recipient 
country (%)
Sending country
Remit-
tances 
inflows
in 2010
($ million)
Sending country
Remit-
tances 
inflows
in 2010
($ million)
Sending country
Remit-
tances 
inflows
in 2010
($ million)
Benin Nigeria 87.4 France 28.4 Togo 24.0 59
Burkina Faso Côte d'Ivoire 32.9 Italy 1.4 France 0.7 90
Burundi United Rep. of Tanzania 0.8 Uganda 0.5 Belgium 0.3 49
Comoros France 9.9 Madagascar 0.5 Egypt 0.2 96
Djibouti France 18.1 Ethiopia 3.3 Canada 1.7 82
Ethiopia United States 148.3 Israel 64.8 Sudan 26.0 62
Gambia Spain 20.3 United States 10.7 United Kingdom 6.2 61
Guinea France 11.6 Côte d'Ivoire 11.3 Senegal 6.7 45
Guinea-Bissau Portugal 11.1 France 4.9 Spain 3.5 72
Lesotho South Africa 457.0 Mozambique 19.2 United States 1.6 95
Liberia United States 32.3 Guinea 7.8 Côte d'Ivoire 4.2 77
Madagascar France 8.0 Canada 0.3 Belgium 0.2 85
Malawi United Kingdom 0.3 Zimbabwe 0.2 South Africa 0.1 69
Mali Côte d'Ivoire 121.0 France 91.1 Nigeria 37.3 65
Mauritania France 0.5 Spain 0.3 Senegal 0.3 60
Mozambique South Africa 51.9 Portugal 24.7 Malawi 7.8 72
Niger Nigeria 14.6 Côte d'Ivoire 13.8 Benin 11.8 58
Rwanda Uganda 25.1 Belgium 15.3 United Rep. of Tanzania 10.2 56
Sao Tome & Principe Portugal 1.2 Angola 0.4 Cape Verde 0.1 92
Senegal France 309.8 Italy 248.1 Gambia 152.4 61
Sierra Leone United Kingdom 11.1 United States 10.2 Guinea 9.1 63
Sudan Saudi Arabia 1025.5 Uganda 407.1 United States 270.6 54
Togo France 61.2 Nigeria 54.3 Germany 49.6 55
Uganda Kenya 326.2 United Kingdom 176.4 United States 87.4 76
United Rep. of Tanzania United Kingdom 4.5 Canada 3.2 Kenya 2.5 58
Zambia United Kingdom 23.4 United Rep. of Tanzania 9.0 United States 6.5 55
Haiti United States 1055.0 Dominican Republic 178.9 Canada 129.7 91
Bangladesh India 3768.9 Saudi Arabia 1249.2 United Kingdom 1113.9 55
Cambodia United States 179.5 France 80.2 Australia 36.0 81
Lao People's Dem. Rep. United States 0.6 France 0.2 Thailand 0.1 87
Myanmar Thailand 55.6 United States 48.6 Australia 11.9 75
Nepal Qatar 1125.2 India 960.9 United States 428.4 72
Yemen Saudi Arabia 1039.4 United States 134.8 United Arab Emirates 122.0 88
Kiribati United States 2.4 Germany 2.0 New Zealand 1.3 65
Samoa New Zealand 65.8 United States 31.4 Australia 26.6 87
Solomon Islands Australia 1.5 New Caledonia 0.4 New Zealand 0.3 80
Vanuatu Australia 2.9 France 1.4 New Caledonia 0.7 72
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on World Bank dataset Bilateral remittance 2010 estimates using migrant stocks, destination and 
source country incomes; http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22803131~page
PK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html
economies in Europe or North America account for only some 30 per cent of 
the total. This is especially true for Bangladesh, Nepal and Yemen, even though 
the corridors linking the UK to its former colonies are also important (table 7). 
For small LDC recipients in South-East Asia, on the other hand, a large share 
of remittances originate from the United States — and to a lesser extent France 
— though the amounts sent are negligible compared to the receipts of other 
Asian LDCs. Finally, unlike the other LDC regions, developed countries account 
for the majority of remittance inflows to Pacific Islands and Haiti. In this respect, 
the United States is, broadly speaking, the main source of inflows, followed by 
Australia and New Zealand in the case of the Pacific Islands; and the Dominican 
Republic and Canada for Haiti.
In the case of the Asian LDCs, India 
and GCC countries are by far the 
primary sources of remittances, 
whereas funds sent from developed 
economies account for only some 
30 per cent of the total. 
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 C. The development impact of remittances
In sections A and B, we have presented clear evidence of the growing value 
of remittances to the LDCs, and of their importance as a source of external 
financing. Given the magnitudes involved, it is likely that they affect not only 
the recipient households but also a number of macroeconomic variables, 
ranging from investments, labour supply and real exchange rates to the potential 
creditworthiness of a country, etc. These overlapping effects, in turn, set in 
motion complex adjustment processes whose ultimate outcomes typically 
depend on country-specific conditions.
This section reviews the current evidence on the development impact of 
remittances, distinguishing between the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
spheres. As noted by Chami et al. (2008), empirical studies in this field have 
widened the scope of research, refining the methodologies applied and moving 
from country case-studies to cross-sectional and panel data analyses. This 
section focuses only on those issues which are deemed critical in the context of 
the LDCs. With regard to macroeconomic impacts, four main questions will be 
addressed:
1. Do remittances have an impact on economic growth?
2. To what extent do they smooth GDP fluctuation and current account 
volatility?
3. Do remittances have an impact on the creditworthiness of the recipient 
country?
4. Is there a risk that remittances may fuel real exchange rate appreciation or 
real estate bubbles in recipient countries? 
With regard to microeconomic effects, the discussion will focus on the impact 
of remittances on poverty reduction and diversification of households’ income 
sources, as well as the different uses of remittance income. 
There is a compelling body of research documenting the positive impact 
of remittances at the household level, both in terms of poverty reduction and 
as a risk mitigation strategy to diversify sources of income. However, the 
evidence on their developmental impact at a macroeconomic level is far less 
clear-cut. Migrants’ remittances may indeed contribute to the development of 
productive capacities by sustaining investment in human and physical capital 
and stimulating financial deepening. However, the realization of such potential is 
largely contingent upon the policy and institutional frameworks which recipient 
countries put in place. In this respect, while capital-scarce LDCs have much 
to gain from the potential developmental impact of remittances, their structural 
weaknesses also make it more difficult to successfully mobilize these sources of 
external financing for productive purposes.
1. MACROECONOMIC ISSUES
a) Do remittances have an impact on economic growth?
The relationship between remittances and economic growth is complex and 
multifaceted, as remittances affect a recipient country’s economy through a 
number of overlapping channels. Since remittances represent a household-to-
household transfer, their receipts directly increase the real disposable income of 
the recipient families, allowing them to improve their standard of living. By doing 
so, they correspondingly boost aggregate demand through either consumption 
Developed countries account for
the majority of remittance inflows
to Pacific Islands and Haiti. 
There is a compelling body of 
research documenting the positive 
impact of remittances at the 
household level, both in terms of 
poverty reduction and as a risk 
mitigation strategy to diversify 
sources of income.
The evidence on their developmental 
impact at a macroeconomic level is 
far less clear-cut.
Migrants’ remittances may 
contribute to the development of 
productive capacities. However, 
the realization of such potential is 
largely contingent upon the policy 
and institutional frameworks which 
recipient countries put in place. 
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or investment spending, with the multiplier being dependent on the specific use 
of remittance income. 
Migration and remittances also affect labour supply directly or indirectly. On 
the one hand, outward migration reduces labour supply, which may put upward 
pressure on domestic wages in the short term. On the other hand, the receipt of 
remittances may be expected to raise the “reservation wage”, thereby reducing 
the incentive to work for household members in the country of origin. For 
example, Kim (2007) finds evidence that remittances have a negative effect on 
labour market outcomes in Jamaica. Jadotte (2009) finds the same in the case 
of Haiti, for both hours worked and for labour market participation. However, 
other empirical studies have yielded contrasting evidence. Ducanes and Abella 
(2008) show that among Filipino households, those with migrants abroad tend 
to display a higher participation in the labour market, once the working age 
population attending schools is factored in. Cox-Edwards and Rodríguez-
Oreggia (2009) also find limited evidence of labour force participation effects of 
long-term remittances in Mexico.11
Generally speaking, it could be argued that the reduced incentive to work 
is likely to be more pronounced in remittance-dependent small economies, 
especially in the presence of large differentials between the domestic wage and 
the wage prevailing in destination countries. This is notably the case for several 
SIDS located at a small distance from much more developed economies.12 Yet 
this concern is plausibly less serious in the LDC context, where underemployment 
and low-value-added informal activities prevail and capital – not labour – is the 
scarce factor. Indeed, both Jadotte (2009) and Kim (2007) note that the negative 
impact on labour supply is quantitatively small, as a result of which adverse 
effects on output are unlikely to be significant.
In the short run (i.e. with fixed capital stock and productivity), aggregate supply 
is unlikely to keep pace with the expansion in aggregate demand financed by 
remittance inflows. Consequently, large inflows of remittances may be expected 
to worsen the trade balance of the recipient country. Relative prices of non-
tradables may then tend to increase vis-à-vis tradables, leading to appreciation 
of the real exchange rate, even as the inflows of financial resources sent by 
overseas migrants help to finance the trade deficit. 
Whether these short-run dynamics can be expected to improve or dampen 
the recipient country’s growth performance depends essentially on the impact of 
remittances on the expansion of productive capacities. On the negative side, the 
adverse effect of remittances on labour market outcomes may reduce economic 
growth if a culture of dependency on foreign transfers becomes gradually 
entrenched. Moreover, unless properly addressed, the tendency of remittances 
to trigger appreciations in the real exchange rate may give rise to “Dutch 
disease” effects, impairing much-needed structural change by undermining the 
competitiveness of non-traditional tradable sectors.
On the positive side, remittances may support economic growth and 
productive capacity development through two non-mutually exclusive channels: 
investment and financial deepening. Indeed, remittances provide a much-
needed source of foreign financing that could accelerate the pace of physical 
and human capital accumulation (the “investment channel”). In addition, they 
tend to increase the availability of funds for the domestic financial system, 
paving the way for recipient households to demand and gain access to other 
financial products and services which they might not have otherwise. Besides, 
remittances may possibly relax financial constraints on recipient households, 
particularly those in rural areas which are poorly served by existing financial 
intermediaries.
The relationship between 
remittances and economic growth 
is complex and multifaceted, as 
remittances affect a recipient 
country’s economy through a 
number of overlapping channels.
On the negative side, the adverse 
effect of remittances on labour 
market outcomes may reduce 
economic growth if a culture of 
dependency becomes gradually 
entrenched or if remittances
trigger appreciations in the
real exchange rate.
On the positive side, remittances 
may support economic growth and 
productive capacity development 
through two non-mutually exclusive 
channels: investment and financial 
deepening.
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Given that the overall impact of remittances on growth is ambiguous at 
a theoretical level, whether or not the positive effects outweigh the negative 
impacts is a purely empirical question, the answer to which depends on 
a host of country-specific factors, ranging from the pattern of migration and 
its underlying distributive consequences to institutional quality and financial 
development. Most econometric analyses investigating the relationship between 
remittances and GDP per capita growth have relied on the standard growth 
regression framework, including additional control variables accounting for 
remittance receipts and other plausible growth determinants. This empirical 
literature has so far yielded mixed results, as well as highlighting a number of 
methodological problems ranging from measurement and specification issues 
to reverse causality and unobservable heterogeneity.13
On one hand, some cross-sectional studies document an adverse effect 
of workers’ remittances on economic growth, traceable to reduced working 
efforts (Chami et al., 2005, 2008) or deteriorating institutional quality (Abdih et 
al., 2012). In the same vein, Acosta et al. (2009) build a two-sector dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model based on the El Salvadorian economy, 
confirming that remittances hamper growth through a decline in labour supply 
and an increase in consumption demand biased toward non-tradables, as with 
the “Dutch disease”.
Yet the above claims are at odds with other empirical research, which 
actually fails to detect any robust statistically significant relationship between 
remittances and growth (IMF, 2005; Pradhan et al., 2008; Giuliano and Ruiz-
Arranz, 2009).14 Moreover, a number of others studies — particularly those 
with a strong emphasis on the time dimension, such as dynamic panel data — 
document instead a positive and statistically significant influence of remittances 
on per capita GDP growth (Glytsos, 2005; Acosta et al., 2008; Catrinescu et al., 
2009; Mundaca, 2009; Ziesemer, 2009, 2012).
Along similar lines, but by means of a completely different framework, namely 
a traditional Keynesian macroeconomic model focusing on five Mediterranean 
countries (Egypt, Jordan, Greece, Morocco and Portugal) — Glytsos (2005) 
obtains a positive effect of remittances on economic growth, with average 
investment and income multipliers of 2.3 and 0.6 respectively.15
As for the “financial deepening channel”, the influence of remittances 
appears to be twofold. First, they appear to sustain growth by easing credit and 
liquidity constraints in countries with poorly developed financial sectors, thereby 
“substituting” for financial development. Consistent with this view, those studies 
adding to a standard growth regression both a remittance variable and an 
interaction of that variable with a proxy for financial development find a significant 
positive coefficient for the former and a significant negative coefficient for the latter 
(World Bank, 2008; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). 16 Second, remittances 
directly foster financial deepening, especially when transferred through formal 
financial institutions, by stimulating demand for new products and services. 
Aggarwal et al. (2006) document this robust positive impact of remittances on a 
panel of 99 countries, even after controlling for other factors that affect financial 
development, and regardless of whether financial development is measured in 
terms of the ratio of deposits or credit to GDP. Various econometric studies 
focused on Latin American and Caribbean countries reach the same conclusion, 
namely, that remittances are strongly associated with greater banking breadth 
and depth, increasing the number of branches and accounts per capita, and the 
ratio of deposits to gross domestic product (World Bank, 2008; Anzoategui et 
al., 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2011).17 In the African context, these findings are 
corroborated by the analysis of several household surveys, which demonstrate 
how, for a given income quintile, the probability of having a bank account is 
considerably higher for households receiving remittances (World Bank, 2011a).
Econometric analyses investigating 
the relationship between remittances 
and GDP per capita growth have 
yielded mixed results.
Remittances appears to sustain 
growth by easing credit and liquidity 
constraints in countries with poorly 
developed financial sectors.
Remittances directly foster financial 
deepening, especially when 
transferred through formal financial 
institutions, by stimulating demand 
for new products and services. 
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Even though the literature is still somewhat inconclusive on how remittances 
ultimately affect economic growth, there appears to be general agreement on 
the fact that complementary policies and sound institutions play an important 
role in enhancing their development impact (World Bank, 2008; Pradhan et al., 
2008; Catrinescu et al., 2009). Governments typically have only limited room to 
directly affect the allocation of remittance income, since taxation or mandatory 
remittance requirements have historically proved rather ineffective and in most 
cases have simply led migrants to use informal channels to remit (Lucas, 2008). 
In the light of the inherently private nature of remittance flows, the effective 
mobilization of remittances for productive purposes depends on a whole array of 
policy and institutional improvements, aimed at reinforcing both the “investment 
channel” and the impact of remittances on financial deepening. This may entail 
a range of policy interventions, from “development-centred” macroeconomic 
and regional development policies aimed at crowding in private investments 
to appropriate financial and regulatory reforms designed to reduce transaction 
costs and promote greater financial inclusion and credit provision for SMEs.
Overall, there is some scope for remittances to stimulate physical and human 
capital accumulation as well as financial development; all the more so when 
a large share of remittance income is received by poor and otherwise credit-
rationed households. In this respect, capital-scarce LDCs clearly have much to 
gain from the potential developmental impact of remittances. However, LDCs’ 
structural weaknesses make it more difficult to successfully mobilize these 
sources of external financing for productive purposes. It is therefore essential to 
design appropriate strategies and policy frameworks for harnessing remittances 
for economic development.
b) To what extent do remittances smooth GDP fluctuation and 
current account volatility?
It is true that remittance flows tend to be correlated with the macroeconomic 
performance of source countries and could thus partially transmit macroeconomic 
fluctuations from source to recipient countries.18 Yet unless business cycles are 
closely synchronized across both sets of countries, remittances can be expected 
to play a somewhat more stabilizing role. In addition, remittances tend to be 
more resilient to downturns than other sources of foreign exchange for several 
reasons, as confirmed in the aftermath of the 2009 global recession (see box 
3). First, as remittances are sent by the accumulated flows of migrants and not 
only by the new migrants of recent years, they tend to be more persistent over 
time. Second, as remittances typically account for a minor share of a migrant’s 
income, the latter often cushions a temporary fall in earnings by reducing other 
costs while continuing to send money back home. Third, the tightening of border 
controls and fear of unemployment back home may encourage the migrant to 
stay abroad longer (i.e. increase the duration of migration) and continue to send 
money overseas. Finally, returning migrants are likely to take back accumulated 
savings, which are counted as remittances.19
Equally important, unlike purely investment-driven sources of capital flows, 
remittances also encompass an altruistic/insurance component, and can thus 
have a stabilizing effect on the recipient economies. For example, remittance 
receipts rose during the so-called “tequila crisis” in Mexico in 1994–1995, and 
during the Asian crisis of 1997 in Korea and the Philippines. Besides, it has been 
noted that they tend to increase in response to natural disasters and political 
conflicts, in countries that have a larger emigrant stock as a share of the home 
country population (Mohapatra et al., 2009). In Haiti, for example, remittance 
receipts increased by over $100 million a year in the biennium following the 
devastating earthquake of January 2010, which corresponds to an average 
annual growth rate of eight per cent.20 Similarly, in West African countries, 
 There appears to be general 
agreement that complementary 
policies and sound institutions play 
an important role in enhancing the 
development impact of remittances.
Capital-scarce LDCs clearly 
have much to gain from the 
potential developmental impact 
of remittances. However, their 
structural weaknesses make it more 
difficult to successfully mobilize 
these sources of external financing 
for productive purposes.
Remittances tend to be more 
resilient to downturns than other 
sources of foreign exchange.
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Chart 22. Volatility and cyclicality of foreign exchange flows to LDCs, 1980–2010
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remittances appear to play a significant role in smoothing GDP fluctuations 
induced by climatic variability (Couharde, Davis and Generoso, 2011).
Several studies covering large samples of countries and using different 
estimation strategies (ranging from instrumental variables to generalized method 
of moments) have shown that an increase in the share of remittances to GDP 
tends to reduce the volatility of GDP growth, even after controlling for other 
possible determinants of growth volatility (IMF, 2005; Bugamelli and Paternò, 
2008; Chami et al., 2010). This finding highlights another potential channel 
through which remittances may sustain economic progress in recipient countries, 
namely by reducing growth volatility, which in itself is detrimental to economic 
growth. This may be particularly relevant in an LDC context, given that these 
economies have indeed been traditionally characterized by relatively recurrent 
growth accelerations but nearly as frequent growth collapses (UNCTAD, 2010a).
From a macroeconomic point of view, the relative stability of remittances 
as compared with other sources of external financing is worth stressing. As 
shown in chart 22, over the period 1980–2010, remittance inflows to the LDCs 
displayed the lowest volatility, as measured by the standard deviation of the ratio 
between the relevant inflow and GDP.21 Among the sources of foreign exchange 
available to the world’s poorest countries, the volatility of ODA net disbursements 
was nearly twice as high, while FDI and export revenues displayed even higher 
instability over time. In addition, over the same period, remittances appear to 
be characterized by considerably lower procyclicality than other types of flows, 
including both aid and FDI.22
This relative stability and lower cyclicality of remittances as compared with 
other inflows may have beneficial implications for the recipient country’s external 
accounts. A comparison of the stabilizing impact of aid and remittances in 
82 developing countries (including 26 LDCs) spanning the period 1980–1995 
reveals that remittances, like aid, behave in a rather acyclical way with respect 
to exports (Guillaumont and Le Goff 2011). However, as remittances are on 
average less volatile than aid, and aid is less volatile than exports, both flows 
tend to dampen the instability of export revenues in the majority of countries 
(ibid.).23
Several studies have shown 
that an increase in the share of 
remittances to GDP tends to reduce 
the volatility of GDP growth, even 
after controlling for other possible 
determinants of growth volatility.
The relative stability and lower 
cyclicality of remittances as 
compared with other inflows may 
have beneficial implications for 
the recipient country’s external 
accounts. 
The Least Developed Countries Report 201262
In the context of the LDCs, whose export structures are concentrated within 
a narrow range of products, the stabilizing effect of ODA and remittances can 
play an important role in reducing the impact of adverse terms of trade shocks. 
Remittances, especially when they are larger than three per cent of GDP, also 
appear to reduce the probability of sharp current account reversals by reducing 
the sensitivity to a decline in international reserves (Bugamelli and Paternò, 
2009). 
c) Do remittances have an impact on the creditworthiness of the 
recipient country?
By increasing the level and often the stability of foreign exchange receipts 
as well, remittances may improve the creditworthiness of the recipient country, 
boosting its ability to repay external debt — at least insofar as they transit through 
formal financial channels. This is illustrated in chart 23, which compares the ratio 
of debt service to export earnings (a standard indicator of debt sustainability), 
both including and excluding remittances from the computation. Across LDCs, 
the inclusion of remittances lowers the indicator of debt burden by roughly one 
percentage point on average. The benefit is significantly larger for some Pacific 
Island LDCs and other traditional recipients. 
Acknowledging the growing importance of remittances for low-income 
countries, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have gradually 
moved towards a revision of the Debt Sustainability Framework, so as to 
account for the impact of remittances on debt repayment capacity as well as 
on the probability of default (IMF and World Bank, 2009 and 2012). The full 
operationalization of this revision is hampered by the poor quality of remittance 
data, as a result of which only eight countries had their risk of debt distress 
assessed using remittances in the 2010–2011 biennium (IMF and World Bank, 
2012).
Given the relative stability of remittances and the underlying implications 
for a country’s creditworthiness, one potential mechanism for enhancing their 
developmental impact could be to use them as collateral for securitization or 
for long-term syndicated loans. This could reduce the (often prohibitive) costs 
LDCs face on international capital markets, potentially broadening their access 
to long-term development finance. This policy option is discussed in detail in 
chapter 5, which also highlights the possible synergies between this measure 
and other institutional and regulatory reforms aimed at strengthening domestic 
capital markets.
d) Is there a serious risk that remittances may fuel real exchange 
rate appreciation or real estate bubbles?
Large remittance recipients should be aware of the risk that, like other 
types of large foreign exchange inflows, these may put pressure on the non-
tradable sector. Since a considerable share of remittance income is typically 
spent on housing, be it to improve the living standards or as a deliberate saving 
strategy, this situation could fuel real estate bubbles, particularly in large cities 
where property is one of the most favoured asset classes. Several practitioners, 
for instance, have observed that transfers from overseas migrants, along with 
other factors such as rapid economic growth and an expanding middle class, 
have pushed up property markets over the last few years in various developing 
countries, ranging from the Philippines to Ghana or Nepal (Buckley and 
Mathema, 2007 and Chow, 2011). This concern may be partly attenuated in 
most LDCs (especially in sub-Saharan Africa), where the overwhelming majority 
of the population lives in rural areas and many recipients of remittances are rural 
dwellers. 
By increasing the level and the 
stability of foreign exchange 
receipts, remittances may improve 
the creditworthiness of the recipient 
country, boosting its ability to repay 
external debt. 
Large remittance recipients, 
however, should be aware of the risk 
that, like other types of large foreign 
exchange inflows, these may put 
pressure on the non-tradable sector.
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Chart 23. Debt service as a share of exports in the LDCs, 2009
(Including and excluding remittances, percentage)
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Large inflows of remittances may also be associated with appreciation of 
the real exchange rate, weighing down domestic competitiveness and hindering 
economic growth (i.e. the so-called “Dutch disease”). This risk appears to be 
more pronounced in Latin American and Caribbean economies, where — 
according to (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004) — a doubling of workers’ 
remittances could result in real exchange rate appreciation of some 22 per 
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Chart 24. Real effective exchange rate, selected LDCs, 1995–2010
(REER = 100 in 2000)
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cent.24 However, there is little evidence of such an effect in broader samples 
of developing countries or in the context of sub-Saharan Africa (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2005; World Bank, 2011a).
The possibility of real exchange rate appreciation may be less of a concern 
for most LDCs. Focusing on the six most remittance-dependent LDC economies 
(i.e. those where remittances represent the highest share of GDP), chart 24 
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shows that only in the case of Haiti — and to a much lesser extent Samoa — 
was the surge in remittances associated with a discernible appreciation in the 
real exchange rate. In the case of Senegal and Bangladesh, on the other hand, 
the boom in remittance inflows did not seem to have a similar effect, while even 
in Nepal — where remittances climbed from five per cent of GDP to 20 per cent 
in the span of a decade — the real exchange rate appreciated only marginally. 
Of course, this does not mean that LDCs should be complacent and 
overlook the potentially adverse implications of remittances, and other foreign 
exchange inflows, on domestic competitiveness. Particularly when the overall 
macroeconomic environment discourages the channelling of remittance incomes 
towards investment, the boost provided to disposable income and aggregate 
demand may conflict with persistent supply-side bottlenecks. This may ultimately 
undermine domestic competitiveness, and require some degree of proactive 
monetary and exchange policy interventions to restore macroeconomic 
conditions that are conducive to growth and economic diversification. In any 
case, insofar as LDCs put in place sustainable exchange rate and fiscal policies 
while crowding in private investment and fostering financial deepening, the 
positive effects of growing remittance inflows are likely to outweigh the modest 
appreciations typically witnessed in the LDC context.
2. MICROECONOMIC ISSUES
In the typical developing country, remittances account for approximately 30 
to 40 per cent of a recipient household’s income. As a result, they can contribute 
towards poverty reduction while raising the household’s savings and investments, 
including through better access to health and education. Empirical studies, 
whether at the country level or across a broad range of economies, typically show 
that remittances reduce standard poverty measures (Adams, 2011; World Bank, 
2011a). An often-cited cross-sectional study based on household surveys for 71 
developing countries shows that both international migration and remittances 
have a statistically significant effect on poverty reduction, whether measured 
through the headcount ratio or the poverty gap (Adams and Page, 2005). Using 
instrumental variables to control for reverse causality, the authors find that, on 
average, a 10 per cent increase in per capita international remittances leads to 
a 3.5 per cent reduction in the proportion of people living below the poverty line 
and a 3.9 per cent reduction in the poverty gap. These findings are basically 
confirmed by another study of 10 Latin American countries, employing a two-
stage Heckman model to control for selection bias, which find that international 
remittances have a positive and statistically significant poverty-reducing effect. 
Similarly, according to the study by (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2010) covering 
a sample of 33 African countries for the period 1990–2005, a 10 per cent 
increase in reported international remittances as a share of GDP leads to a 2.9 
per cent decline in the share of people living in poverty, with similar declines also 
occurring for the depth and severity of poverty. Besides, remittances (whether 
national or international) appear to contribute to household income smoothing 
and to a diversification of sources of income, broadly in line with the tenets of the 
New Economics of Labour Migration.
The impact of remittances on inequality is less clear-cut, especially in view of 
the serious econometric concerns related to reverse causality and above all to 
the selectivity underlying the migration process. As prospective migrants incur 
upfront costs which are largely dependent on the destination, those belonging to 
the poorest households are typically unable to afford long-distance international 
movement or the costly bureaucratic procedures usually required to migrate to 
developed economies. So it is precisely the poorest who are unable to benefit 
from the largest differentials in terms of expected wages and who consequently 
remit larger sums. As a result, international migration in many cases appears 
On average, a 10 per cent 
increase in per capita international 
remittances leads to a 3.5 per cent 
reduction in the proportion of people 
living below the poverty line. 
Remittances appear to contribute to 
household income smoothing and
to a diversification of sources
of income.
The impact of remittances on 
inequality is less clear-cut, especially 
in view of the selectivity underlying 
the migration process.
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Chart 25. Use of remittances by recipient household in selected African countries, by source of remittance
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to have a regressive impact on inequality (Adams, 2011). Consistent with this 
finding, recent household surveys show that more than half of households in 
Burkina Faso, Ghana and Nigeria and 30 per cent of households in Senegal 
receiving remittances from outside Africa are in the top two consumption quintiles 
(World Bank, 2011a). Conversely, households receiving remittances from other 
African countries or domestic sources tend to be more evenly distributed across 
consumption expenditure quintiles, although these flows of remittances tend 
to be significantly lower than remittances from outside the region. Once again, 
however, country-specific conditions matter. For example, in Fiji and Tonga — 
where migration to neighbouring developed economies (i.e. Australia or New 
Zealand) is relatively more affordable — remittances are found to have a positive 
effect not only on poverty but also on income distribution (Brown and Jimenez, 
2007).25
In terms of uses of remittance income, while it is true that a substantial 
portion is spent on food and housing, this should not be taken to mean that 
“remittances are predominantly spent on excessive consumption” (De Haas, 
2005). On the contrary, a significant proportion of remittances is typically used 
for human capital accumulation, namely health and education expenditures. 
Household surveys conducted by the World Bank in Burkina Faso, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda show, for instance, that the share of international 
remittance income spent on health and education ranged between 10 to 32 
per cent, albeit with some variability across destination and source regions 
(chart 25). Accordingly, remittances are typically found to improve health and 
education outcomes, even though the absence of a migrant family member may 
to some extent erode part of these benefits (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2010; 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2010; Adams, 2011).
A significant proportion of 
remittances is typically used for 
human capital accumulation, namely 
health and education expenditures. 
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Equally important, a significant share of remittances is also spent on physical 
investment. For example, it is estimated that some 20 per cent of the capital 
invested in 6,000 microenterprises in urban Mexico was financed by remittances 
(Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). Similarly, household surveys from the six sub-
Saharan African countries mentioned above show that on average, 20 per cent 
of international remittance income is spent on physical capital investments such 
as buying land or equipment, starting a business, or improving a farm (chart 25). 
Interestingly, the selectivity of migration may also be linked to households’ use 
of remittance income. Given their state of deprivation, the poorest households 
are likely to use a relatively higher share of remittance income on subsistence 
items such as food and clothing. Conversely, in relatively wealthier settings, 
remittances respond more to strategies of risk diversification and investment, 
so there is a larger share of income financing productive assets. The evidence 
reported in chart 25, which compares the use of remittance income by source, 
is consistent with this reasoning. 
Given the relatively shallow levels of financial development in most LDCs, 
the potential linkages between remittances and household access to financial 
services are worth noting. Especially in rural areas, the receipt of remittances 
often constitutes the only relationship poor people have with the formal financial 
system. So they potentially provide an opportunity for financial intermediaries 
to “get to know” otherwise unbanked recipients, paving the way for the 
latter to obtain new financial products, for saving as well as credit purposes 
(Orozco and Fedewa, 2006). Consistent with this, data from recent household 
surveys conducted in Africa and in Latin American and Caribbean economies 
demonstrate how households that receive remittances typically have better 
access to financial services, such as bank accounts (World Bank, 2008, 2011a).
D. Remittance payment systems and LDCs
In most LDC remittance corridors, the cost of sending remittances is still high 
relative to the often low incomes of migrant workers. At the 2009 G8 Summit 
in L’Aquila, countries pledged to reduce the cost of sending remittances by half 
(from 10 to 5 per cent) in five years. As a result of this commitment, the Global 
Remittance Working Group and the World Bank initiated the 5x5 objective, which 
is based on the BIS-World Bank General Principles for International Remittance 
services.26 However, in an LDC context, it is unclear as to whether the target 
has been achieved and whether the problem of persistently high costs is due 
to sending country or recipient country factors. In this section, we consider 
the costs of remittances in terms of socioeconomic factors, industry market 
structure, government policies and regulations that affect the costs borne by 
remitters.
1. THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH REMITTING
Migrants typically utilize a whole range of formal and informal channels for 
remitting, chosen on the basis of cost, reliability, accessibility and trust. Formal 
channels include money transfer services by banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, such as bureaux de change, and dedicated money transfer operators 
(MTOs) like Western Union and MoneyGram. The former enables financial 
transfers from a bank account in the host country to a foreign account through an 
international funds transfer. These require considerable administration, and the 
process may take several days. Formal financial institutions tend to have higher 
overhead costs than MTOs due to their network of branches and automated 
Especially in rural areas, remittances 
often constitute the only relationship 
poor people have with the formal 
financial system. So they potentially 
pave the way for households to 
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teller machines (ATMs) and regulatory compliance requirements, which feed into 
higher remittance fees. In the LDCs, the majority of MTO transactions involve 
the receipt of funds, and because MTOs tend to have smaller networks than 
commercial banks, they tend to focus on serving specific populations and 
geographic niches. These channels are changing in LDCs with the growth of 
Internet-based firms and new forms of service provision, such as the option to 
have goods delivered or to purchase vouchers for redemption in shops in the 
home country. 
In some African LDCs — although it is difficult to determine the extent of this 
practice — diaspora organizations facilitate remittance transfers, both formally 
or informally (Melde and Ionesco, 2010). In addition, bus, coach and courier 
companies that transport money or goods as part of their regular and official 
services also offer domestic and intraregional remittance transfer (formal but 
non-financial) services. Informal systems of remittance transfers in LDCs tend to 
have many similarities, whether in Africa, Asia or the Middle East, as nationals 
of most LDCs tend to send money with friends, relatives or carry it themselves. 
Other informal systems include hawala or hundi services or are single-destination 
services provided by individual business people (see section B.2). For example, 
Somali refugee communities in Nairobi, Kenya often use informal agents with 
radio or satellite phones to Somalia to manage money transfers home (Omer, 
2003; Kabbucho et al., 2003).
Informal and formal remittance channels are utilized for different reasons. In 
some cases, formal transfers can be slow, expensive and bureaucratic and incur 
additional charges, while in other instances they may be more cost-effective 
than informal channels. On the other hand, the latter tend to be inherently more 
risky, as usually there are no official means for loss recovery if the money is not 
successfully delivered. In addition to the formal and informal remittance channels 
discussed below, there are also new and emerging innovations in the remittance 
transfer and payment systems, such as mobile money, which are discussed 
further on in section 2.27
Though resorting to informal remittance channels may be a rational choice 
from the point of view of the individual migrant, from a policy perspective, 
formal remittance systems are preferable, even leaving aside concerns related 
to security, regulation or supervision. The prevalence of informal flows limits 
the ability of recipient countries to make the best use of the foreign exchange 
sent by overseas migrants. This may reduce the effects remittances have on a 
country’s creditworthiness or in stimulating financial deepening, and encourage 
informal (black market) currency transactions.
The Remittance Prices Worldwide database collected by the World Bank 
Payment Systems Group shows that, as of the first quarter of 2009, the cost of 
remittances averaged nine per cent of the amount sent (see chart 26). For LDCs, 
the average cost of remitting $200 was close to 12 per cent of the amount sent, 
30 per cent higher than the global average. 
Chart 27 shows the spread between the minimum and maximum amounts 
charged on average by remittance service providers (RSPs) in countries sending 
remittances to LDCs, reflecting both destinations and providers. It also reflects 
disparities in the cost structures between the major sending countries and 
within each sending country. For example, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the 
lowest total average cost. Among the G8 countries, the UK and the USA are 
below the world average, at 6.9 per cent and 7.7 per cent respectively. South 
Africa is the costliest G20 remittance-sending country in the G20 group, with an 
average of 19 per cent to LDCs as compared to an average of 16 per cent to 
other developing countries (ODCs). For most LDCs, the cost of formal money 
transfer is in the range of 4–25 per cent of the value sent, and the price depends 
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Chart 26. Average total cost of remitting from selected regions
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Chart 27. Country remittance average service provision costs across providers and LDC destinations
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Chart 28. Main LDC RSP sender cost corridors
(Percentage)
0 5 10 15 20 25
Singapore - Bangladesh
Saudi Arabia - Yemen
Saudi Arabia - Nepal
Saudi Arabia - Bangladesh
United Kingdom - Bangladesh
United Kingdom - Nepal
United Arab Emirates - Nepal
Malaysia - Bangladesh
United States - Ethiopia
United Kingdom - Somalia
United States - Haiti
Senegal - Mali
Italy - Senegal
United Kingdom - Sierra Leone
United Kingdom - Ethiopia
Belgium - Dem.Rep. of Congo
United Kingdom - Uganda
Kenya - Uganda
Kenya - Rwanda
United Kingdom - Zambia
United Kingdom - Gambia
New Zealand - Samoa
United Kingdom - Tanzania
France - Senegal
United Kingdom - Rwanda
Dominican Republic - Haiti
Australia - Vanuatu
Italy - Ethiopia
France - Mali
Canada - Haiti
Canada - Rwanda
France - Haiti
South Africa - Lesotho
United Kingdom - Eritrea
Australia - Samoa
South Africa - Angola
South Africa - Mozambique
South Africa - Malawi
South Africa - Zambia
Tanzania - Rwanda
Tanzania - Uganda
Percentage
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on The World Bank Group, Remittance Prices Worldwide: Making Markets More
Transparent, online at remittanceprices.worldbank.org (accessed May, 2012; first quarter 2012 data).
on informal networks, aggregate volume and competition as well as on the 
availability of banking institutions and technology.
If North–South remittance costs are high, South–South remittance costs are 
often significantly higher (see chart 28). The most expensive channels for remitting 
transfers to LDCs are found within Africa, whereas the least expensive are from 
Singapore and Saudi Arabia to Asian LDCs. Remitters to Asian LDCs face the 
If North–South remittance costs are 
high, South–South remittance costs 
are often significantly higher.
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lowest average costs for sending remittances; they also tend to encounter 
lower spreads between the minimum and maximum average cost (six per cent), 
compared with 12 per cent for Pacific LDCs and 20 per cent for African LDCs. 
One possible reason is that Asian LDCs have a higher than average estimated 
number of RSPs per sending country, compared with African LDCs and Haiti. 
Asian LDCs also face lower average exchange rate margin costs than African 
and Pacific LDCs.28 For example, exchange rate margins in Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Yemen are on average 1.3 per cent.29 For 16 African LDCs, the margin is on 
average 2.9 per cent, whereas for five Pacific LDCs, the average is 4.6 per cent. 
Although the major MTOs are present in the Asian market, they face greater 
competition due to the absence of exclusivity agreements30 and the proliferation 
of new technologies, such as mobile phone transfers and transfer cards, which 
have helped to reduce costs. 
There is significant variation across Africa (chart 29a): while most African 
corridors have average remittance costs of 22 per cent, the cost is only 10 per 
cent for remittances sent from Kenya. For remitters sending from the UK to 
Rwanda and Uganda, the average cost is lower than from Tanzania, at 12 per 
cent and 8 per cent respectively (chart 28). Sending remittances within Africa 
is thus prohibitively expensive, and costs nearly twice as much as sending the 
same amount of money between Singapore and Bangladesh (chart 28). In 
Kenya, banks sending remittances to African LDCs are on average around 19 
per cent more expensive than MTOs, and almost three times more expensive 
than MTOs in South Africa and Tanzania. For sending remittances from the UK 
to Rwanda and Zambia, banks are on average 35 per cent more expensive than 
MTOs. 
The implications of such high remittance costs may be significant. The World 
Bank has estimated that in 2010, annual remittances sent to sub-Saharan 
Africa could have generated an additional $6 billion for recipients, if the costs of 
remitting money had matched the global average (Ratha et al., 2011). In many 
LDCs, the remittance market exhibits a low level of competition with very little 
financial institutional presence, in particular in rural areas. For example, for the 
whole of sub-Saharan Africa, 65 per cent of all remittance payout locations are 
controlled by two MTOs (MoneyGram and Western Union). Similarly, African 
governments have put in place several RSP exclusivity arrangements limiting the 
type of institutions able to offer remittance services only to banks, thus reducing 
RSP competition (Ratha et al., 2011).
Pacific LDCs also face an average cost of remitting to the region which is 
significantly higher than the global average, though somewhat lower than 
within Africa. Chart 29(c) shows that across most corridors (such as Australia-
Samoa), the average remittance cost is 15 per cent of the amount remitted 
when sent from Australia and 11 per cent when sent from New Zealand. These 
relatively high costs may in part reflect the relatively small and remote nature 
of many Pacific economies, which could be limiting the extent to which RSPs 
can leverage “economies of scale” (that is, falling average costs as the number 
of transactions increases) to reduce costs. However, as in the case of sub-
Saharan Africa, other factors such as regulatory, competition and infrastructure 
issues may also play a role.31
Average remittance costs naturally mask a wide range of elements that 
vary by corridor and RSP. By corridor, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have the 
highest average fees from both Australia and New Zealand. Average costs 
vary from 10 per cent (New Zealand to Kiribati) to 17.5 per cent (Australia to 
Solomon Islands). In competitive markets, fees imposed on remittance services 
should reflect their cost of provision by RSPs, allowing for a profit margin. More 
competitive markets are usually associated with low profit margins and prices 
to consumers that closely reflect the cost of providing this service, as firms are 
The most expensive channels for 
remitting to LDCs are found within 
Africa, whereas the least expensive 
are from Singapore and Saudi 
Arabia to Asian LDCs. 
In 2010, annual remittances sent 
to sub-Saharan Africa could have 
generated an additional $6 billion for 
recipients, if the costs of remitting 
money had matched the global 
average.
For sub-Saharan Africa, 65 per cent 
of all remittance payout locations 
are controlled by two MTOs 
(MoneyGram and Western Union).
African governments have put 
in place several RSP exclusivity 
arrangements limiting the type of 
institutions able to offer remittance 
services only to banks, thus 
reducing RSP competition.
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Chart 29. RSP sending countries to LDC recipients’ spreads and averages
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on The World Bank Group, Remittance Prices Worldwide: Making Markets More
Transparent, online at remittanceprices.worldbank.org (accessed May, 2012; first quarter 2012 data).
unable to charge fees greatly in excess of their costs without losing market share 
to competitors. Among RSPs, financial institutions are on average around 22 per 
cent more expensive than MTOs in Australia and 10 per cent more expensive 
in New Zealand, although at an individual RSP level, the lowest cost providers 
in some New Zealand remittance corridors are banks. However, several studies 
suggest that remittance charges tend to decline with volume sent, and this is 
particularly true as regards charges for amounts ranging from $150 to $300 
(Ratha et al., 2011; CGAP, 2010). 
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Table 8. Regulatory challenges facing international RSPs in LDCs
Issues generic to 
international RSPs
t "DRVJSJOHUIFOFDFTTBSZBVUIPSJ[BUJPOPGOPOCBOLFOUJUJFTUPQSPWJEFDSPTTCPSEFSUSBOTGFSTFSWJDFTJO-%$T
often incurs high transaction costs.
t )BSEDVSSFODZPVUPGDPVOUSZUSBOTGFSSFHVMBUJPOT
SFNJUUBODFTFSWJDFQSPWJEFST	341T
DPNQMJBODFXJUI
exchange control and reporting requirements are arduous and costly in some LDCs.
t &YDIBOHFDPOUSPMSFHVMBUJPOTUIBUSFRVJSFDVTUPNFSTUPQSPWJEFSFQPSUJOHEPDVNFOUBUJPOJOQFSTPONBZ
prevent mobile international remittance models from growing sustainably. Also, exchange controls and 
foreign currency rationing in LDCs may pose a significant barrier to South-South regional mobile international 
remittance development.
RSP exclusivity 
agreements
t *O-%$T
PGUFOUIFMBSHFTU.50TFOUFSJOUPFYDMVTJWFQBZNFOUBHSFFNFOUTXJUIUIPTFCBOLTUIBUIBWFUIF
widest retail network, and that sometimes no other (non-bank) institutions are allowed to pay remittances. 
t .PSFPWFSUPFOUFSUIFTFNBSLFUT
341TGBDFBTJUVBUJPOXIFSFUIFGFXCBOLTBMMPXFEUPQBZSFNJUUBODFT
cannot sign an agreement with a new (possibly more efficient) RSP due to the exclusivity agreement; often 
other potential payment partners, such as MFIs or post offices, are prohibited from offering remittance 
services. 
Issues specific 
to international 
remittances 
through mobile 
money
t 4JODF
UIFFYJTUJOHJOUFSOBUJPOBMGSBNFXPSLBOEOBUJPOBMNFBTVSFTGPSBOUJNPOFZMBVOEFSJOH	".-
BOE
combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) may have had far-reaching effects for LDCs. The introduction of 
stricter AML/CFT regulations (such as record-keeping and customer ID compliance regulations) may have 
unintentionally reduced the access of LDC populations to formal financial services.
t ".-$'5SFRVJSFNFOUTWBSZCZDPVOUSZGPSCPUINPCJMF341TBOENPCJMFNPOFZNPSFHFOFSBMMZ)PXFWFS
JO
many LDCs cross-border transactions now involve stricter compliance and increased requirements.
Mobile money 
specific issues
t "VUIPSJ[BUJPOPGDBTIJOBOEDBTIPVUTFSWJDFTPVUTJEFPGCBOLCSBODIFTJOTPNF-%$TJTTUJMMHSFBUMZ
restricted.
t *ONBOZ-%$T
$FOUSBM#BOLBVUIPSJUJFTSFTUSJDUUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGNPCJMFJOUFSOBUJPOBMSFNJUUBODF
deployments by not currently allowing the use of non-bank agents in fund transfer transactions.
Source: UNCTAD secretariat summary based on World Bank (2011a) and CGAP (2010).
Competitive markets for transfer services tend to develop in areas where 
there are large immigrant populations, generating economies of scale that 
reduce transaction and transfer costs. The cost of formal international transfers 
to rural areas tends to be high (Orozco, 2010) and access to remittance outlets 
can present a problem for rural residents. Formal banking procedures (such as 
documentation requirements) and physical access difficulties constitute major 
barriers for the rural population (World Bank, 2005). The weak institutional 
capacity of rural finance providers is also related to the limited availability of 
educated and well-trained people in smaller rural communities — this is 
particularly an issue for community-based microfinance institutions (MFIs).
Accessible and low-cost money transfer mechanisms are not only needed 
for international remittances but also for domestic ones, i.e. for money sent from 
urban to rural areas or from one agricultural region to another (Wimaladharma 
et al., 2004; Pradhan et al., 2008). In Viet Nam, it was found that seven out of 
every eight transfers are domestic, although they make up only half the value 
of international remittances (Sander, 2003). Since international travel can be 
expensive, domestic remittances are particularly relevant to the rural poor (Faini, 
2006).
In general, the lack of competition among RSPs appears to be a significant 
factor in explaining the high costs of remittances. The regulatory challenges that 
RSPs face vary by LDC and region, and have led to different characteristics 
in the respective remittance markets (UNCTAD, 2010b). Some of these are 
summarized in table 8 below and discussed in the next section of this chapter.
2. EMERGING REMITTANCE TRANSFER PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Remittance transfer payments systems in LDCs are evolving, and new 
channels and technologies are emerging. In most LDCs, there is little 
interoperability between bank ATM and point-of-sale (POS)32 networks, a factor 
which limits customer numbers and therefore the financial viability of these 
networks. Most bank branch and ATM networks are located in major population 
centres, limiting rural access. With improving LDC infrastructure and the growth 
in mobile bank branches and branchless banking, both urban and rural clientele 
Accessible and low-cost money 
transfer mechanisms are not only 
needed for international remittances 
but also for domestic ones, i.e. for 
money sent from urban to rural 
areas.
The lack of competition among 
RSPs appears to be a significant 
factor in explaining the high costs
of remittances.
Remittance transfer payments 
systems in LDCs are evolving, and 
new channels and technologies
are emerging.
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Chart 30. Bank accounts and mobile subscriptions per 1000 inhabitants, selected LDCs, 2010
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access to financial services should improve. In LDCs, there are now more mobile 
subscriptions than bank accounts (chart 30). The UNCTAD Information Economy 
Report (2010b) shows that there is rapidly growing interactive connectivity in 
LDCs, which could facilitate access to financial services and low-cost mobile 
micro-insurance products. However, as noted in table 8, regulatory issues have 
arisen as a result of concerns at the international level about money laundering 
and the financing of terrorist activities (IMF, 2012).
Chart 31 shows a schematic of potential branchless banking options 
for remittance transfer in LDCs. There are four emerging delivery models of 
relevance to LDCs: 
1. M-wallets (mobile money) to facilitate cash-in;
2. Customer m-wallets to enable cash-out;
3. Agent m-wallets (mobile money) to enable cash-out.
4. Prepaid cards that can be topped up directly from one sending country to 
enable cash-out (CGAP, 2012).
UNCTAD (2012c) has categorized mobile money services into three groups: 
(i) M-transfers: where money is transferred from one user to another, often 
referred to as person-to-person (P2P) transfers, which may be domestic or 
international; (ii) M-payments: where money is exchanged between two users 
with an accompanying exchange of goods or services; and (iii) M-financial 
There is rapidly growing interactive 
connectivity in LDCs, which could 
facilitate access to financial services 
and low-cost mobile micro-
insurance products. 
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Chart 31. Potential branchless banking options for remittance transfers in LDCs
International remittance / Money transfer flow
Received in bank account
Cashed in through:
Or, new distribution methods using branchless infrastructure
Banks, MFIs, MTCs
or MNO
Banks, MFIs, MTCs
or MNO
Banks or
FX companies
Cashed out through traditional distribution methods:
Branch or automated
teller machine (ATM)
Personal m-wallet Agent POS
Agent m-wallet
Card
PIN
or
or
ATM
Personal identification
number issued (PIN code) MTC office / branch
International
Money
Transfer
Processing
Money whether
cash, debit or pre-
paid card is
deposited at a:
Bank branch,
MTO office, or
m-wallet agent
Account is either a
bank account or
m-wallet
and debited:
in person,
online, or
on phone
Source: Adapted from CGAP (2012). 
Note: Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC), Mobile Network Operator (MNO) (technology providers enhancing ATM interoper-
ability with banks). Regarding mobile cash-in or cash-out methods, irrespective of how a sender transmits funds, these funds are 
stored in an m-wallet which can be used for mobile transactions or cashed through an MNO agent network.
services: where mobile money may be linked to a bank account to provide 
the user with a whole range of transactions (savings, credits) that they would 
ordinarily access at a bank branch (see chart 31).
Within Africa, the East African Community (EAC) is at the frontier of both 
mobile money transfer technology and payment systems. Nonetheless, most 
mobile money services across EAC are essentially domestic between urban 
and rural areas, with m-transfers accounting for the bulk of transactions (CGAP, 
2012; UNCTAD, 2012c). Mobile money services may be gradually replacing 
traditional, often insecure informal methods of sending money.
The UNCTAD (2012c) study focusing on the EAC notes that some M-PESA 
agents perform informal cross-border mobile money transfers between Uganda 
and Kenya. Also, Western Union has already integrated its system with a number 
of mobile money platforms in the EAC in order to allow international remittances 
to be converted and credited directly to a user’s mobile money account. At 
present, this movement is only one way and the service is currently operational 
on M-PESA in Kenya and MTN Mobile Money in Uganda. Clearly, this reflects 
potential nascent demand for mobile money remittance services, and could 
help facilitate growth in cross-border mobile money transfers and regional trade 
within the EAC. In addition, similar cash-in and cash-out mobile money transfer 
services are being established in other LDCs such as Bangladesh (Banglalink), 
Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Samoa and Tanzania. 
Mobile money services may be 
gradually replacing traditional, 
often insecure informal methods of 
sending money.
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Table 9. MTO participation in the remittance market in African LDCs
(Percentage)
Western 
Union
Money-
Gram
Coinstar
Money 
Express
Express 
funds inter-
national
Express 
Money 
Transfer
Trans-
horn 
Money 
Trans
Money 
Transfer
Other
Angola 30 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Benin 64 5 2 18 0 0 11 0 0
Burkina Faso 65 11 2 12 0 0 11 0 0
Burundi 85 3 3 0 0 0 10 0 0
Central African Republic 96 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chad 59 23 3 15 0 0 0 0 0
Comoros 67 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 26
Democratic Republic of the Congo 45 3 29 0 0 0 23 0 0
Djibouti 67 6 17 0 0 0 0 0 11
Equatorial Guinea 80 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eritrea 7 10 0 0 0 0 0 7 76
Ethiopia 33 14 2 0 0 24 0 0 28
Gambia 63 23 3 4 0 0 0 1 7
Guinea 66 18 1 5 0 0 1 0 9
Guinea-Bissau 64 13 8 0 0 0 0 0 15
Lesotho 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 88
Liberia 0 98 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Madagascar 86 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malawi 43 38 5 0 0 0 0 0 14
Mali 77 14 1 3 0 0 5 0 0
Mozambique 37 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 47
Niger 63 12 0 13 0 0 1 0 11
Rwanda 79 3 0 0 0 0 18 0 0
Sao Tome and Principe 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal 38 9 21 15 0 0 17 0 0
Sierra Leone 32 36 1 0 0 0 4 6 21
Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Sudan 41 0 54 0 0 0 0 2 2
Togo 50 7 1 26 0 0 16 0 0
Uganda 50 32 3 0 0 0 0 0 15
United Republic of Tanzania 44 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 47
Zambia 39 61 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LDC average 51 19 6 3 0 1 4 1 16
Source: Adapted from IFAD (2009).
Moreover, Western Union has established strategic alliances with MTN 
Uganda and Roshan in Afghanistan which will allow senders to remit funds 
directly to a recipient’s mobile wallet from any of Western Union’s agent 
locations worldwide. Clearly, MNOs are positive about the prospects for greater 
deployment of international remittances through mobile money in LDCs, 
although these benefits are most likely of a long-term nature.
Notwithstanding the potential of these emerging systems, in most LDCs more 
traditional forms of RSP provision still dominate. LDC MTOs operate through 
their own chain stores or a range of existing outlets, for example supermarkets, 
pharmacies, other transfer agents, bureaux de change and post offices. Since 
MTOs often partner with other outlets, they usually face lower operating costs 
than banking institutions. RSPs generate revenue through transfer fees, foreign 
exchange margins and delayed transfers (to earn interest income). Table 9 
shows that MTO participation in the remittance market in African LDCs is heavily 
concentrated in the hands of Western Union and MoneyGram, which account for 
approximately 70 per cent of the market — five per cent above the pan-African 
average. Most financial market regulations in Africa only allow banks to provide 
remittance services (see table 8). Approximately 51 per cent of payments and 
65 per cent of all pay-out locations are serviced by banks in partnerships with 
either MoneyGram or Western Union (IFAD, 2009).
Notwithstanding the potential of 
these emerging systems, in most 
LDCs more traditional forms of RSP 
provision still dominate. 
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Table 10. African LDC inbound payment of remittances by institution, 2010
(Percentage)
Bank Forex MFI Other Post Retail
Angola 100 0 0 0 0 0
Benin 26 0 0 8 54 11
Burkina Faso 31 2 2 14 38 13
Burundi 68 0 21 11 0 0
Central African Republic 70 0 20 0 0 10
Chad 53 0 0 47 0 0
Comoros 12 0 9 0 76 3
Democratic Republic of the Congo 25 0 0 67 0 9
Djibouti 23 0 0 23 46 8
Equatorial Guinea 75 0 0 13 13 0
Eritrea 42 58 0 0 0 0
Ethiopia 89 0 0 10 1 0
Gambia 34 42 0 15 1 9
Guinea 47 6 0 28 0 19
Guinea-Bissau 26 26 0 48 0 0
Lesotho 100 0 0 0 0 0
Liberia 69 0 0 28 0 3
Madagascar 52 6 0 24 18 0
Malawi 70 10 0 15 0 6
Mali 59 0 17 15 9 0
Mozambique 100 0 0 0 0 0
Niger 33 0 6 18 28 14
Rwanda 63 0 24 9 4 0
Sao Tome and Principe 100 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal 13 0 9 26 53 0
Sierra Leone 62 20 0 16 0 3
Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 100
Sudan 18 46 7 29 0 0
Togo 23 0 14 25 38 0
Uganda 63 0 17 19 1 0
United Republic of Tanzania 65 0 0 10 25 0
Zambia 84 0 0 5 11 0
Average 53 7 5 16 13 7
Source: Adapted from IFAD (2009).
However, table 10 shows that although there is scope for greater participation 
of MFIs and post offices in providing remittance pay-out and transfer services in 
African LDCs, the market for these services is still dominated by banks, which 
account for 53 per cent of inbound payment of remittances in African LDCs. 
Although post offices have a strong geographical presence in African LDCs, they 
lack the necessary human capital, communications infrastructure and cashflow 
to participate effectively in the remittance pay-out market. Similarly, MFIs only 
account for five per cent of African LDC inbound payment of remittances by 
institution yet tend to have a greater institutional presence in rural areas, where 
most Africans still reside. Much of this is concentrated in six African LDCs: 
Rwanda, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mali, Uganda and Togo (see 
table 10).
In LDCs, MFIs actually have a greater network and reach in rural areas 
than either commercial banks or cooperatives, especially as compared with 
ODCs (see table 11). However, efforts to promote competitive and reliable fund 
transfer services and to adopt technology that lowers the cost and improves 
the efficiency of financial services delivery to the rural population have been 
constrained by a lack of infrastructure and supportive legal frameworks. The 
rural poor would benefit directly from policies and regulatory systems that raise 
There is scope for greater 
participation of MFIs and post 
offices in providing remittance
pay-out and transfer services
in African LDCs.
Efforts to promote competitive 
and reliable fund transfer services 
have been constrained by a lack of 
infrastructure and supportive legal 
frameworks. 
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confidence in the role of MFIs and other non-bank financial institutions and rural 
savings mobilization. They would also benefit if MFIs, post offices and banks 
acted as channels for rural payments and for the transfer of remittances. Efforts 
to promote partnerships between the private sector and governments (in both 
developed and developing countries) and to remove barriers to the flow of 
remittances also have the potential for improving access to finance for the rural 
poor and local SMEs. 
The potential benefits of remittances would be maximized if LDC governments 
and their development partners could address transaction cost and access 
issues related to monetary transfers. One way of doing this would be to launch 
initiatives with bilateral and multilateral partners to address existing infrastructural 
and regulatory barriers. In addition, there may be a need to promote greater 
competition among remittance service providers (Mundaca, 2009; Orozco, 
2007; Sander, 2003). Microfinance institutions and credit unions are likely to 
be a key link in channelling remittances, particularly to rural communities, and 
in facilitating financial intermediation (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005; Orozco and 
Fedewa, 2006). However, promoting competition raises regulatory issues, 
primarily to ensure the reliability and integrity of transfer systems and to avoid 
their abuse (e.g. for money laundering). Policymakers face a challenge in striking 
the right balance between promoting competition and maintaining supportive 
regulations.
Data from the World Bank’s Global Payments Systems survey, 2010 (2011c) 
about the relative importance, as rated by LDC central banks, of the various 
payment instruments for sending and receiving remittances, reveal that current 
account transfers are perceived as the most important instrument, followed 
by cash. For receiving remittances, most LDC central banks ranked cash and 
current account transfers as the most important and mobile phone payments 
as the least important. The ratings are similar to those reported by central bank 
respondents in ODCs. 
Chart 32 shows the lack of cashless payment infrastructure such as ATMs, 
point-of-sale terminals, debit and credit cards in LDCs as compared with ODCs 
and developed economies. Although the expansion of the cashless payment 
infrastructure is increasing in LDCs, this is from a very low base. Moreover, 
in developed countries, an individual performs on average over 100 cashless 
transactions per year, while this same indicator is 19 for ODCs and economies in 
transition and less than 1 for LDCs. However, there is evidence of growth in per 
capita cashless transactions in both LDCs and ODCs during the period 2006–
2009 (see chart 32). Within the LDC group, cashless transactions grew fastest 
in African LDCs during the period 2006–2009 (by approximately 500 per cent).
In sum, it is clear that remittance payment systems in LDCs are comparatively 
limited and mainly located in urban centres. Moreover, the slow development of 
access channels to initiate and deliver cashless payments (e.g. POS terminals 
in many LDCs, together with inadequate interoperability of the infrastructure 
that already exists) has constrained access to modern and cheaper modes of 
accessing remittance services. It is likely that limited competition among RSPs, 
especially banking institutions, MTOs and other payment services providers, 
typically results in higher costs and less access to RSP services, especially in 
rural areas. Accordingly, LDC policymakers need to introduce policy reforms 
to improve the national payments system, not just for remittance recipients 
Table 11. LDC bank branches per hundred thousand adults, 2010
Commercial banks Cooperatives SSFIs MFIs
LDC average 2.9 2.9 0.6 3.7
ODC average 16.0 2.5 1.5 1.6
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on CGAP (2010).
SSFIs = Specialized State Financial Institutions; MFIs = Microfinance Institutions.
The potential benefits of remittances 
would be maximized if LDC 
governments and their development 
partners could address transaction 
cost and access issues related to 
monetary transfers.
Policymakers face a challenge in 
striking the right balance between 
promoting competition and 
maintaining supportive regulations.
LDC policymakers need to introduce 
policy reforms to improve the 
national payments system, not just 
for remittance recipients but also for 
firms, in addressing the prevalence 
of more expensive cash-based 
transactions in LDCs. 
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Chart 32. Recent trends in LDC cashless payment systems 2004–2010
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but also for firms, in addressing the prevalence of more expensive cash-based 
transactions in LDCs. 
Policies are also required to improve competition and regulation of the RSPs 
through greater transparency by providing more information about the service 
(price, speed, foreign exchange charges, etc.) (table 12). In an LDC context, 
this raises concerns about RSP services and appropriate consumer protection 
(see World Bank (2011b). Also, LDC-based RSPs face some financial risk (e.g. 
if liquidity is supplied to disbursing agents), legal and operational risks, and the 
threat of fraud.
There are of course cost implications for effective transparency and 
accountability mechanisms, which may well be passed on to customers. 
Therefore, good governance and risk management practices by RSPs are 
required to help make remittance services safer and help protect LDC consumers. 
Table 12 summarizes an initial assessment of the transparency of remittance 
services based on a selected sample of LDCs, and suggests that LDC RSPs in 
general, as compared with ODC RSPs, have a similar and reasonable regulatory 
framework in place (see table 12). Nonetheless, in an LDC context, we have 
highlighted the importance of RSP competition and the need to remove entry 
barriers for other potential remittance service providers, such as post offices and 
MFIs. This approach, particularly in an African LDC context, would be enhanced 
by the removal of exclusivity conditions (as opposed to an agent choosing to 
offer only one remittance service).
Good governance and risk 
management practices by RSPs
are required to help make remittance 
services safer and help protect
LDC consumers. 
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E. Conclusions
The evidence presented in this chapter highlights the importance of 
remittances to LDCs, not only in terms of the increasing value of these resources 
but also relative to the size of the recipient economies or to other sources of 
external financing. Notwithstanding some heterogeneity across individual 
countries, remittances appear to play a more prominent role in LDC economies 
than in other developing countries. There are distinct regional and subregional 
patterns of remittances, underscoring the significance of South–South flows not 
only in Asia but also within sub-Saharan Africa.
If the rise in remittances has increased the availability of external financing for 
LDCs, the developmental impact of this evolving reality is subject to a number of 
caveats. Migrants’ remittances undoubtedly exert a positive effect at household 
level, in terms of poverty reduction as well as mitigation of adverse income shocks. 
It is less clear as to whether they contribute to the structural transformation of 
recipient countries or merely supplement disposable income with negligible (or 
possibly even adverse) consequences for long-term development.
Overall, the chapter shows that remittances do offer some scope to 
sustain the development of productive capacities, by increasing investment in 
human and physical capital and by stimulating financial deepening. However, 
the realization of such potential is contingent upon the policy and institutional 
framework which recipient countries put in place. In other words, owing to the 
intrinsic specificities of remittances as private sector financial flows, their effective 
mobilization for productive purposes essentially depends on the capacity of the 
State to create a “development-centred” macroeconomic environment while 
also supporting the establishment of a viable and inclusive financial sector. 
This, in turn, warrants a combination of policies at multiple levels, ranging from 
traditional macroeconomic policies capable of crowding in private investment 
and/or avoiding exchange rate appreciation to appropriate financial and 
regulatory reforms aimed at fostering financial deepening, thereby stimulating 
greater use of remittances for productive purposes.
Particularly in an LDC context, leveraging remittances to extend access to 
financial services will also require engaging with a broad range of financial actors, 
along with commercial banks and RSPs. State banks, post offices, microfinance 
institutions and agricultural development banks may have extensive branch 
networks that can be used to extend access to rural financial services quickly 
and relatively cheaply and reach out to a broad array of potential customers, 
from SMEs to micro-entrepreneurs. However, it is clear that greater competition 
in the RSP market involving a wider range of financial institutions with greater 
rural market penetration would be desirable in most LDCs.
Since LDCs typically face disproportionately high costs for remittance 
services, the chapter has also highlighted the role of RSPs and retail payment 
systems, payment platforms and instruments. In this respect, harnessing the 
development potential of remittances will require stronger competition in the 
remittance market and greater attention to regulation (clearing and settlement, 
capital adequacy, exchange controls, disclosure and cross-border arbitration). 
Wider LDC adoption of the 5x5, BIS-World Bank General principles for 
International Remittance services might facilitate this process. This and other 
policy proposals introduced in the present chapter will be elaborated upon in 
chapter 4 of this report.
Notwithstanding some heterogeneity 
across individual countries, 
remittances appear to play a more 
prominent role in LDC economies 
than in other developing countries.
Remittances do offer some scope 
to sustain the development of 
productive capacities.
Their effective mobilization for 
productive purposes essentially 
depends on the capacity of the
State to create a “development-
centred” macroeconomic 
environment while also supporting 
the establishment of a viable and 
inclusive financial sector. 
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Notes
  1 In nominal terms, for instance, net ODA disbursements (excluding debt relief) declined 
from $57 billion in 1990 to $48 billion in 2000 then rose steadily over the 2000s, 
peaking at $125 billion in 2010, that, is, 2.6 times their value at the beginning of the 
decade. Conversely, global FDI flows rose from $207 billion in 1990 to $1,401 billion 
in 2000, peaking at $1,975 billion in 2007, but have not yet recovered since then: in 
2011, they still totalled $1,524 billion.
  2 Since recorded migrant stock does not capture short-term migration, it is also 
possible that such migration, including GATS-related movement, increased in this 
period.
  3 It is worth noting that the rapid growth rate of remittance inflows to transition 
economies during the 1990s largely reflects the disruption of the Soviet Union and 
the consequent abrupt surge in both migrant stocks and international remittances.
  4 Note, however, that improvements in the country coverage of the series only explain a 
minor part of the rise of LDC remittance inflows. When the analysis is limited to the 22 
LDC countries with consistent data series over the 1980–2011 period, remittances 
grew at a rate very similar to the total figure (nearly 12 per cent per year), climbing 
from $2 billion in 1990 to nearly $20 billion in 2011.
  5 In the wake of 9/11, the strengthening of financial controls led to the disruption of 
some informal “hawala” networks, leading migrants to switch to formal remittance 
channels (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005; Grabel, 2008).
  6 The comparison between remittances and other types of foreign exchange inflows 
(such as export revenues, ODA, or FDI) makes sense from a national accounting 
point of view, but one should bear in mind that the former are radically distinct from 
other capital flows insofar as they are intrinsically linked to international migration. For 
a discussion of some delicate consequences of migration for home countries, notably 
the “brain drain”, see chapter 4.
  7 On the patterns of growth followed by the LDCs in this period, refer to (UNCTAD, 
2010a, 2011a; Valensisi and Davis, 2011).
  8 Data problems, including the presence of frequent zero entries, may also explain 
unrealistically high growth rates for remittance inflows to some recipient countries.
  9 For instance, countries like Ethiopia and Haiti, which receive the bulk of remittances 
from the USA and other developed economies, were typically more adversely hit by 
the fallout of the global financial crisis than other LDCs, such as Bangladesh Lesotho 
or Nepal, whose diasporas mainly reside in other developing countries (UNCTAD, 
2010a).
10 Unfortunately, the lack of adequate time series impedes an assessment of how 
remittance patterns to LDCs have evolved over time: estimates of bilateral remittance 
flows are only available for 2010.
11 The authors explain this finding, arguing that a persistent flow of remittances becomes 
an integral part of a household’s income generation strategy and that the emigrant 
worker remits to simply replace his/her lost contribution to the household.
12 For instance, MacMaster (1993: 279) notes that “In the Cook Islands, Tonga and 
Western Samoa these [remittances] are a mixed blessing as they undermine the 
incentive to work and are rarely spent on productive investment.” Similarly, Mitchell 
(2006: 21) voices the concern that “Remittances create dependency and act as a 
disincentive to the mobilization of domestic resources.”
13 While differing in terms of country/time coverage, control variables included, and 
definition of remittances used (either “personal remittances” or only the balance 
of payment item “workers’ remittances”; see box 3), these studies usually employ 
instrumental variable techniques or panel data methods to address issues of reverse 
causality and unobservable heterogeneity.
14 In the last two of the three papers referenced above, the authors indeed obtain 
a positive effect for the remittance variable on GDP per capita growth, but the 
corresponding coefficient is not significant.
15 All the authors referenced above have left aside distributional issues, although 
admittedly the propensity to save out of remittances income also depends on the 
affluence of the recipient households. Here, distributional aspects will be treated 
below.
16 Note that the idea that remittances “substitute” for a viable financial sector is 
contradicted by (Mundaca, 2009), who, however, does not include any interaction 
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between remittances and financial development. Incidentally, also observe that 
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009) fail to obtain a statistically significant coefficient for 
the remittance variable in the growth regression, unless when they also include a 
variable for financial development, and the interaction between the two.
17 Interestingly, the positive effect of remittances on financial deepening appears to be 
stronger in terms of saving instruments than of access to credit, in line with the idea 
that remittances might ease credit constraints, thereby reducing the need for external 
financing from financial institutions (Anzoategui et al., 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2011).
18 For example, the financial and housing crisis in the USA quickly triggered steep 
reductions of remittance receipts in many Central American economies and in 
Mexico.
19 It is worth noting that the gender dimension could also affect the sensitivity of 
remittances to business cycles. As women migrants are largely employed in the 
services sectors (especially as caregivers and housemaids), they tend to be less 
affected by business cycles than male migrants typically working in manufacturing 
and construction. Hence, countries with a higher proportion of female migrants tend 
to have less cyclicality in remittance transfers (Ghosh, 2009; UNDP, 2009).
20 Interestingly, the USA, where nearly half of the Haitian diaspora resides, favoured 
this process by granting temporary protected status for 18 months to Haitians 
already in the country. The temporary protected status allowed over 200,000 Haitians 
residing in the USA without proper documents to live and work legally, without fear of 
deportation. It also allowed them to send money home quickly and efficiently through 
formal remittance channels (Migration and Development Brief 12).
21 This definition of volatility is consistent with the one employed in (IMF, 2005).
22 Cyclicality in this case is measured as the correlation between detrended relevant 
inflows and detrended GDP growth. For all series, the Hodrick-Prescott filter has 
been used to separate the trend from the cyclical component, setting the smoothing 
parameter equal to 7, in line with standard practice.
23 Using a slightly different approach, (Neagu and Schiff, 2009) find that for a panel of 
116 countries, remittances tend to be more stable and less procyclical than FDI but 
more erratic than ODA, which in turn tends to be countercyclical.
24 This point appears to be confirmed by other studies as well (World Bank, 2008; 
Acosta et al., 2009).
25 The positive impact of remittances on inequality (and not just on poverty measures) in 
the Pacific region is likely to be explained not only by geographic proximity, but also 
by the existence of specific policy frameworks favouring circular migration between 
Australia or New Zealand and several Pacific Islands.
26 The World Bank – 5x5 General Principles for International Remittances Services are 
as follows:
GP1: The market for remittances should be transparent and have adequate consumer 
protection;
GP2: Improvements to payment system infrastructure that have the potential to 
increase the efficiency of remittance services should be encouraged;
GP3: Remittance services should be supported by a sound, predictable, non-
discriminatory and proportionate legal and regulatory framework;
GP4: Competitive market conditions, including appropriate access to domestic 
payments infrastructures, should be fostered in the remittance service industry; 
and
GP5: Remittance services should be supported by appropriate governance and risk 
management practices.
27  UNCTAD (2012c) defines mobile money as funds stored using the SIM (subscriber 
identity module) in a mobile phone as an identifier as opposed to an account number 
in conventional banking. Mobile money banking works as follows: (i) notational 
equivalent is in value issued by an entity (i.e. an MTO) and is kept in a value account 
on the SIM within the mobile phone that is also used to transmit transfer or payment 
instructions, while the corresponding cash value is normally held in a bank; (ii) the 
balance on the value account may be accessed via the mobile phone, which is also 
used to transmit instant transfer or payment instructions (UNCTAD, 2012c).
28  The exchange rate spread is the difference between the exchange rate applied by 
the RSP to convert, for example, dollars into local currency and the interbank (market) 
exchange rate. RSPs usually offer the sender a less favourable exchange rate than 
the market rate.
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29  A survey of the charges borne by LDC remitters suggests that they vary according 
to whether money is transferred in local or foreign currency. RSPs (including MTOs) 
tend to charge more when the amount is sent in dollars (this is an additional source 
of profit for the RSP and an additional cost component). Conversely, if the money is 
sent in local currency at lower fees, the recipient loses a percentage of the remittance 
in the foreign exchange rates. In LDCs, a growing number of companies offer money 
transfers in dollars. However, it should be noted that this activity does not necessarily 
guarantee that received remittances will not include detrimental exchange rate 
charges, as banks can sell dollars at adverse exchange rates (in an LDC context, this 
is a subject requiring further research but is currently beyond the scope of this report). 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the lower costs of delivering funds in dollars are 
not a complete saving for the recipient with a different national currency, as he or she 
will still need to convert the dollars into local currency, an operation which entails a 
transaction cost.
30  According to the World Bank Global Payments Systems Survey of 2010 (2011), 
a number of RSPs reported that in some countries, the largest MTOs enter into 
exclusive payment agreements with those banks that have the widest retail networks 
and that sometimes no other (non-bank) institutions are allowed to pay remittances. In 
response, regulators in some countries, including Nigeria and Ethiopia, have banned 
exclusive remittance agreements. They report that a number of new providers have 
entered the market as a result and that prices have fallen.
31  Pacific LDCs might reasonably expect a more than proportionate increase in 
remittances from a reduction in the related transaction costs, as remittances appear 
to have a negative cost-elasticity with respect to the fixed fee component of money 
transfer costs (Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Ratha, Mohapatra and Saheja, 2011; Gibson 
et al., 2006).
32  Point of sale (POS), such as electronic funds transfer at a point of sale (EFTPOS), is 
a payment system involving electronic funds transfers based on the use of debit and 
credit at terminals located at points of sale.
4CHAPTER
MOBILIZING THE DIASPORA:
FROM BRAIN DRAIN TO BRAIN GAIN
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A. Introduction
The present chapter analyses two aspects of international migration in the 
LDCs not yet discussed in this Report. First, it studies the flows of knowledge and 
technology stemming from the international movement of labour — particularly 
from the migration of so-called high-skilled persons — , their impact on the 
human capital endowment and technological accumulation of LDCs, and the 
emergence of diaspora knowledge networks. Second, the chapter examines 
the impact of international migration on the business activities of these countries 
through two mechanisms: international trade and investment flows between 
home and host countries; and returnee entrepreneurship.
The issues of brain drain, brain gain, brain circulation and the effects of 
diaspora networks on home countries are very contentious. They involve complex 
processes produced by economic, political and social factors and strongly 
influenced by policies in both sending and receiving countries. Mainstream 
academic and policy discussions have swung from a pessimistic view to a 
rather optimistic position on these processes. A significant share of the literature 
is theoretical, but lacks empirical validation. Another portion of research focuses 
on national or local case studies, the conclusions of which cannot always be 
generalized. There is scarcely any study of these processes for the group of 
LDCs, which is what this chapter strives to do.1 It shows that brain drain is 
more prevalent in LDCs than in other developing countries and is especially 
strong in islands and some African LDCs. However, the potential contribution 
to the home country stemming from the strong presence abroad of high-skilled 
LDC nationals and other members of the diaspora is not automatically realized. 
This is especially true of knowledge transfer and sharing, the strengthening of 
trade and investment linkages, or the contribution of returnees to their home 
country. Achieving this potential depends on a series of institutional, economic 
and political conditions, which are so far missing in most LDCs. Therefore, policy 
action by home and host countries, as well as by the international community, is 
crucial in order to foster or strengthen positive diaspora effects on LDCs. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section AB explains how home country 
economies can be adversely affected by brain drain and analyses its trends 
globally and in the LDCs. Incorporating more recent research on the issue, 
Section C analyses how the international movement of skilled persons has 
the potential to benefit the countries of origin, and examines to what extent 
LDCs are availing themselves of these opportunities. Section D summarizes and 
concludes.
B. Brain drain and its adverse
implications for home countries
1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Labour movements and knowledge flows. All international movement of 
labour entails some degree of knowledge flow across countries, which takes 
place in two basic forms. First, embodied knowledge directly accompanies 
people whenever they move across borders temporarily or permanently, “carrying 
with them” the knowledge which has been accumulated through education, 
learning and/or experience. Second, once migrants are settled abroad they 
can share their knowledge, skills and technology with their home country at a 
Brain drain is more prevalent
in LDCs than in other developing 
countries.
The potential contribution stemming 
from diaspora is not automatically 
realized. 
Policy action is crucial in order 
to foster or strengthen positive 
diaspora effects on LDCs.
All international movement of labour 
entails some degree of knowledge 
flow across countries.
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distance (e.g. through information and communication technologties (ICTs)), i.e. 
without this involving the cross-border movement of natural persons.
International migrants consist of people with all levels of educational 
background, including those with no formal education and those with some 
degree of primary, secondary or tertiary education. Differences in knowledge 
and skills between non-migrants and migrants and among the latter tend to 
become more accentuated as the migratory experience unfolds. Time spent 
studying, living and working abroad usually allows migrants to be exposed to 
different cultural and business environments and to acquire new skills, such as 
language, craft, technological, academic, professional, managerial, networking 
and relational capabilities. This human capital accumulation abroad takes place 
through different mechanisms, including formal education, informal channels 
(e.g. on-the-job training, learning by doing while working) and/or accumulated 
experience (Dustmann et al., 2011; Domingues dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 
2003). All emigrants can acquire some type of new skills and knowledge, but 
this tends to happen more intensively the more skilled emigrants are, through a 
process of cumulative causation driven by the increasing returns that are typical 
of knowledge and its accumulation.
While all international migrants have some knowledge and skills, a large 
portion of the research and policy discussions on brain drain and brain 
circulation focuses on so-called “high-skilled migrants”. These are migrants who 
have some length of tertiary (i.e. university-level) education, ranging from one 
year of study at this level to post-doctorate graduates.2 Statistics generally use 
this definition of high-skilled worker. Accordingly, brain drain has been defined as 
“the migration of engineers, physicians, scientists, and other very highly skilled 
professionals with university training” (Docquier and Rapoport, 2008). 
Two other categories largely overlap with that of high-skilled workers: 
knowledge workers and talent. Knowledge workers are those persons who 
possess specialized knowledge and are involved in high value-added and 
high-productivity jobs that are essential for the global knowledge economy and 
society. The category of internationally mobile talent is composed of three broad 
types: 1. directly productive talent (entrepreneurs, executives, managers, and 
technical engineers); 2. scientific talent (academics, scientists and international 
students); and 3. health and cultural talent (physicians, nurses, artists, musicians, 
writers, and media-related people) (Solimano, 2008).
The knowledge-based economy and brain drain. International movements 
of skilled people or talent are a feature of the knowledge-based economy (David 
and Foray, 2002; Foray, 2006; Hollanders et al., 1999). The latter also has the 
following defining features:
t *UQSPEVDFTJODSFBTJOHMZLOPXMFEHFJOUFOTJWFHPPETBOETFSWJDFT
XIJDIJO
turn require skilled labour inputs for their production. This raises demand for 
skills (or talent) both in terms of the number of workers and in terms of the 
skill level of each worker;
t 5IFJOUBOHJCMFDBQJUBMTUPDL	SFTVMUJOHGSPNJOWFTUNFOUJOFEVDBUJPO
USBJOJOH

research and development, health, etc.) tends to become larger than 
physical capital (physical infrastructure and equipment, natural resources, 
etc.);
t ,OPXMFEHF JT JODSFBTJOHMZCFDPNJOH UIFDSVDJBMEFUFSNJOBOUPG DPVOUSJFT
long-term growth and international competitiveness.
Given these developments, knowledge is part of UNCTAD’s definition of 
productive capacities and plays an essential role in the development of LDCs 
(UNCTAD, 2006: 59–84, 2007: 1–10).
Time spent studying, living and 
working abroad usually allows 
migrants to acquire new skills.
All emigrants can acquire some type 
of new skills and knowledge, but this 
tends to happen more intensively 
the more skilled emigrants are.
Brain drain is the migration of 
engineers, physicians, scientists, 
and other very highly skilled 
professionals with university training.
International movements of skilled 
people or talent are a feature of the 
knowledge-based economy.
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The agglomeration economies typical of knowledge-intensive activities lead 
to the concentration of high-skilled people in a few locations (nationally) or 
countries (internationally). Talented individuals rarely develop their full potential 
by working in isolation. A new idea, a new product, a new production process 
or a new scientific theory requires human interaction and cooperation. An 
entrepreneur needs access to capital, markets and technology to develop his 
or her new ideas and visions. A scientist needs a certain number of peers to 
discuss his or her theories and present research papers. As a result, highly 
skilled people from both developed and developing countries — including LDCs 
— who decide to emigrate mainly choose developed countries as their migration 
destination (see subsection B2a below). 
Recent research3 on high-skilled labour identifies the following main factors 
that drive its international mobility: 
t .PSFGBWPVSBCMFDPOEJUJPOTGPSQSPGFTTJPOBMEFWFMPQNFOUJOIPTUDPVOUSJFT
In destination countries, high-skilled emigrants typically earn higher salaries 
than in their home countries. The pay gap is such that salaries in developed 
destination countries are sometimes 20 times higher than in LDC countries 
of origin. Host countries allow higher labour productivity, thanks to a 
better institutional environment and to the externalities stemming from the 
agglomeration of knowledge workers. Complementarities between talent, 
capital and technology reinforce these agglomeration economies. Moreover, 
destination countries offer better opportunities for professional development 
in terms of career advancement prospects as well as better living conditions 
for emigrants and their families, superior infrastructure necessary for work 
and daily life, and political stability. In most cases, host countries offer more 
favourable conditions for research and academic interaction for scientists, 
as well as more secure property rights for entrepreneurs;
t "EWFSTF DPOEJUJPOT JO IPNF DPVOUSJFT 	FH QPMJUJDBM TUSJGF
 DJWJM DPOþJDU

insecurity), which act as push factors of international migration;
t -PXFSSFMBUJWFNJHSBUJPODPTUTGPSUIFIJHITLJMMFEBTDPNQBSFEUPUIFMPX
skilled, given the former’s easier access to information on host country 
labour markets, more favourable migration conditions and their greater 
access to transportation;
t 4FMFDUJWFJNNJHSBUJPOQPMJDJFTGPSBUUSBDUJOHGPSFJHOUBMFOUFOBDUFEFTQFDJBMMZ
by several developed countries. 
2. BRAIN DRAIN TRENDS
The following section briefly analyses global trends and future prospects for 
international flows of high-skilled labour, in order to put trends concerning brain 
drain and knowledge circulation in LDCs into perspective. 
a) Global trends
Current flows of high-skilled workers. Brain drain has been increasing 
worldwide in absolute figures. The number of high-skilled international migrants 
climbed from 16.4 million in 1990 to 26.2 million in 2000, which implies an annual 
growth rate of 4.8 per cent. Between 2000 and 2010, the emigration of highly 
educated persons continued to increase, rising at an estimated annual pace of 4 
per cent (based on figures for the United States, the largest destination for brain 
drain worldwide and home to some 40 per cent of all high-skilled emigrants). 
Complete data on worldwide bilateral flows of high-skilled labour are available 
for 1990 and 2000, because at the time of writing this Report, most results of 
the 2010 round of population censuses (the major primary source for brain drain 
statistics) had not yet been published.4 The UNCTAD secretariat has collected 
The agglomeration economies of 
knowledge-intensive activities lead 
to the concentration of high-skilled 
people in a few countries.
The main factors driving international 
mobility of high-skilled labour are: 
(a) More favourable conditions for 
professional development in host 
countries; (b) Adverse conditions in 
home countries; (c) Lower relative 
migration costs for the high-skilled; 
(d) Selective immigration policies for 
attracting foreign talent.
Brain drain has been increasing 
worldwide in absolute figures.
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more updated indicators and information on high-skilled emigration from LDCs 
and has also commissioned case studies on some of these countries. Together, 
these sources of information and data provide solid evidence for analysing major 
flows, trends and structural features of brain drain.
International immigration is selective, since it is skewed towards highly 
educated people. Twenty-six per cent of all international migrants are tertiary-
educated (according to data for 2000), while only 11.3 per cent of the world 
labour force have tertiary education. In developing countries, university-level 
workers account for a much lower five per cent of the labour force. 
The selectivity of international migration is also reflected by the different 
emigration rates, i.e. the number of emigrants as a share of the corresponding 
labour force segment. Worldwide, the emigration rate is 6.6 per cent for all 
tertiary-educated people, well above the 2.63 per cent emigration rate of low-
skilled people. Moreover, the degree of skill-based selectivity of immigration 
varies sharply according to the development level of the host country, rising 
with the development level of the destination country of international migrants. 
In developed countries, 35 per cent of immigrants are tertiary-educated, while in 
other developing countries (i.e. those developing countries which are not LDCs) 
this share is one-third of that level: 13 per cent. In LDCs, by contrast, a mere 
four per cent of immigrants are highly skilled (chart 33). Immigration selectivity 
has been increasing. Worldwide, the total stock of high-skilled immigrants rose 
by 60 per cent between 1990 and 2000, while that of low-skilled migrants went 
up by a modest 16 per cent. This is largely driven by immigration trends in 
developed countries. There, the selection rate (i.e. the tertiary-educated as a 
share of all immigrants) rose by six percentage points in the ten years to 2000. 
This confirms the tendency of human capital to agglomerate in locations where it 
is already relatively abundant (Docquier, Marfouk et al. 2011), a tendency which 
is reinforced by selective immigration policies in major destination countries. 
More than half of international high-skilled migration is South–North. 
The second most important flow of tertiary-educated people is North–
North: migration among developed countries amounts to almost one-third of 
Chart 33. Immigrant selection rate of major host country groups, 2000
(Share of worldwide and LDC immigrants with tertiary education)
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International immigration is selective, 
since it is skewed towards highly 
educated people.
The degree of skill-based selectivity 
of immigration rises with the 
development level of the
destination country.
More than half of international high-
skilled migration is South–North. 
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international skilled labour flows. Skilled migration flows are highly concentrated 
in a few destination countries, and developed countries absorb some 80 per 
cent of all international high-skilled migratory flows. The major country is the 
United States, which hosts some 40 per cent of all internationally mobile high-
skilled people. It is followed by Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, Germany, 
Russian Federation and France.5 The professions most affected by brain drain 
are computer specialists, accountants, managers, medical doctors and nurses 
and, among higher education levels, scientists and academics. 
The gender balance of brain drain seems to be closely associated with the 
level of development of destination countries. In developed countries, high-
skilled men and women each account for half of total high-skilled immigration. 
In the group of other developing countries, two-thirds of all tertiary-educated 
immigrants are male, while in LDCs this share is 71 per cent. In developing 
countries of origin, genders differ slightly in their brain drain rates (i.e. the number 
of tertiary-educated emigrants as a share of the labour force at the same level 
of education in the home country). They are five per cent for males and six per 
cent for females. The main reason for this discrepancy is that tertiary education 
enrolment in home countries is higher for males than for females (Docquier and 
Rapoport, 2012).
Future outlook. Based on underlying forces pushing current international 
migratory flows, and barring major disruptions in the international economy, the 
international mobility of high-skilled persons is likely to continue in the future, 
largely as a result of the following trends: 
t 5IFHSPXJOHLOPXMFEHFJOUFOTJUZPGUIFXPSMEFDPOPNZ	TFFTFDUJPO#

t 5IFEFDMJOF JO EFNPHSBQIJD HSPXUI BOEDPOTFRVFOU BHFJOHPG UIFXPSME
population, as well as the expanding demand for health services which 
accompanies development; 
t 5IFTUFBEJMZGBMMJOHDPTUTPGUSBOTQPSUBUJPOBOEDPNNVOJDBUJPO
t &DPOPNJDJOUFSEFQFOEFODFCSPVHIUBCPVUCZHMPCBMJ[BUJPO
t 5IF MJOHFSJOH JODPNF HBQT CFUXFFO QSPGFTTJPOBMT JO EFWFMPQFE BOE JO
developing countries.
The first two processes above are progressing at a faster pace in developed 
countries than in developing countries. Together with the other three, they are 
likely to continue driving international movement of skilled labour in the future.6
b) LDC trends
An estimated 1.3 million workers with university-level education had emigrated 
from LDCs by 2000. While this was 58 per cent more than a decade earlier, 
bilateral flows developed unevenly. The greatest increase was in emigration to 
developed countries, which almost doubled during this period (table 13). By 
now the total stock is estimated to have exceeded two million.
During the 2000s, the number of high-skilled persons migrating from LDCs 
to the main destination countries continued to grow. In the United States, 
the number of tertiary-educated residents born in LDCs rose by 78.7 per 
cent between 2000 and 2010. Table 14 provides the corresponding data, as 
well as indirect evidence of developments in brain drain from LDCs to major 
destination countries.7 These data indicate continuing growth in migration 
of high-skilled LDC nationals to other developed countries. Such a result is 
somewhat surprising, since it comes in spite of two major developments that 
are likely to have depressed immigration in those countries in the 2000s: first, 
the immigration backlash following the 9/11 attacks; and, second, the world 
economic and financial crises which started in 2007. These developments seem 
Skilled migration flows are highly 
concentrated in a few destination 
countries, and developed countries 
absorb some 80 per cent of these 
flows.
The international mobility of high-
skilled persons is likely to continue
in the future. 
An estimated 1.3 million workers 
with university-level education had 
emigrated from LDCs by 2000. 
During the 2000s, the number of 
high-skilled persons migrating 
from LDCs to the main destination 
countries continued to grow.
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Table 13. International high-skilled migration corridors fom LDCs, 2000
(Number of high-skilled migrants and percentage)
Country of destination
Developed
Transition 
economies
Other developing LDCs
Country of origin Asia Pacific Europe
North 
America
Africa America Asia Africa Asia Total
Number of migrants
LDC Africa 14,245 170,814 178,561 55 86,763 380 44,696 29,809 - 525,323
LDC Americas 20 2,127 150,999 0 19 8,138 11 - - 161,314
LDC Asia 37,179 67,041 192,243 218 2,297 17 295,669 - 2,703 597,367
LDC Pacific 10,450 354 5,762 1 4 1 6 - - 16,578
LDC Total 61,894 240,336 527,565 274 89,083 8,536 340,382 29,809 2,703 1,300,582
Percentage of destination
LDC Africa 23.0 71.1 33.8 20.1 97.4 4.5 13.1 100 - 40.4
LDC Americas - 0.9 28.6 - - 95.3 - - - 12.4
LDC Asia 60.1 27.9 36.4 79.6 2.6 0.2 86.9 - 100 45.9
LDC Pacific 16.9 0.1 1.1 0.4 - - - - - 1.3
LDC Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 100 100.0
Percentage of origin
LDC Africa 2.7 32.5 34.0 - 16.5 0.1 8.5 5.7 - 100.0
LDC Americas - 1.3 93.6 - - 5.0 - - - 100.0
LDC Asia 6.2 11.2 32.2 - 0.4 - 49.5 - 0.5 100.0
LDC Pacific 63.0 2.1 34.8 - - - - - 0.0 100.0
LDC Total 4.8 18.5 40.6 - 6.8 0.7 26.2 2.3 0.2 100.0
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from Docquier et al. (2011).
Table 14. Indicators of high-skilled immigration from LDCs to selected host countries in the 2000s
(Persons and percentage)
Host country Indicator
Initial
period (A)
Latest
period (B)
Persons Change
(A) (B) (B/A : %)
United Statesa,b Number of tertiary-educated residents from 15 LDCs 
(amounting to 91 per cent of total LDC high-skilled 
residents in 2000)
2000 2010 381,425 681,485 78.7
Number of non-resident visas for skilled persons 
granted to nationals from all LDCs
1998-2000 2008-2010 1,289 1,364 5.9
Canadac Permanent residents born in all LDCs 1999-2001 2009-2011 15,950 22,813 43.0
Arrival of students born in all LDCs 1999-2001 2009-2011 1,514 2,406 58.9
United Kingdomd Nationals from all LDCs given work permit for jobs 
other than domestic work
2004 2009 676 1,581 133.9
Nationals from all LDCs granted entry into the UK 
under PBS Tier 1 (Highly skilled workers) and PBS 
Tier 2 (Skilled workers) schemes
2009 2010 788 1,077 36.7
Francee Number of workers’ visas granted to nationals from 
all LDCs
2004-2005 2007-2008 324 1,214 274.7
Number of student visas granted to nationals from all 
LDCs
2004-2005 2007-2008 4,841 4,446 -8.2
Australiaf Number of high-skilled nationals from all LDCs 
arriving for permanent settlement
2000-2001 2010-2011 964 1,121 16.3
Source: UNCTAD secretariat elaboration based on the sources quoted in the notes (see below).
Notes: When periods are indicated, data refer to annual averages. The destination countries above hosted 55 per cent of high-skilled 
emigration from LDCs in 2000.
a US Census 2010  (for 2010); American Community Survey 2010 (for 2010) for the number of tertiary-educated residents from 15 
LDCs.
b State Department, for the number of non-resident visas for skilled persons. Includes the following visa types: H1-B, H1-C, L1, O1 
and E-2.
c Statistics Canada.
d Home Office and National Statistics. PBS: Points Based System for immigration, introduced in 2008.
e Institut national d'études démographiques.
f Department of Immigration and Citizenship.
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to have been offset by the continuing operation of the push and pull forces 
driving brain drain mentioned in section B1.
Host countries. Almost two-thirds of LDC high-skilled emigrants live in 
developed countries, while one-third moved to other developing countries. 
Skilled migratory flows from LDCs are directed mainly to developed America 
and Europe, oil-exporting developing countries and neighbouring countries 
(chart 34). The major destination country of the LDC brain drain is the United 
States, which hosts one-fourth of all LDC high-skilled emigrants. Other major 
destination countries are Saudi Arabia, Canada, the United Kingdom, India and 
France (chart 35). North America hosts almost the entirety of the Haitian brain 
drain and approximately one-third of high-skilled emigration from the LDCs of 
Africa, Asia and the Pacific (table 13). The remaining flows from each of these 
regions differ geographically. For African LDCs, the other major destination is 
developed Europe (especially the United Kingdom, France and Belgium) and, to 
a lesser extent, other developing African countries (mainly Côte d’Ivoire, South 
Africa and Kenya). Asian LDCs are the group for which intraregional South-
South flows are the most pronounced: almost half of their high-skilled emigrants 
live in other Asian developing countries (especially India, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, 
Iran and the Gulf States). For Pacific LDCs, New Zealand and Australia host 
almost two-thirds of their high-skilled emigrants. 
The selection rate of immigration from LDCs is directly related to the income 
level of destination countries, as is the case for immigrants from all other 
countries. In developed countries, the selection rate is highest: 35 per cent of all 
immigrants born in LDCs are tertiary-educated. In other developing countries, 
the corresponding share is much lower (five per cent), while in the case of other 
LDCs it is a scant one per cent. In other words, intra-LDC migration largely 
consists of low-skilled persons. The total selection rate of LDC immigrants in 
developed countries is similar to that of immigrants coming from other regions. In 
developing countries, by contrast, immigration from LDCs is much less selective 
than migratory flows originating in other country groups (chart 33). This confirms 
the strong Northern bias of LDC skilled emigration. Available data indicate that 
LDC emigration selectivity rose in the 2000s. In the United States (the largest 
host country for LDC high-skilled emigrants), the selection rate for LDC nationals 
rose from 32.4 per cent in 2000 to 48.3 per cent in 2010 (based on the same 
sample as table 14). 
Home countries. The major source of high-skilled LDC emigrants is Asia, 
which generates 45.9 per cent of tertiary educated migrants from LDCs. It is 
followed by African LDCs, which account for 40.4 per cent of the LDC brain 
drain (table 13). Regional figures, however, mask a very strong concentration of 
migratory flows in a few countries. The largest LDCs of origin for skilled migrants 
are Bangladesh and Haiti, both of which have more than 160,000 high-skilled 
nationals living abroad. These two countries account for 30 per cent of all LDC 
migration. They are followed by Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Ethiopia and Cambodia, each of which have more than 
50,000 high-skilled people living abroad (chart 36). Taken together, these nine 
countries account for almost two-thirds of LDC brain drain. Data on the major 
bilateral high-skilled migration corridors originating in LDCs are shown in table 
15.
Brain drain rates. Collectively, the LDCs are by far the most seriously 
affected by brain drain among the country groups shown in chart 37. They have 
an average brain drain rate of 18.4 per cent, much higher than other developing 
countries (10 per cent). Regionally, the worst affected subgroups are LDCs from 
the Americas (Haiti), Pacific and Africa, which have higher brain drain rates than 
all other groups of developing countries except the Pacific ODCs. The LDC 
regional group with the lowest brain drain rate is Asian LDCs (chart 37). 
Skilled migratory flows from LDCs 
are directed mainly to developed 
America and Europe, oil-exporting 
developing countries and 
neighbouring countries. 
The selection rate of immigration 
from LDCs is directly related to 
the income level of destination 
countries.
The major source of high-skilled 
LDC emigrants is Asia (45.9 per cent 
of the LDC brain drain) followed by 
African LDCs (40.4 per cent). 
 The LDCs are by far the group most 
seriously affected by brain drain.
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The LDCs most affected by brain drain are islands or relatively small African 
countries. For example, six LDCs have more high-skilled professionals living 
abroad than at home: Haiti, Samoa, the Gambia, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Sierra 
Leone. However, the case of Haiti stands out (box 5). Apart from the six LDCs 
already mentioned, 11 other LDCs also have more than 30 per cent of their 
high-skilled labour force living abroad. These are mostly African countries 
(Liberia, Eritrea, Somalia, Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, Togo and Guinea-
Bissau), and three are Asian LDCs: Yemen, Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
and Afghanistan (chart 38). The majority are post-conflict States. 
3. ADVERSE IMPACTS
Brain drain has both adverse and beneficial effects on the countries of 
origin of high-skilled emigrants, as summarized in table 16. While the positive 
aspects are discussed later in section C, the negative implications are analysed 
below. The adverse impacts of brain drain can be especially damaging when 
the countries of origin are developing countries and/or they have a small pool of 
highly qualified human resources. 
a) Shrinking human capital stock and slower economic and 
productivity growth
Brain drain deprives countries of origin of some of the most qualified persons 
whom they have educated and trained. In the source country, it reduces the 
stock of human capital, a factor which is already scarce in developing countries, 
especially in LDCs (box 6). This effect is particularly strong if a large share of 
Chart 35. Major destination countries of high-skilled LDC emigrants, 1990 and 2000
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from Docquier et al. (2011).
Brain drain has both adverse and 
beneficial effects on the countries
of origin.
Brain drain deprives countries of 
origin of some of the most qualified 
persons whom they have educated 
and trained.
95CHAPTER 4. Mobilizing the Diaspora: From Brain Drain to Brain Gain
Chart 36. Number of skilled emigrants from LDCs, 1990 and 2000
(Thousand persons)
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high-skilled people emigrate (Berry and Soligo, 1969; Bhagwati and Hamada, 
1974). Given the fundamental role played by human capital in long-term growth 
and development, brain drain could have the impact of slowing down the origin 
country’s economic growth rate (Miyagiwa, 1991; Haque and Kim, 1995; Wong 
and Yip, 1999). The adverse impact of shrinking human capital on development 
is especially acute as the world economy becomes increasingly knowledge-
based.
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Chart 37. Brain drain rate of country groups, 2000
(Percentage)
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Note: The brain drain rate is the emigrants’ share of the correponding age and educational group in the home country.
Table 15. Largest bilateral migration corridors for skilled emigrants from LDCs, 2000
(Number of migrants)
Originating LDC Destination country Skilled migrant stock
Haiti United States 126,524
Bangladesh India 70,092
Bangladesh United States 41,920
Lao People's Democratic Republic United States 41,440
Bangladesh Saudi Arabia 41,222
Yemen Saudi Arabia 39,200
Ethiopia United States 34,428
Cambodia United States 32,955
Haiti Canada 24,475
Sudan Saudi Arabia 22,399
Afghanistan Iran 20,715
Afghanistan United States 19,246
Liberia United States 18,436
Democratic Republic of the Congo Belgium 18,428
Myanmar United States 18,047
Uganda United Kingdom 17,600
Myanmar Thailand 15,742
Bangladesh United Kingdom 15,507
Afghanistan Germany 14,519
Bangladesh Oman 12,625
United Republic of Tanzania Canada 12,220
Nepal India 11,179
Bangladesh Canada 11,065
United Republic of Tanzania United Kingdom 10,535
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from Docquier et al. (2011).
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Box 5. Brain drain and the labour market in Haiti
Most LDCs with very high brain drain rates are countries with a small population. Haiti is an exception. Its population 
was 8.6 million in 2000 and currently stands at 10.3 million. Yet it has the highest brain drain rate of all LDCs (83.4 per cent). 
This places Haiti worldwide among the countries most affected by brain drain, since only six other countries have brain drain 
rates above 80 per cent. 
Labour market conditions in the country largely explain the extent of brain drain, according to the national case study 
prepared for this Report. Although some 200,000 people enter the labour market every year, labour demand does not even 
represent 10 per cent of this supply. Moreover, almost half of all Haitians over 65 continue to work, due to the lack of a well-
functioning retirement pension system. The chances of finding a job are higher for university graduates than for secondary-
educated people, but they are still low. Nevertheless, this situation acts as an incentive with regard to higher education, 
although the additional supply of skills is not met by demand.
A major job website for qualified professionals posted 2,230 positions between 2008 and 2010. Based on the highly 
conservative assumption that only five per cent of available jobs are advertised, this would bring the total number of jobs to 
44,600 for the three-year period, far from matching a labour market supply of 600,000. In view of this labour supply mismatch, 
especially for skilled labour, there are only two options: resort to informality, which is already the main sector of employment 
in the country,1 or emigrate. Orozco (2006) points out that close to 90 per cent of Haiti´s skilled emigrants moved abroad due 
to lack of job opportunities.
Apart from the very difficult conditions of the labour market, other features push skilled Haitians abroad, such as insecurity 
and the political situation. Conditions were worsened by the earthquake of 2010. It is estimated that after this natural disaster, 
one-third of the remaining high-skilled persons living in the country decided to emigrate. 
1 Some 57 per cent of employment in Haiti takes place in the informal sector (IHSI, 2010). 
Table 16. Possible effects of brain drain on (developing) home countries
Effect types / Processes Adverse Beneficial
Knowledge and human 
capital
t Shrinking human capital base
t Less innovation
t Sectoral impacts, especially health and 
education
t Brain waste
t Brain gain
t Transfer/sharing of skills/technology
t Diaspora knowledge networks
t Acccumulation of broader/deeper knowledge/
skills/experience
Macroeconomic processes t Slower economic growth
t Declining high-skill labour externalities
t Lower productivity growth
t Less entrepreneurship
t (Fiscal) cost of educating high-skilled persons
t Foregone taxes paid by high-skilled persons
t Returnee entrepreneurship
Trade / capital flows t Changing relative resource endowments away 
from skills
t Remittances
t Diaspora savings: bonds, deposits, loans, funds, 
etc.
t Diaspora effects and business networks:
tDSFBUJPOTUSFOHUIFOJOHPGUSBEFþPXT
merchandise and services (e.g. tourism)
tDSFBUJPOTUSFHUIFOJOHPGGPSFJHOEJSFDU
investment
Institutional processes t Lower supply of/demand for institutions t Diaspora assistance in/pressure for institution-
building
t Returnee supply of/demand for institutions
Source: UNCTAD secretariat.
Note: The table presents the potential effects of brain drain which can generally affect home economies negatively or positively. The 
actual impact on individual countries depends on their specific conditions and on their level of economic, social and instiutional 
development.
Brain drain reduces welfare due to the loss of externalities. The high-skilled 
labour force tends to have a positive externality on the rest of the labour force, 
since the latter emulates the better qualified workers and thereby achieves 
higher productivity. Therefore, the positive impact of highly talented persons 
goes well beyond their small numbers in the population. If many of the most 
highly skilled workers leave the country, this externality is considerably reduced 
(Haque, 2005).
Apart from this general formulation on human capital, brain drain can have 
an adverse effect on local science and knowledge systems (box 7 provides 
the example of Ethiopia), impairing the economy’s capacity to produce and 
Brain drain can have an adverse 
effect on local science and 
knowledge systems.
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Chart 38. Brain drain rate of LDCs, 1990 and 2000
(Percentage)
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from Docquier et al. (2011).
implement innovation. This, in turn, slows down productivity growth (Kapur and 
McHale, 2005; Agrawal et al., 2011). Schiff and Wang (2009) empirically estimate 
that higher brain drain rates reduce the technological absorptive capacity of 
home countries and thereby the degree to which they incorporate technological 
innovation. As a result, brain drain could lead to lower productivity growth. 
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Box 6. Human capital endowments and international labour and resource flows
Least developed countries have relatively more low-skilled than high-skilled labour. In the LDCs, the ratio of the former 
to the latter is 42. This is more than double the level in other developing countries (16) and more than ten times higher than 
in developed countries, where the ratio is just 4.1 Prima facie, it could be expected that high-skilled labour has the highest 
return where it is relatively scarcer, i.e. in developing countries and especially in LDCs. Therefore, highly qualified labour should 
apparently flow to the latter countries, where human capital is most scarce and knowledge stocks are lowest. In absolute 
figures, the prediction of the conventional view is verified: low-skilled emigration from LDCs outpaces high-skilled emigration 
by a ratio of 11. Yet this same ratio shows that LDCs are exporting high-skilled labour more intensively than low-skilled labour, 
since the low/high-skilled ratio of “labour exports” (i.e. emigration) corresponds to just one-fourth of the ratio of endowments. 
Another way of measuring the relative “export intensity” at the different skill levels is through the emigration rates for low-skilled 
and high-skilled labour.2 In 43 out of the 48 LDCs, the emigration rate of high-skilled labour is higher than that of low-skilled 
labour, and the opposite is true in only five of these countries. 
The above data reveal that the vast majority of LDCs export high-skilled labour more intensively than low-skilled labour. 
This finding contradicts the expectations mentioned above based on apparent returns to knowledge. The explanation for 
this apparent paradox seems to lie in the particular nature of human capital embodied in people. Knowledge is subject to 
increasing returns and to positive agglomeration effects. Agglomeration economies generate centripetal forces, so that human 
resources tend to agglomerate in locations which already have a considerably stock of qualified persons. Agglomeration 
leads to higher productivity and earnings in these locations. For instance, Clemens et al. (2008) estimate that on average, 
Haitians moving to the United States boost their incomes almost sevenfold. Beyond earnings differentials, the significance of 
agglomeration effects is particularly strong for research and scientific production, which depend on the availability of scientific 
infrastructure (laboratories, measurement instruments, specific materials, sophisticated machinery, access to databases and 
libraries, interaction with colleagues, face-to-face discussions and collaboration, etc.).
South–North migration of high-skilled labour amounts to an international transfer of (human) resources from the poorest 
countries to the richest. Similarly, South–South flows of high-skilled people from LDCs (around one-third of the total) are 
directed to developing countries with a relatively higher development and income level.
1 Data are for 2000, the year for which the latest bilateral high-skilled migration matrix is available.
2 The emigration rate is the number of emigrants divided by the corresponding skill and age group. In the case of high-skilled labour, it is the 
brain drain rate.
Box 7. The effects of brain drain on higher education and academic research in Ethiopia
The exponential growth of higher education in Ethiopia over the last 15 years (section C1) hides the extent to which the 
sector is adversely affected by brain drain. The number of students graduating at the bachelor’s level rose sharply from 29,800 
in 2007 to 75,300 in 2011. At the same time, however, the corresponding figure for higher level education (master’s and PhD) 
rose much more moderately: from 2,700 to 6,200.
As a result, there is a dearth of people with doctorate-level degrees in Ethiopia, and this is especially true where they are 
most needed, i.e. in higher education. Among the 15,192 teachers and researchers working in the country’s 25 universities, 
only 979 (6.4 per cent) hold a doctoral degree. Moreover, PhD holders are very unevenly distributed, since half of them work at 
the University of Addis Ababa. The bulk of the country’s university teachers and researchers have only a master’s degree (43.4 
per cent) or a bachelor’s degree (42.6 per cent). Ethiopian higher education institutions sorely lack very high-skilled people.
The number of PhD-holding teachers and researchers active in the country’s universities is much lower than the members of 
the Ethiopian diaspora just in the United States and Canada who have that level of education: 1,600, according to conservative 
estimates. The case study on the Ethiopian academic diaspora prepared for this Report identified 200 Ethiopian professors 
currently working in foreign universities, of whom 148 are active in the United States. Among these, 72 are full professors. In 
Ethiopia, by contrast, only 65 persons hold an equivalent position. In other words, there are more Ethiopian full professors 
working in the United States than in Ethiopia itself, in spite of the strong need of Ethiopian universities for very highly skilled 
people. 
In order to respond to the stringent need for more qualified university teachers and professors, the Ethiopian Government 
has launched a campaign to recruit 631 teachers and researchers, especially from India. Whether this programme will succeed is 
not yet clear. Nevertheless, if properly implemented, its implications for the country’s limited foreign exchange will be significant.
Brain drain can also comprise entrepreneurs and students (i.e. future 
professionals). The former’s departure deprives the home country of some of 
the people who create businesses and employment. As for students, most 
developing countries send some of them abroad for tertiary-level studies, as 
a means of expanding and improving the human capital stock of the home 
country. However, this often becomes a route to brain drain. The greater the gap 
between the conditions in the study country and those in the home country, the 
higher the probability of graduates staying abroad (Finn, 2010), which shrinks 
the human capital base of the home country.
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b) Sectoral impacts 
The impact of reduced availability of qualified professionals could be more 
acute in some sectors, for instance education and scientific activities (box 7) 
and health (box 8). These are the main sectors responsible for building and 
improving countries’ human capital endowment. Their malfunction due to brain 
drain hampers the continuing formation of human capital, which in turn is likely 
to depress the national long-term growth rate. 
c) Fiscal costs and foregone revenues 
Expanding a country’s human capital base through education has a high 
cost, which is financed to a large extent by the State.8 Typically, the persons 
thus trained work, live and pay taxes in the home country upon completion 
of education (at whatever level). This allows the State to partly recoup the 
investment through the taxes (income, property, indirect, etc.) generated 
by these people. In the case of brain drain, however, this payback does not 
occur, because emigrants generally live, work and pay taxes abroad (Bhagwati 
and Hamada 1974; Grubel and Scott 1966; Berry and Soligo 1969; Johnson 
1967; Kwok and Leland 1982). Although these effects take place for all sorts 
of migrants, they are strongest in the case of high-skilled migrants. Their 
education costs the most for the home country and, since they have the highest 
earnings, the corresponding foregone fiscal revenues are the highest. Gibson 
and McKenzie (2010) present the results of survey micro-data for high-skilled 
emigrants from Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, 
Ghana and New Zealand. The developing countries in the sample share several 
structural characteristics with Pacific and African LDCs. They estimate the net 
annual fiscal cost per high-skilled emigrant at $6,300–16,900 in Ghana and 
Papua New Guinea, but a much lower $500–1,000 in Tonga and Micronesia, 
which have very low tax rates.9
d) Changing relative resource endowments 
If brain drain is significant, it can alter the relative resource endowment of 
both origin and destination countries. By reducing the human capital stock of 
countries of origin, it tilts the relative factor endowment of the domestic economy 
towards other factors (e.g. natural resources), thereby altering the patterns of 
comparative advantage. At a minimum, it can reinforce the home country’s 
specialization away from skill-intensive sectors or activities.10 Worldwide, tertiary 
graduates tend to agglomerate in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada and some other developed countries. The pre-existing 
polarization of the geographical distribution of talent is reinforced by the South–
North migration of high-skilled people. These flows amount to a net transfer of 
resources from the country of origin to the country of destination (box 6). 
e) Brain waste
In the context of international labour mobility, brain waste refers to the fact 
that some immigrants can only find jobs in the host country which are below the 
skills corresponding to their education level. This happens for instance when 
medical doctors work as nurses or university graduates work as taxi drivers 
or waiters. The degree of brain waste depends to a large extent on home 
country characteristics. In the case of the United States, Mattoo et al. (2008) 
note that the probability of skilled immigrants finding a job corresponding to 
their education level rises with the income level of the country of origin and with 
the level of the latter’s expenditure on education. Educated immigrants from 
Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa are more likely to take jobs below 
their education skill level than immigrants from Asia and industrial countries. In 
The impact of reduced availability 
of qualified professionals could be 
more acute in some sectors, for 
instance education and scientific 
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Box 8. Medical brain drain
LDCs form the group of countries with the lowest medical density: 0.12 physician/1000 inhabitants, well below the 
acceptable threshold recommended by the World Health Organization of 2/1000. The medical density in other developing 
countries is nine times higher than in LDCs, whereas in developed countries it reaches a multiple of 24. The emigration of 
doctors from developing countries aggravates these disparities: LDCs also have the highest rate of medical brain drain, i.e. 
the number of nationally trained physicians who work abroad as a share of those who work at home or abroad. This rate is 
highest in Haiti (35 per cent) and African LDCs (14 per cent) (box chart 2).1 Medical brain drain has been growing since the 
1990s in both the LDCs and in other developing countries. 
In the case study on Ethiopia prepared for this Report, it is estimated that around 1000 Ethiopian medical doctors work 
in the United States, whereas the number of physicians working in the home country in 2009 was 2,154. Therefore, it can be 
surmised that out of all Ethiopian doctors, between one-third and one-half work abroad. Bangladesh has a physician density 
of 0.25/1000 inhabitants and 32 medical schools. Some 2,000 persons graduate annually, of whom some 300 emigrate. 
Although the share is low, these are generally the best and the brightest. The quality of medical research and intellectual 
development at the top institutions in the country suffers from this brain drain (Rahman and Khan, 2007). 
The main development problems associated with medical brain drain in LDCs are its impacts on the health of the population 
and the cost of medical education in these countries. Higher brain drain rates are associated with higher infant and child 
mortality and lower vaccination rates in developing countries, as well as higher adult mortality due to AIDS in the case of 
sub-Saharan Africa (Bhargava et al., 2011; Bhargava and Docquier, 2008). They also have an indirect negative impact on 
medical research and innovation in home countries. More broadly, the adverse impact on national health systems has long-
term negative consequences on the human capital formation and accumulation of LDCs. Still, brain drain is only one factor 
in the sub-standard performance of health systems in most LDCs. In various African countries, a number of doctors and 
nurses are inactive or unemployed, indicating that understaffing of health systems is also due  to factors other than brain 
drain (Skeldon, 2005).
The education of doctors has a very high cost for LDCs, and medical brain drain largely prevents these countries from 
recouping the educational investment made. It has been estimated that the full cost of educating a medical doctor in sub-
Saharan Africa from primary school to university is $66,000, while the corresponding cost of educating a nurse is $43,000. If 
this investment is lost to the home country, the opportunity cost could be at least $364,000 and $238,000, respectively, for 
each emigrated professional (Kirigia et al., 2006). These amounts far exceed the remittances that these professionals could 
send home during their working life.
1 These rates are low as compared with those for total brain drain quoted in the main text. This is due to methodological differences in computing 
both sets of rates. The present ones are based on the country of training and on emigration to just 12 developed countries. By contrast, the 
figures for total brain drain in the main text are based on nationality or country of birth and on all host countries. Clemens and Pettersson (2008) 
estimate medical brain drain for African countries based on physicians’ country of birth and reach rates much higher than the ones quoted in 
this box. Their median medical brain drain rate for African LDCs is 39 per cent, as opposed to 14 per cent in the database used in the present 
box. These authors do not provide data for non-African countries.
Box chart 2. Medical brain drain and physician density by country groups, 2004
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other words, the lower the economic and institutional development of the home 
country, the more likely that brain waste takes place. 
These findings can be expected to apply to LDCs. The occupational profile 
of high-skilled emigrants from some of these countries deteriorates with 
emigration, according to survey data. Comparing the occupations of tertiary-
educated migrants from Uganda, Senegal and Burkina Faso before and after 
migration shows an abrupt fall in the share of managerial posts (by at least 15 
percentage points). By contrast, the share of persons performing technical and 
associated professional occupations rises strongly (by 19 percentage points 
in the case of Senegal) (table 17). Similarly, in interviews undertaken for this 
Report with a sample of high-skilled Haitian emigrants living in the United States, 
Canada, France and Spain, 47 per cent indicated that their present job requires 
less knowledge than what they had acquired in the home country. Nevertheless, 
16 per cent stated that it required the same level and 38 per cent indicated 
higher skill requirements that those mastered before emigration. 
f) Institution-building 
Typically, the most skilled people are those who are best qualified to build 
and run institutions which are required for the national development process 
(State and government institutions, policymaking organizations, political debate, 
etc.).11 At the same time, the most qualified people are those who are most 
likely to demand good-quality institutions and press for them. Their departure 
therefore potentially reduces both the demand and the supply of the institutions 
required for development and may slow the long-term development of the home 
country.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR LDCS
Lack of more comprehensive data makes it difficult to estimate the exact 
impact of brain drain on home economies, especially LDCs. Existing research 
has postulated that the net impact of brain drain on home countries depends 
to a large extent on the intensity of brain drain, though this relationship is not 
always linear. Some degree of brain drain may be tolerated because of its 
potential positive effects (discussed in section C below). By contrast, at high 
brain drain rates, the negative consequences mentioned above are likely to 
predominate, as they tend to outweigh the positive effects. Therefore, it has 
been posited that there is some “optimal” level of brain drain, at which the net 
balance of positive and negative effects on the domestic economies reaches the 
Table 17. Occupation of high-skilled international migrants from selected LDCs in home and host countries, 2009
Occupation
Home country
Uganda Senegal Burkina Faso
Where occupation performed
Homea Hostb Homea Hostb Homea Hostb
Managersc 54.9 3.0 27.7 8.7 48.7 33.7
Professionals 10.9 29.4 18.3 0.6 30.9
Technicians and associate professionals 3.5 10.9 17.4 36.3
Clerical support workers 1.2 5.7 1.5 8.8
Service and sales workers 11.7 1.1 1.4
Other 18.7 12.9 33.3 9.2 - -
Don't know 10.9 26.5 0.6 35.0 51.3 35.5
Memo item: Share of high-skilled out of international migrants surveyed 31.5 6.6 0.4
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on data from the World Bank Migration and Remittances Household Surveys 2009 (available 
at http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/534).
 a Occupation performed in home country before migration.
 b Occupation currently performed in the host country (in 2009, date of the surveys).
 c Includes "Senior management employees" in the case of Burkina Faso.
The departure of  the most qualified 
people potentially reduces both 
the demand and the supply 
of the institutions required for 
development.
The net impact of brain drain on 
home countries depends to a large 
extent on the intensity of brain drain.
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maximum level. It has been estimated that an “optimal” high-skilled emigration 
rate lies between five per cent and 10 per cent of the high-skilled workforce, on 
the basis of a series of empirical studies on the effects of brain drain (Docquier, 
2006). By contrast, “high” brain drain rates are considered to be those above 
the 15–20 per cent range. Beyond this level, the likelihood increases that the 
negative impacts of brain drain will outweigh its positive consequences. 
The actual brain drain rate is “high” in 30 of the 48 LDCs; conversely, it is close 
to the “optimal” level in only five of these countries. Given the intensity of the 
phenomenon in these countries, it is likely that economic development in most 
LDCs has been adversely affected both directly and indirectly. It is, however, not 
possible to arrive at a precise estimate of the magnitude of its macroeconomic 
impact in terms of economic or productivity growth rates. Concerning sectoral 
impacts, by contrast, there is ample evidence of the adverse effect of brain drain 
on LDCs, especially with regard to health, education and science, technology 
and innovation (STI). The poor performance of STI in LDCs has adverse second-
round impacts across all economic sectors and on LDCs’ development of 
productive capacities (UNCTAD, 2007: 139–160), although brain drain is not the 
only factor explaining such poor performance.
C. Turning brain drain into
benefits for home countries
Since the 1990s, the so-called “new economics of the brain drain” has 
argued that brain drain can be beneficial to developing countries, through the 
so-called “beneficial brain drain” or “brain gain”.12 This potential positive effect 
of labour migration comes alongside other possible beneficial effects of labour 
migration, which were already recognized by the early literature on migration but 
have recently received increased attention (table 18). These beneficial effects are 
presented below and their operation in LDCs is analysed.
1. BRAIN GAIN
Beneficial brain drain. The brain gain literature argues that brain drain raises 
returns to education, providing an incentive for people to obtain additional 
education in order to increase their chances of emigrating. Out of these educated 
people, many emigrate (i.e. brain drain). At the same time, some eventually do 
not settle abroad and thereby help raise the human capital endowment of the 
home country with respect to what would have been the case if the migration 
incentive had not been present (i.e. a net brain gain). The evidence on the 
benefits of migration stressed by the new migration literature is still inconclusive 
(Solimano, 2010). Schiff (2006) questions the assumptions and conclusions of 
this literature, arguing that the actual brain gain effect is smaller than what these 
authors claim and that they fail to take into account several negative externalities 
caused by brain drain. Still, both he and these authors agree that the net impacts 
of brain drain on home countries vary with brain intensity and are negative for 
countries with high brain drain rates.
Tertiary education has been expanding in most LDCs since the 1990s. 
Between 1999–2000 and 2009–2010, the number of graduates in all tertiary-
level programmes in a sample of 16 LDCs more than doubled from 182,000 to 
455,000, which corresponds to a 19 per cent annual growth rate.13 This has 
been driven by the efforts of the educational sector – mainly public but also 
private – to respond to previously unmet demand for university-level education 
in many LDCs.14 However, it is difficult to attribute this rapid expansion in higher 
The actual brain drain rate is “high” 
in 30 of the 48 LDCs; conversely, it 
is close to the “optimal” level in only 
five of these countries.
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education to the incentive effect of emigration prospects. While part of the 
repressed demand may have had this motivation, it has probably not been the 
most important one. In recent decades, the rate of growth of university-level 
education in LDCs has far outpaced that of high-skilled emigration. Among the 
sample of Haitian qualified emigrants interviewed for this Report, none indicated 
the prospect of emigration as a motivation for obtaining tertiary education. In the 
case of Bangladesh, the case study carried out for this Report indicated that if 
emigration had been a major motivation for university education, the subjects 
chosen most frequently would have been different from the actual ones.15
Given the difficulties of making direct empirical measures of brain gain, Beine 
et al. (2008) perform an econometric estimation of the impact of emigration 
prospects on human capital formation. They find a positive effect for countries 
at all income levels. However, in order to estimate the net effect after accounting 
for emigration, they compare the actual human capital stock to what it would 
have been if high-skilled workers had been allowed to emigrate at the same rate 
as low-skilled workers. In the case of the LDCs, the negative effect of brain drain 
on human capital formation predominates (in 20 out of 41 countries) and it is nil 
in 11 countries, due to the high rates of brain drain in these countries. The effect 
is positive (i.e. net brain gain) in only 10 LDCs and even there its intensity is low, 
since the estimated impact is at most an expansion of 0.2 percentage points in 
the proportion of the high-skilled in the labour force. These findings confirm that 
the brain gain effect of high-skilled emigration is largely absent from most LDCs.
Broader meaning of brain gain. Besides the technical meaning of brain gain 
postulated by the “new economics of the brain drain” as mentioned above (i.e. 
the additional education taken thanks to the migration motivation but which 
does not actually lead to brain drain), “brain gain” is commonly used in a broader 
sense. As such, it refers to the expansion of human capital, skills and knowledge 
which accrue to the home country as an indirect effect of migration, but working 
through other channels. This includes the use of remittances for education, 
temporary return of high-skilled diaspora members or definitive return of qualified 
emigrants. 
In home countries, remittances can be used to pay for education, so that 
recipients of those flows can either finance additional education or avoid taking 
children out of school (Özden and Schiff 2006; Acosta et al., 2007). In such 
cases, remittances release the liquidity constraint preventing further education. 
Evidence on the use of remittances in LDCs (section C2 of chapter 3 of this 
Report) seems to indicate that the mechanism is at work in some of these 
countries. 
The other channels of “brain gain” in this broader meaning are analysed in 
sections C3 to C5 below.  
2. FINANCIAL FLOWS
The most tangible positive impacts of both high- and low-skilled migration 
are the financial flows to the home country that they generate. These flows are 
mainly remittances, diaspora bonds and foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
trends and economic impacts of remittance to LDCs are analysed in detail 
in chapter 3 of this Report. Therefore, this section focuses on two issues: 1. 
differences in remitting patterns between emigrants according to their skill profile; 
and 2. whether remittances offset the costs of brain drain. Diaspora bonds are 
mentioned in this section, while diaspora FDI is discussed in section C4 below. 
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a) Brain drain and remittances 
It is often difficult to differentiate between remittances flows generated by high-
skilled and low-skilled emigrants. However, some recent evidence suggests that 
high-skilled emigrants have a lower propensity to send remittances but those 
who do send money transfer larger amounts than the low-skilled emigrants, 
thanks to their higher earnings abroad (Bollard et al. 2011). The contribution of 
high-skilled emigrants to total remittances thus depends on their propensity to 
remit and on their share of total migrant stocks.
Available data for LDCs reveal mixed patterns. High-skilled emigrants have 
a lower propensity to remit in Senegal, but the opposite is true in Uganda 
and Burkina Faso. The average amount sent home by high-skilled remitters 
is predictably a multiple of that of low-skilled emigrants (except for Senegal, 
where the difference is very small). Consequently, the contribution of high-skilled 
remitters to the total flow of remittances to the home country is higher than their 
share of the group of emigrants who do send money home. In Uganda, where 
almost half of the international remitting emigrants are high-skilled, they account 
for two-thirds of total remittance flows to the country. In Senegal and Burkina 
Faso, by contrast, where only a fraction of the remittance-sending emigrants are 
tertiary-educated, their contribution to total remittances flows is less than 10 per 
cent (table 18).
b) Brain drain costs and remittances
While data on remittances have been calculated and/or estimated and made 
publicly available, there is no comparable information on the costs and benefits 
of brain drain. Given the complexity of the multiple impacts of brain drain (table 
16) it is very difficult to compute the welfare gains/losses of home and host 
countries, especially with regard to the associated externalities (both positive 
and negative) and the value of knowledge flows. Haque (2005), for instance, 
argues that remittances should not be compared with the externalities generated 
by human capital. 
Nevertheless, some attempts have been made to appreciate the net results 
of some of the effects. Easterly and Nyarko (2009) estimate that in Ghana, 
remittances exceed costs of training tertiary brain-drained citizens (when 
only the cost of tertiary education is considered). They claim that as long as 
the remittances of the typical person exceed 30 per cent of GDP per capita 
of the home country, they exceed the cost of (tertiary) education. LDC mean 
remittances correspond to four per cent of GDP per capita, exceeding 30 per 
Table 18. Emigrant skills and remittance patterns in selected LDCs, 2009
(Percentage, unless otherwise indicated)
Home country
Uganda Senegal Burkina Faso
Remitting propensity of international migrants (share of migrants who ever sent remittances)
Low-skilled 27.9 78.8 60.8
High-skilled 51.1 60.6 76.8
Annual amount of money sent per remitter ($)
Low-skilled 782 1538 98
High-skilled 1882 1545 679
Composition of group of emigrants who ever sent remittances
Low-skilled 54.2 94.9 99.5
High-skilled 45.8 5.1 0.5
Origin of total remittances sent
Low-skilled 33.2 94.8 96.9
High-skilled 66.8 5.2 3.1
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data from the World Bank Migration and Remittances Household Surveys 2009
             (available at http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/534).
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cent in only one case (Lesotho) (table 6, chapter 3).16 Thus, indications are 
that remittances do not offset the costs of educating people who leave the 
country (even if computing solely the costs of higher education). Therefore, it is 
more likely that these countries lose out on balance when comparing costs of 
education and remittance recepits.
c) Other financial flows
Beyond remittances, diasporas can also be a source of savings, which can 
be channelled as capital inflows to home countries. Home-based economic 
agents such as governments mobilize these savings through diaspora bonds 
and other financial instruments like deposit accounts, transnational loans and 
diaspora mutual funds (Terrazas, 2010). Among LDCs, Ehtiopia, Nepal and 
Rwanda have issued diaspora bonds.
3. DIASPORA KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS
a) Diasporas as a knowledge pool
The stock of knowledge and skills of emigrants can potentially contribute 
to the accumulation of human capital and technological capabilities in the 
home country, mainly through two mechanisms: first, the operation of diaspora 
knowledge networks, analysed below; and second, the return to the home 
country of students17 and long-term emigrants (whose impacts are discussed 
in subsection C5). 
Diasporas. A diaspora refers to a community of expatriates who are spread 
or dispersed around the world, outside their homeland. A distinctive feature 
of diasporas is the sense of national identity and emotional attachment to the 
homeland. Diasporas are often heterogeneous groups. The degree of cohesion, 
shared values and motivations may vary depending on the type of diaspora and 
their histories. Some diasporas have greater political and national motivation 
and corresponding willingness to contribute to the homeland. Yet this may cut 
both ways: some diaspora groups that are affected by internal conflicts, exile or 
persecution may be reluctant to engage if they perceive governments at home 
as hostile and unfriendly to them. By contrast, other types of diaspora groups, 
e.g. those formed by internationally mobile professionals and entrepreneurs, 
can be willing and prepared to cooperate with their homeland in the transfer 
of knowledge, as well as capital, networks and other attributes if they see the 
home conditions as propitious and/or a possible source of commercial gain 
(Solimano, 2010).
Diaspora knowledge networks. Diasporas can thus serve as “brain banks” 
abroad; when properly organized, they can become a source of knowledge 
sharing and technology transfer with their home country (Mahroum et al., 2006). 
Technology appears to diffuse more efficiently through culturally and nationally 
linked groups. As shown in chapter 5 of this Report, by facilitating international 
knowledge flows and technology diffusion, diasporas can act as “knowledge 
brokers” and promote innovation in the home country (Agrawal et al., 2008, 
2011). The skills of diaspora members are deemed especially appropriate, 
thanks to their combination of technical and substantive expertise with their 
acquaintance with local conditions (language, institutions, culture, etc.). 
However, the intensity and quality of knowledge flows and transfer between host 
and home countries depends on how they are organized, the actors involved, 
the amount of finance mobilized, the commitment of diaspora members, and 
the institutional and economic development of the home countries. High-skilled 
emigrants tend to share little knowledge with home countries if these are small or 
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low-income economies which are not undergoing rapid structural transformation. 
There, information flows tend to concentrate mostly on emigration itself (i.e. 
work opportunities abroad, migration mechanisms, etc.) (Gibson and McKenzie, 
2010). This is in sharp contrast with the case of home economies which are 
large or growing rapidly and undergoing structural transformation. Successful 
examples of diaspora knowledge mobilization (e.g. Israel, Taiwan Province 
of China, India and China, discussed in chapter 5 of this Report) show that 
diaspora technological entrepreneurs overseas can play an important role in 
helping to develop technological firms at home and serve as a two-way link for 
market knowledge, connections and technological transfer across countries.
b) Initiatives to harness diaspora knowledge flows to LDCs
The channels used to date to foster the transfer and sharing of diaspora 
knowledge and skills with LDCs home countries can be grouped into two 
categories: 1. diaspora-inspired initiatives; and 2. multilateral and bilateral 
programmes. 
Diaspora initiatives. While most LDC diaspora associations, organizations 
and NGOs have philanthropic objectives, some of them are aimed at assisting 
home countries in benefiting from the expertise, skills and experience 
accumulated by diaspora members. This is the case with diaspora associations 
of medical doctors, scientists, engineers, etc., which strive to transfer and share 
knowledge and technology with researchers, scientists and entrepreneurs in 
the country of origin. Most LDC diaspora organizations are based in developed 
countries. Examples of successful knowledge initiatives and programmes are 
provided in box 9. 
Bilateral and multilateral programmes. These include programmes initiated 
by international organizations (typically acting in collaboration with national 
governments of both home and host countries) or knowledge components of 
wider agreements between origin and destination countries initiated to influence 
bilateral migration and the ensuing flows of expertise and business. The 
knowledge components of these programmes take the form of either advisory 
missions or participation in specific projects in the home country. The main 
beneficiaries in the LDC home countries are universities, government institutions, 
civil society and the private sector.
At the multilateral level, the United National Development Programme (UNDP) 
launched the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) 
in 1977. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has also been 
running the Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) and Migration for 
Development in Africa (MIDA), the latter since 2001. Through MIDA, the following 
LDCs have created partnerships with destination countries and expatriates: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Box 10 
provides examples of how international programmes operate in LDCs. 
Several bilateral programmes have been launched jointly by host and home 
countries in order to foster cooperation on bilateral migration. They typically 
deal with different aspects of international labour flows, including diaspora 
mobilization though knowledge transfer and direct investment, and assistance 
to permanent return migration. One example is the Programme d’Appui aux 
Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement (PAISD), jointly undertaken by 
the Governments of Senegal and France during 2009–2011 in the context of 
co-development programmes. With total funding of €9 million, its knowledge 
component financed 52 diaspora experts to transfer knowledge and experience 
to Senegalese counterparts through short- to medium-term missions. The 
sectors targeted were health, agriculture and food industry, management, ICTs 
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and biotechnology. In some cases, the projects included financing to upgrade 
installations and equipment of home country beneficiary institutions (both public 
and private).18
c) Effects on LDCs 
To date, many of the efforts to establish diaspora knowledge networks and 
foster knowledge transfer and sharing between diaspora members and home 
LDC countries have attained their specific and circumscribed goals. However, 
they have not succeeded in creating synergies with other initiatives or ensuring 
continuity, both of which are essential for a regular knowledge flow to home 
countries. As a result, their development impacts have been limited for a number 
of reasons, such as: 
Box 9. Examples of successful LDC diaspora initiatives for knowledge sharing and transfer
The national case studies prepared for this Report highlight some examples of how diaspora knowledge, skills and 
resources can be successfully harnessed and transferred to home countries. 
Strengthening PhD education at the University of Addis Ababa. Given the obvious need for more and better training 
at the doctorate level in Ethiopia, the country’s largest university established several PhD programmes. It realized, however, 
that in order to reach its objectives it could not rely uniquely on its own resources. Accordingly, it decided to mobilize the 
knowledge of the national diaspora working in foreign academic institutions. To this end, in 2008 it launched a large-scale 
programme financed by the Ethiopian Government and the Swedish and French official development aid agencies. The main 
participants abroad have been Ethiopians active in US and European universities, who in several cases convinced their non-
Ethiopian colleagues to take part in the project. Their collaboration with the home country has taken the form of participation 
in research seminars, book donations, links between laboratories in the universities of Addis Ababa and laboratories abroad, 
and thesis direction by diaspora members. The programme has had a considerable impact on several departments.
Decoding the jute genome in Bangladesh. A Bangladeshi microbiologist and biochemist who studied and worked in 
the Soviet Union, Germany, United States and Malaysia decoded for the latter country the genome sequencing of its most 
important plant, rubber. In order to have his country of origin benefit from his knowledge and skills, he later undertook the 
same type of research for jute. This was done in a joint project with the Global Network of Bangladeshi Biotechnologists 
(GNOB), the Centre for Chemical Biology, the University of Science (Malaysia) and the University of Hawaii (United States) and 
a team of Bangladeshi researchers. The discovery facilitates pest control and the manufacturing of better finished industrial 
products out of jute.
Upgrading the national health sector in Ethiopia. The People to People association was established by Ethiopian 
diaspora members in the late 1990s with the aim of mobilizing diaspora skills for the benefit of the home country. It operates 
in several countries in North America and Europe and has been active above all in the health sector. Its activities have included 
participating in medical training in Ethiopia, advocating for diaspora mobilization with international organizations and donor 
institutions, mobilizing resources abroad for medical programmes in Ethiopia, setting up a telemedicine system in the home 
country, restructuring university hospitals, organizing an annual conference on health in Ethiopia, awarding a prize for medical 
best practice, and maintaining a blog for the exchange of medical best practices and discussions. The association collaborates 
with other diaspora organizations, NGOs active in Ethiopia and international organizations (e.g. the World Bank), the United 
States National Institute of Health and universities of host countries. 
Mobilizing resources and knowledge transfer to Haiti. In Canada, the Regroupement des organismes canado-haïtiens 
pour le développement (ROCADH) is an effort to coalesce many philanthropic organizations working for the advancement of 
Haitian communities back home. ROCADH brings together some 47 home town associations. It has been active in the fields 
of education and capacity-building (including in agricultural, animal breeding techniques, commodity processing, medical and 
tourism service skills). ROCADH has been able to channel substantial funding through the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA). To be eligible for CIDA funds, ROCADH has to contribute one-third of the value of the project.  
Medical diaspora network for Bangladesh. Bangladeshi physicians in North America established the Bangladesh 
Medical Association of North America (BMANA) in 1980. It supports the home country by organizing visits of medical teams 
to provide training and technology transfer, provision of subsidized/pro bono specialized clinical services, and donation of 
books, computers and journals to medical colleges and universities in Bangladesh. Its members have been participating in 
activities of knowledge transfer and training in terms of cutting-edge advances in medical specialities, such as neurology, 
surgery and infection control. 
Water in Ethiopia. A programme of collaboration between an American and an Ethiopian university was put in place in 2009 
at the initiative of an Ethiopian working as professor in a United States university, with financing from the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) under the African American Universities Partnership. It was successful in leveraging 
official financing to obtain financing from the American private sector for project activities. It foresees the establishment of 
a research centre on water in Ethiopia to conduct academic research and participate in the formulation and planning of the 
country’s policies and programmes for water management.
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Dispersion and lack of coordination of resources. The spread and 
multiplication of actors, initiatives and programmes and the lack of coordination 
among them result in the dispersion of efforts, energy and resources.19
Most LDC diaspora associations and NGOs tend to be ad hoc efforts with very 
small budgets, and their actions are local and small-scale. Often their members, 
although willing to engage, are not experts in the field of development, which 
does not allow them to undertake large-scale development projects that could 
have a region-wide or country-wide impact on the lives of the beneficiaries. In 
many cases, emigrants rely on channels such as family members, local chieftains 
or social and professional networks to carry out their activities, depending on the 
level of institutional development of the home country. At the same time, they 
often lack more structured institutional support.20 The lack of coordination can 
limit the effectiveness of the initiatives and programmes which are implemented 
by individual or a small number of organizations and NGOs. This can lead to 
situations in which “projects carried out by such [diaspora] organisations 
interfere with mainstream policies carried out by the national government or 
local organizations” (Zoomers and van Naerssen, 2006: 73).
Nevertheless, in some cases, diaspora knowledge-sharing initiatives are 
undertaken in partnership with home country governments or international 
organizations. Coordinating the actions and programmes of different actors can 
leverage existing resources and greatly enhance their development impact (box 9).
Official international initiatives for diaspora knowledge-sharing and transfer 
through circular migration or return sometimes encounter problems. First, 
the financial and human resources involved can be somewhat limited. For 
instance, the final report of a large project aimed at clarifying the links between 
migration and development and the impact of official programmes for promoting 
knowledge transfer concludes that “the numbers are very modest and the 
Box 10. International programmes to foster diaspora knowledge transfer to LDCs
Afghanistan. Since the 1980s, the resurgent periods of civil conflict in Afghanistan have spurred brain drain (over one-third of 
high-skilled workers lived abroad in 2000), low numbers of permanent return migration and the deterioration of the educational 
system, which failed to modernize. As part of reconstruction efforts of the 2000s, international organizations mobilized high-
skilled diaspora members to contribute through transfer of skill and knowledge, and local capacity-building. From 2002 until 
2006, 38 volunteers provided assistance to the national capacity-building efforts of the Afghan Interim Administration and 
the successor government. They were mobilized through the TOKTEN programme of the UNDP. IOM launched a Temporary 
Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programme together with the Netherlands. It mobilized and financed the temporary return 
(for three or six months) of members of the Afghan diaspora in the Netherlands in the fields of education, health, engineering, 
infrastructure and information technology. Despite some initial resistance, diaspora members were able to teach and train 
locals in new teaching methods, university organization, medical procedures and equipment, building techniques, use of 
computers and the Internet, software previously not in use in Afghanistan, and work and managerial methods and routines. 
These innovations had been learned and/or practised by diaspora members in the host country. Participants mentioned as their 
motivation identification with the home country and their desire to participate in its rebuilding (Siegel and Kuschminder, 2012). 
Great Lakes. The MIDA Great Lakes Programme was launched by IOM in 2001 and is expected to continue until 2012. 
Its main objective was to fill technical skills gaps in the fields of health, education and rural development, by tapping into 
the knowledge pool of the diasporas of Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in Europe. It started by 
identifying the technical skills needs of local beneficiary institutions (universities, hospitals, laboratories, professional training 
centres). To match the demand side, the supply side was organized by mobilizing diaspora experts interested in participating 
and selecting them. Training and capacity-building activities were undertaken through the return of diaspora members, 
which could be temporary (ranging from some weeks to several months), virtual (by means of ICTs and e-learning tools) or 
– exceptionally – permanent. More than 400 short-term expert and capacity-building missions were carried out. The main 
achievements claimed by the project are training physicians and paramedics; strengthening health institution management 
and planning; introducing South–North partnerships of health institutions; improving course quality in universities; relaunching 
courses previously inactive for several years; strengthening libraries and IT infrastructure in education institutions; and building 
the capacity of ministries and provincial authorities active in rural development. The Programme claims that its actions are 
aligned with national priorities. It was foreseen that at the end of the project, the functions of diapora mobilization and matching 
of skills would be transferred to the three national governments and to diaspora associations.1
1  Based on information available at the website of the project (http://mida.belgium.iom.int/).
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success is limited and the number of beneficiaries is not in proportion to the total 
number of migrants and/or expatriates” (Zoomers and van Naerssen, 2006: 
29). Second, such initiatives are frequently inconsistent with national priorities. 
Knowledge-sharing programmes and activities are often designed without 
consulting home country governments and are not articulated with broader 
development strategies or wider national policies and programmes in mind. This 
thwarts the desired effectiveness of diaspora knowledge initiatives. 
Trust. Trust among different groups of the diaspora and stakeholders of 
knowledge transfer is often lacking, hampering collaboration and coordination 
between them. In some cases, associations of LDC nationals living abroad prefer 
not to undertake projects in collaboration with the national government either 
because of the causes of emigration (civil conflict, political strife, etc.) or due to 
frustration with bureaucratic delays and uncertainty concerning the use of funds. 
In other cases, trust is lacking among diaspora associations themselves. 
Limited information. Some LDC governments have initiated programmes 
and action courses to strengthen the engagement of their diasporas with the 
home country (e.g. Bangladesh, Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Haiti). One 
of the components of these programmes is collecting information on diasporas, 
including their number, location, professional activities, skills, etc. Information 
gathering is the first step towards strengthening the engagement of the diaspora 
in the development of the home country. However, those LDCs which have not 
initiated an active programme of diaspora engagement are typically not aware of 
the potential that diasporas represent in terms of skills and knowledge (but also 
in terms of savings and investment potential). This lack of information prevents 
them from mobilizing diaspora knowledge effectively. 
Differential treatment of nationals. In order to attract diaspora members to 
work for the home country (temporarily or permanently), national governments 
and international organizations often mobilize financial resources for and/or 
provide special treatment to these emigrants (e.g. fiscal breaks, special political 
rights). Such treatment can generate resentment among national residents 
working at a comparable grade (e.g. government officials, experts, professors, 
scientists, researchers), hampering collaboration between national residents 
and diaspora members. 
Cost of technology transfer. The transfer of knowledge, skills and 
technologies requires efforts by beneficiaries and transferors. It therefore entails 
costs of local adaptation of procedures, methods and equipment, including 
the creation of locally appropriate skills and resources. This feature is well 
known from the literature on transfer of technology (Teece, 1977; von Hippel, 
1994). Even if it is easier to learn from fellow countrymen and countrywomen 
than from foreigners, it still entails costs (Obukhova, 2009). Such costs tend to 
be overlooked when planning diaspora knowledge transfer programmes and 
initiatives.
4. DIASPORA BUSINESS NETWORKS
a) Potential business impacts of diasporas
Apart from forming diaspora knowledge networks, diasporas can contribute 
to the development of their home country by facilitating the establishment 
of business and trade networks between the home and the host country. 
Diaspora members can help link people and firms in both countries thanks to 
superior knowledge of, or preferential access to, market opportunities, as well 
as familiarity with home country markets, language, preferences and business 
contacts. Emigrants can also help overcome reputational problems their home 
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country may have abroad. Diaspora members reduce transaction costs by 
means of these specific skills and capabilities. 
Diasporas can play an important role in fostering business creation and 
expansion in the home country by participating in external searches for new 
market opportunities and domestic institutional reform, through their contacts 
with domestic officials concerning the redesign of relevant institutions and firms. 
Diasporas have played a major role in the establishment and development of 
high-tech clusters in India, China, Taiwan Province of China, Israel and Ireland 
since the 1990s (Saxenian and Sabel, 2008; Saxenian, 2005), as discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 5 of this Report. 
Business linkages and economic flows between home and host countries 
can come from either high-skilled or low-skilled emigrants, but they are more 
likely in the case of high-skilled emigrants, since the latter tend to have wider and 
higher-level contacts in both home and host countries (Docquier and Lodigiani, 
2010). 
The presence of a diaspora is therefore often associated with higher bilateral 
trade flows (Gould, 1994; Mesnard and Ravallion, 2001; Head and Ries, 1998; 
Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Rauch and Casella, 2003; Combes et al., 2005, Peri 
and Requena, 2009). The most direct and simple form of a diaspora business 
network is when the diaspora itself is a prime market for the exports of home 
country goods, in what has been termed “ethnic trade” or “nostalgia trade”. 
This consists mainly of foodstuffs, but also includes films and music, reading 
material, utensils and dishes, ornaments, textiles and clothing – goods which, in 
principle, have more difficulty penetrating international markets than other types 
of exports (Newland and Taylor, 2010). If home country exporters are successful 
in exploiting the diaspora market, they can move beyond it to tap other markets. 
In this case, diasporas serve as a bridge to wider markets. 
Beyond merchandise trade, the presence of diasporas also stimulates the 
export of services, especially international tourism. Diaspora tourism offers 
domestic agents some advantages over other types of tourism. First, diaspora 
tourist spending typically reaches domestic goods and services suppliers more 
directly, as nationals tend to use locally-targeted accommodation, shops and 
restaurants rather than facilities established for typical international tourists. As 
a result, this type of spending reduces the well-known phenomenon of tourism 
leakage (Supradist, 2004). Second, diaspora tourists are more widely spread 
over the home country territory. Third, their arrivals can be less seasonal than 
those of other tourists (Newland and Taylor, 2010). Diaspora tourism is therefore 
likely to have a greater developmental impact than other types of tourism. 
Moreover, diasporas can serve as a bridge to wider markets by overcoming 
reputational problems or a lack of information in host countries concerning their 
home country as a tourist destination, as with the case of nostalgia trade. In 
most of the countries sampled by Gibson and McKenzie (2010), more than half 
of high-skilled emigrants advised other people concerning tourism in their home 
country.
Another, non-exclusive possibility of diaspora business networks is for 
diaspora members to invest directly in the home economy (Javorcik et al., 2001; 
Kugler and Rapoport, 2007; Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010). This may take 
various forms, such as a capital contribution to family business, the acquisition 
of shares in publicly traded firms, or other forms of direct diaspora investment. 
Evidence presented by Gibson and McKenzie (2010) shows that this is the 
exception. Only between five and eight per cent of high-skilled migrants from 
developing countries invested directly in their home country, and the amounts 
invested were relatively small (less than $18,000).
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b) Initiatives to strengthen diaspora business effects
In order to engage diasporas and encourage them to invest part of their 
savings in LDC home countries, action has been taken at the international, 
bilateral and national levels. Programmes have targeted both individual and 
collective investment. LDCs like Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Senegal and Rwanda have launched initiatives to attract direct 
investment of their diasporas by organizing roadshows for investor; publishing 
investment guides geared to their diasporas; encouraging diaspora investors’ 
associations; initiating dialogues on major constraints for emigrant investment 
in the home country, including diaspora investment in bilateral cooperation 
programmes, etc. 
At the multilateral level, some Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) 
projects carried out by IOM feature a component aimed at strengthening 
diaspora investment in the home country and mobilizing diaspora business and 
professional networks in order to strengthen international business activity of 
home countries. This comes in addition to the MIDA components designed to 
foster knowledge flows to home countries.
At the bilateral level, several agreements launched in conjunction with 
European co-development initiatives have incorporated a component to foster 
diaspora investment in the home country. In some cases, programmes foresee 
co-financing of development projects by diasporas and donor countries. 
In 2009, Senegal launched the Plateforme d’appui au Secteur Privé et à la 
Valorisation de la Diaspora Sénégalaise en Italie (PLASEPRI) together with Italy, 
and another programme, Programme d’Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour 
le Développement (PAISD), together with France. These three-year programmes 
aim to boost SME development and employment generation in regions with high 
emigration rates. 
Among national initiatives, in 2009, Senegal launched the Fonds d’Appui aux 
Investissements des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (FAISE), aimed at encouraging 
diaspora members to invest in their region of origin. 
c) Diaspora business effects in LDCs
There is a very high participation of migrants in the United States in the 
market for home-country goods, according to Orozco (2008). Each migrant 
spends almost $1000 per year on nostalgia products, and the total may exceed 
$20 billion annually. Orozco and Burgess (2011) estimate that some 90 per cent 
of Haitians living in the United States consume nostalgia goods to the tune of 
$800 per person per year, which amounts to a potential market of some $285 
million. For the home country, this represents a major export market allowing 
the diversification of its exports. While 80 per cent of Haitian exports consist of 
manufactures, nostalgia goods are mostly agriculture-based. Similarly, Debass 
and Orozco (2008) estimate that the Ethiopian diaspora in the United States 
spends $1,077 on nostalgia goods annually. Going beyond diaspora markets, 
in the United Kingdom, part of the Ethiopian diaspora has established a niche 
market by marketing home coffee to independent delicatessens, ethically aware 
food shops, corporate purchasers and faith groups through the Oromo Coffee 
company (Newland and Taylor, 2010).
Econometric evidence computed by the UNCTAD secretariat indicates 
that worldwide, the presence of both skilled and unskilled immigrants helps to 
expand merchandise trade between home and host countries. The former have 
a trade-creating impact which is double that of the latter. In the case of the 
LDCs, by contrast, unskilled immigrants have such an impact, but there is little 
corresponding evidence in the case of skilled immigrants. This indicates that so 
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far, low-skilled LDC immigrants have been more involved in facilitating bilateral 
trade in their destination countries than their more educated fellow countrymen 
and countrywomen.
With regard to tourism, 70 per cent of the 254,000 tourists arriving in Haiti 
are Haitian-born or of Haitian origin, with the United States, Canada, France 
and the Dominican Republic as the leading sources (data for 2011). These are 
the main host countries of the Haitian diaspora. Haitian diaspora tourists spend 
amounts ranging from $1000-5000 per person on each trip, and it is therefore 
likely that they account for a larger share of the country’s tourism receipts than 
the number of tourists arriving in the country.
The diapora business network effect of generating bilateral FDI is expected 
to vary according to the size of the diaspora and of the home country (Docquier 
and Lodigiani, 2010). FDI by diasporas in LDC home countries (which are mostly 
small economies) is still limited. According to concerns expressed by potential 
LDC diaspora investors, the main reported deterrents are lack of support from 
the home government, a dearth of incentives for investment, and diasporas’ 
demand for guarantees for their investments. Still, some LDC diasporas have 
started gearing up to invest in their home country. Members of the Haiti diaspora 
are active in FDI in the areas of mining, tourism, energy and financial services. 
They seem to be cautious and risk-averse, typically taking minority stakes in 
projects and companies and shunning larger investment projects. The diasporas 
of Rwanda and Liberia have launched or planned diaspora funds, which are 
professionally managed vehicles that allow individual investors to diversify risk 
by purchasing shares of a basket of investment products – typically including 
money market funds, sovereign and corporate bonds, and equities (Terrazas, 
2010).
In Senegal, PAISD provided technical assistance for 221 investment projects 
in the country in agriculture, domestic trade, handicraft, services, tourism, 
ICT, consultancy, etc. Half of them were undertaken by diaspora members 
who remained in France, while the others were implemented by investors who 
returned permanently to Senegal to oversee their projects. The total value of the 
beneficiary investment projects was $4 million, which represents around 0.1% 
of gross fixed capital formation in 2010. Some $400 million were mobilized to 
co-finance them. 21 PLASEPRI had a budget of €24 million, consisting mainly 
of credits to SMEs and microfinance institutions as well as a grant component. 
Also in Senegal, in 2010 FAISE had a budget of $323,000 to finance 31 diaspora 
projects, mainly in fisheries, small industry and services (ANSD, 2011).
5. RETURNEES
a) Potential contribution to the home country
The potential contributions of permanent returnees to the home country 
are many and often depend on the level of development of the home country 
and the range of opportunities for the involvement of returnees. Some of the 
potential contributions are discussed below.
Knowledge. Returnees can deploy their skills and experience accumulated 
abroad by working in knowledge-intensive activities, e.g. government, 
consultancies, managerial positions in firms, etc. (Dustmann and Kirchkamp 
2002). They can also forge and sustain simultaneous and multi-stranded 
relationships that link their societies of origin and destination (Glick Schiller et 
al., 1992). There is ample evidence demonstrating that the knowledge and skills 
accumulated abroad and brought home by returnees have significantly boosted 
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the technological capability and innovation activities of economies that have 
successfully undergone structural change, as shown in chapter 5 of this Report.
Entrepreneurship. Returnees can use their entrepreneurial capabilities to 
establish new businesses,22 which may be in technologically more advanced 
sectors. Compared with their fellow countrymen and countrywomen who did 
not emigrate, returnees are more likely to be entrepreneurs thanks to: 
t 4BWJOHTBDDVNVMBUFEEVSJOHFNJHSBUJPO
t "EEJUJPOBM TLJMMT BDRVJSFE BCSPBE 	.D$PSNJDL BOE8BICB
 8BICB
and Zenou, 2011);
t $POOFDUJPOT UPCVTJOFTTOFUXPSLT FTUBCMJTIFEXIJMF MJWJOH BCSPBE
XIJDI
can be mobilized for the purposes of foreign trade, marketing, financing, 
access to technology, etc.
Entrepreneurial activities of returnees can arise from both high-skilled and 
low-skilled emigration, but are more likely to have an impact in the former case. 
High-skilled emigrants are more likely to have acquired managerial experience 
abroad and to have put aside savings necessary to start businesses.
Institutions. Returnees can participate in institution-building in the home 
country by strengthening both supply of and demand for institutions (Docquier, 
Ldogiani et al., 2011; Easterly and Nyarko 2009). This is a mirror effect of the 
loss incurred by the home country due to brain drain (see section B3f above), 
with the major difference that returnee actions are enriched by their learning and 
experience abroad. 
However, the various potential positive contributions of permanent returnees 
to the home country mentioned above are not always realized. This depends 
on the conditions of return, in particular returnees’ motivation, preparedness 
and time spent abroad (Cassarino, 2004), as well as local conditions. Typically, 
home economies that are not undergoing structural transformation are less 
likely to attract returnees who want to participate actively in local development. 
By contrast, highly dynamic home economies stand a greater chance of luring 
migrants back. Sustained growth over many years tends to precede permanent 
return, especially for high-skilled migrants. This has been the experience of 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. It means that permanent return 
of the high-skilled is more often a consequence than a trigger of economic 
growth (Docquier, 2006).
b) The experience of LDCs
The conditions of LDCs have generally not been very conducive to active 
contributions by permanent returnees to home country development. The 
major driver is family reasons, but other motivations seem to vary according to 
conditions prevailing locally in LDCs. In Haiti, these include above all involuntary 
return (e.g. deportation, work permit expiry, failure to find a job, etc.). In Senegal, 
Uganda and Burkina Faso, the fact that emigrants had no intention of staying 
abroad is the second most important reason quoted for return. By contrast, 
Bangladeshi returnees interviewed for this Report cited positive motivations 
besides family reasons, such as the desire to have a greater impact on society 
and willingness to make own knowledge and experience available to the home 
country. 
Most LDCs have only been able to attract return migration in very low 
numbers, a factor which has constrained their contribution to home country 
development. The rate of return (i.e. the number of returnees as a share of the 
emigrant stock plus returnees) in a selection of LDCs varies from six per cent in 
Uganda to 10 per cent in Senegal and approximately 15 per cent in Haiti and 
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Burkina Faso. As a share of the population, they account for less than two per 
cent in all four cases.23 It should be borne in mind that in these countries (except 
for Uganda) the vast majority of returnees are low-skilled, which means that they 
are less likely to have accumulated resources and new knowledge abroad. As 
for the time spent abroad, in Haiti, out of returned emigrants 78.4 per cent have 
lived six years or less abroad. Only 6.7 per cent of all returnees have spent ten 
years or more abroad, which means that most returnees have had little time to 
accumulate resources.
On the whole, professional and business development opportunities have 
not been very common in most LDCs, so they have not been very successful 
in attracting returnees and benefiting from their professional and entrepreneurial 
activities. In many cases, LDC returnees have tried to start new businesses, 
but have been discouraged by lack of support for enterprise development 
(extension services, financing, etc.) or have found bureaucratic requirements 
too demanding. This contrasts with the experience of more vibrant economies 
which offer wider opportunities for returnees in terms of both economic activities 
and professional prospects, as exemplified by Bangladesh (box 11). 
Despite these caveats, there is evidence of positive effects for migration 
and returnees’ activities in the home country and for returnees’ contribution to 
economic activities in LDCs. In Senegal, research findings show that returnees 
Box 11. Contributions of returnees to the Bangladeshi economy and society
The highly skilled knowledge workers who migrated from Bangladesh through State-sponsored scholarships from the 
1950s to the 1980s rarely returned or circulated to the home country. Since the 1990s, however, private universities, technical 
institutions, research bodies and NGOs have provided a launching pad for temporary or permanent return. At present, the 
country has reached a social and economic stage where the return and circulation of knowledge workers are sustainable 
(RMMRU-DRC, 2005). Some examples of the contribution of permanent returnees to Bangladesh in different domains are 
given below.1
Education. After studying and working at Harvard University (United States), a scientist returned to Bangladesh, where 
he is contributing to the development of a leading private university. He has successfully developed collaborative research 
relationship with different United States and United Kingdom universities, including for an international centre for climate change 
and development in his institution. After having studied and worked in the United States, a computer scientist returned to 
Bangladesh to become a professor of computer science and engineering at a public university. He is a public activist and part 
of the nationwide campaign using contests and science fairs, for example, to encourage young students to concentrate on 
science and mathematics. He has been a member of the technical committee which prepared the draft national education policy.
Medicine. After working as a senior physician in a leading US hospital, a Bangladeshi doctor returned to his home 
country to use his expertise in pathology and improve the quality of pathology tests. There are only a few individuals in the 
country with exposure to leading-edge pathology, which is one of the most technology-intensive branches of medicine. 
Some Bangladeshi doctors, after finishing their post-graduate studies in Japan, returned to their home country, where they 
established the Japan Bangladesh Friendship Hospital (JBFH) in 1993 in partnership with Japanese doctors. The Hospital has 
initiated a grassroots programme entitled “Krishoker Sashtho Seba” (health care for farmers). It has been conducted in the 
remote areas of Bangladesh in order to provide health-care facilities to farmers since 2006. JBFH also provides health-care 
facilities to the marginal and underprivileged and organizes workshops on issues such as first aid training and awareness of 
common diseases. 
Telecommunications. A top Bangladeshi manager studied in the United States, where he worked in both the public 
and private sectors. He returned to his home country, where he contributed to providing access to telephone services and 
increasing self-employment opportunities for the rural poor through connectivity. In 1993, he started a company with the 
backing of a Norwegian telecom company and financing from aid agencies and development banks. The company later 
became a major telephone operator, with 16 million subscribers providing telephone access to more than 100 million people 
covering 60,000 villages. 
Finance. A Bangladeshi returnee from the United States and one from the United Kingdom have successfully contributed 
to the strong spread of microcredit in Bangladesh, first to the country’s subsistence farmers then to urban areas. Rahman 
(2010) argues that this helped foster entrepreneurship among the rural poor. 
Media. Two communications professionals developed international careers as journalists and worked for several public 
affairs and media bodies in Asia, North America and Europe, including international organizations. They later returned to 
Bangladesh, where they launched a newspaper in 1991, with the stated aim of strengthening democracy and freedom of 
expression. The newspaper has become the country’s English-language daily with the largest circulation. 
1  The individual cases presented in this Box as examples derive from a country study prepared for this Report.
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have some characteristics which differentiate them favourably from non-
migrants: 1. returnees have higher labour force participation rates and have a 
stronger tendency to be self-employed; 2. they are more likely to have skilled 
jobs; 3. they are more present in commercial and handicraft activities; 4. they 
have higher earnings (Mezger, 2008; Mezger and Flahaux, 2010). Beyond 
self-selection at the moment of deciding whether to migrate or not, it is likely 
that the knowledge and experience accumulated abroad contribute to further 
differentiating returnees from non-migrants.
Survey evidence on the investment activity of returnees in LDCs shows that 
in Burkina Faso, 32.5 per cent of them have invested based on the savings 
accumulated abroad, whereas in Senegal the corresponding share is 17.3 per 
cent.24 In the former country, all individual returnee amounts invested were 
smaller than $5,000, while in Senegal they ranged as high as $20,000. The 
total cumulative amount invested by returnees in Senegal corresponds to 
2.6 per cent of the country’s gross fixed capital formation in 2009, whereas 
in Burkina Faso, the corresponding share is a higher 6.2 per cent. 25 In both 
countries, returnees have invested mainly in traditional sectors. In Burkina Faso, 
the primary sector accounted for 65 per cent of returnee investment projects, 
whereas in Senegal, 60 per cent of the projects were in trade and services, while 
the remainder was in the primary sector and real estate. A fraction of returnee 
investment involved international partners: two per cent or less in both cases. 
It is likely that a significant share of these business partnerships resulted from 
contacts held while living abroad, possibly indicating some form of diaspora 
business network.
These case studies do not correspond to the typical examples of 
transformative returnee entrepreneurship in modern sectors which assists the 
structural transformation of home country economies, as was the case with 
a few successful dynamic developing countries mentioned above. Still, they 
do show that the potential of returnees and their entrepreneurship is far from 
negligible. The example of the contribution of Bangladeshi returnees (box 7) 
reveals that, given a conducive domestic environment and policy action, this 
potential can be developed to a much greater extent.
c) International programmes to assist permanent return
International action has striven to assist return migration by facilitating their 
permanent resettlement in the home country and providing financial assistance 
in that respect. This was the case for the Return and Reintegration of Qualified 
Nationals (RQN) programmes of the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) and the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) 
programme of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), mentioned 
above. However, these programmes have generally failed to meet expectations. 
They have been very costly, considering the amounts allocated to individual 
returnees. At the same time, the financing required to effectively help returnees 
resettle in their home country has been much higher than what is available 
through the programmes. In several cases, beneficiary nationals returned to the 
home country temporarily but subsequently emigrated again.26 Therefore, the 
emphasis of international programmes has mostly shifted to temporary return, 
i.e. from return migration to circular migration. TOKTEN was mainly reoriented 
towards temporary return. IOM has launched the Temporary Return of Qualified 
Nationals (TRQN) and Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) focusing on 
temporary return to replace previous programmes aimed at permanent return 
(see section C3b above).27 In bilateral initiatives, by contrast, assistance to 
permanent return remains one of the components, as in the case of the bilateral 
programmes and agreements on co-development to which European countries 
are a party. 
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D. Conclusions
According to Gibson and McKenzie (2011: 125), “we are still some way 
from a comprehensive global answer on the effect of brain drain on sending 
country growth and development outcomes”. This is certainly true of LDCs. 
Nevertheless, this chapter has presented analysis and information which help us 
to identify some major features of high-skilled migration and the potential impact 
of diasporas on LDC home country development.
On average, LDCs are more affected by brain drain than any other group of 
countries. The intensity is especially acute in islands (where more than half of the 
high-skilled workers often live abroad) and in African LDCs, 21 of which have 
more than one-fifth of their high-skilled population abroad. The brain drain rate is 
lower is Asian LDCs, though even there it is still higher than in other developing 
countries. There is strong variation in the rates of brain drain of LDCs, but it 
is close to the estimated “optimal” level (5–10 per cent) in only five of these 
countries. Apart from the likely adverse macroeconomic effects to be expected 
at these high rates of brain drain, emigration of highly qualified LDC nationals 
has adverse consequences, especially in the activities of health, education and 
STI. This brain drain primarily amounts to a South–North transfer of resources.
Available evidence shows that the (positive) developmental impacts of brain 
drain on LDCs have been limited so far. Concerning their human capital base, 
since the 1990s, education enrolment in most LDCs has been expanding rapidly 
at all levels, including the tertiary stage. This expansion is driven mainly by public 
policies and by the increased supply of educational services. It is very difficult 
to attribute improving educational attainment (or a significant share of it) to the 
incentive effect of emigration, although some observers argue that it has been 
one of the factors pushing demand for higher education.
There are indications of embryonic diaspora business network effects in a 
few LDCs. With respect to financial and capital flows, beyond the remittances 
analysed in chapter 3 of this Report, a few LDCs have taken initial steps to 
mobilize the savings of their diaspora through diaspora bonds and FDI. Some 
fledgling diaspora business network effects are starting to appear in terms of 
strengthening trade and investment ties between home and host countries. 
The current impact pertains especially to bilateral trade in services (especially 
tourism) and goods (e.g. nostalgia trade). LDC diaspora FDI in home countries is 
still very limited compared to its potential. 
Diaspora knowledge networks are incipient in most LDCs. A number of 
initiatives and programmes to leverage diaspora knowledge for the benefit of 
LDC home country development have been launched. They are undertaken by 
individuals, diaspora associations and NGOs, national home and host country 
governments and/or international organizations, often in an uncoordinated way. 
They generally have positive effects, but these are very localized and specific. In 
most cases, these initiatives do not have a broader impact because the multitude 
of actions by different stakeholders tends to dilute resources, efforts and 
energies. They are often isolated programmes, which are not linked to broader 
development strategies and policies. The few cases of more effective initiatives 
have typically been a result of coordinated action by different stakeholders —
including the home government —, which creates synergies among agents and 
leverages resources.
Returnees’ contribution to investment, innovation and institution-building in 
LDCs has varied according to local conditions in home countries. Where local 
conditions are unfavourable to investment and innovation and/or policy has 
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not been supportive, returnee investment has been limited and has tended to 
reinforce existing patterns of specialization. By contrast, in some larger LDC 
economies or those that are growing and undergoing structural transformation, 
returnees have made significant contributions to economic activity and social 
innovation. 
The contribution of diasporas and other positive effects of brain circulation 
to the development of LDCs is below its potential. There are two main reasons 
for this: the development stage of LDCs themselves, and the initiatives put in 
place. First, prevailing conditions in most LDCs are quite different from those 
in countries which benefitted greatly from diaspora knowledge and business 
networks and were able to attract return emigrants. In the latter case, diaporas 
contributed significantly to home country development, helping many of these 
countries to become high-income countries.
Second, although most LDCs at present reap limited gains from their 
diasporas, it is likely that the positive effects of brain circulation will strengthen 
later during the economic development of these countries. While this is a long-
term perspective, initiatives can be taken in the short term to strengthen the 
home country benefits associated with brain drain. This will require policy action 
by LDC themselves and by the international community. The next chapter of this 
Report provides an analysis of policy alternatives and options needed to achieve 
this objective.
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Notes
  1 This chapter builds on UNCTAD (2007: 139–160) by updating the statistical 
information and broadening the scope of analysis and policy recommendations.
  2 By contrast, low-skilled migrants are those whose highest educational attainment is 
at the secondary or primary level or who did not undergo any formal schooling.
  3 Bhagwati and Hanson (2009); Docquier and Rapoport (2012); Kapur and McHale 
(2005); IOM (2008); Solimano (2010); Pritchett (2006).
  4 The most widely used database on worldwide brain drain is that of Docquier and 
Marfouk (2006), which was later revised to provide a gender breakdown (Docquier, 
Lowell and Marfouk, 2009). It was subsequently expanded in Docquier et al. (2011), 
which includes non-OECD host countries and therefore captures South–South 
flows. The first version of this database was kindly made available to the UNCTAD 
secretariat by its authors.
  5 High-skilled people flows are in sharp contrast with those of overall migration, where 
South–South movements predominate, as seen in chapter 2 of this Report. The latter 
are strongly influenced by the migration of low-skilled people.
  6 Given the preponderance of oil exporters among developing host countries, 
developments in the price of this commodity are also likely to play a role in determining 
brain drain trends in the future.
  7 The indicators include the number of LDC students, since studying abroad is often 
the first step towards long-term emigration.
  8  Even if education is financed privately, this is an investment in human capital formation 
made under the expectation that it will bring returns.
  9 These costs are net of: 1. the estimated fiscal gains from domestic consumption 
funded by remittances; and 2. the Government savings from not having to provide 
services to people who no longer live in the home country.
10 By the same token, host countries become better endowed with skills or human 
capital, which tends to reinforce their specialization in the corresponding goods and 
services.
11 On the importance of institutions to economic growth and development, see Szirmai 
(2012) and Bluhm and Szirmai (2012).
12 Mountford (1997); Stark (2004); Stark et al. (1997, 1998); Vidal (1998); Beine et al. 
(2001); Docquier and Rapoport (2007, 2012); Kangasniemi et al. (2007); Commander 
et al. (2004).
13 Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Uganda 
and United Republic of Tanzania (UNCTAD secretariat estimates, based on data 
from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics: http//www.uis.unesco.org, accessed on 
22/06/2012). 
14 In Ethiopia, for example, in the mid-1990s, university-level institutions hosted 
only 15,000 students, but received 300,000 applications annually. However, the 
introduction of new policies by the Government to boost investment in human capital 
formation resulted in a rapid expansion of the number of universities and students. 
During the academic year 2006/2007, universities hosted 203,000 students at 
the bachelor’s level and within five years the number of enrolments had more than 
doubled to 448,000. Similarly, in Senegal, the number of students enrolled in tertiary-
level education institutions swelled from 30,000 in 2001 to 86,000 in 2008, as the 
expansion rate was double that of the preceding decade. By 2012, total enrolment 
had reached 91,000.
15 Similarly, in Gibson and McKenzie’s (2010) survey data for high-skilled emigration 
from Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Ghana and New 
Zealand, the migration incentive generally pushed respondents to learn a language or 
take test preparation classes, but not to lengthen schooling itself.
16 Even considering that high-skilled emigrants tend to remit more than low-skilled 
emigrants (and remittance data refer to all migrants), remittances as a share of GDP 
per capita exceed 20 per cent in only four LDCs: Lesotho, Haiti, Samoa and Nepal.
17 Rogers (2004) finds that countries with relatively high numbers of students studying 
science and engineering abroad experience faster subsequent growth.
18 Source: http://www.codev.gouv.sn.
19 The Government of Senegal, for instance, has recorded as many as 741 associations 
of the Senegalese diaspora (ANSD, 2011). 
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20 The lack of linkages to national government sometimes stems from limited trust of 
diaspora organizations in the latter or from missing interest or institutional capacity 
of the national government to engage with diaspora organizations active in specific 
projects.
21 This share provides an order of magnitude, since the diaspora investment was made 
over several years.
22 A survey of Turkish returnees shows that more than half are economically active 
upon return and most of them engage in entrepreneurial activities (Dustmann and 
Kirchkamp 2002). In Egypt, returning migrants tend to have higher levels of human 
capital than non-migrants, and are likely to be more entrepreneurial the longer they 
have worked abroad (McCormick and Wahba 2001; Wahba 2007).
23 Data for 2009 for Uganda, Senegal and Burkina Faso, and for 2001 in the case of 
Haiti.
24 Based on the same source as table 17.
25 These shares provide an order of magnitude, since the returnee investment was 
made over several years.
26 In Ethiopia, out of 30 expatriates who participated in a TOKTEN programme in the 
home country, only one decided to resettle there permanently (Adredo, 2002).
27 In the MIDA Great Lakes Programme (box 10), just 15 permanent returnees were 
aided financially, as compared with more than 400 missions, often involving more 
than one expert.
5CHAPTER
TOWARDS A POLICY AGENDA
FOR THE LDCS: AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH TO MIGRATION,
REMITTANCES AND MOBILIZATION
OF DIASPORA KNOWLEDGE
The Least Developed Countries Report 2012122
A. Diasporas and capacity-building 
 1. INTRODUCTION
This Report examines the impact on LDCs of past and current migration 
that has created diasporas in different parts of the world, and the potential for 
utilizing these diasporas for development of the home country. It is evident that 
migration and its varied consequences have become increasingly significant for 
developing countries in general and LDCs in particular, and these trends are 
likely to continue in the medium term.
In this Report, various forms of migration have been considered, with a more 
specific focus on high-skilled migrants. It has been seen that while concerns 
about brain drain and other costs associated with the migration of skilled 
personnel are still valid in LDCs, there is also potential for both residents and 
governments of home countries to utilize the presence of skilled, high-earning 
diasporas in other parts of the world. It is useful for analytical purposes to 
distinguish between three sets of resources, capabilities and assets associated 
with diasporas and their contributions to home countries. They are:
1) Diasporas as sources of capacity-building;
2) Diasporas as sources of knowledge and learning; and
3) Diasporas as sources of development finance
Each of these features could contribute to the development of home 
countries in different ways, depending on the context, the economic processes 
at work within the country, and of course the overall policy framework as well 
as the specific policies applied in different sectors and areas. These aspects of 
the relationship between cross-border migration and diasporas’ links with their 
countries of origin, along with some specific policies that could be utilized to 
enhance the relationship in a mutually beneficial way, are outlined in the table 19 
and considered in more detail below.
2. CREATING THE POLICY FRAMEWORK
a) The need for information
To start with, governments in LDCs need to be aware of the actual extent 
and pattern of cross-border migration, the location, spread and nature of 
diaspora activities and the extent and pattern of remittances. On these issues, 
the current state of knowledge in most LDCs is relatively poor. Therefore, one 
part of the issue to be addressed is statistical in nature. There is hardly any 
official apparatus to report on and monitor many of the facets of migration and 
its results, and what does exist is mainly concerned with remittances. Yet this is 
to be expected, given that central banks normally monitor and register the flows 
of remittances coming in through formal channels. Central banks are natural 
stakeholders in this process since the inflow of remittances alleviates a country’s 
balance of payments constraints. For other aspects of migration, however, 
there are no natural stakeholders in the government administration, or at best 
they are dispersed and only loosely connected. Consequently, data on these 
phenomena are sparse and incomplete, and sometimes do not exist at all. This 
is especially true of data on the geographic location of diasporas; the costs of 
remitting; the extent of brain drain; and the current professional and educational 
status of emigrants. 
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Table 19. Key objectives and possible activities of a diaspora strategy for LDCs
Key objectives Possible activities Rationale
Making diaspora mobilization and 
engagement a priority in the development 
agenda of the home countries 
Creating a ministry-level institution to link 
diaspora issues with national development 
agenda, identifying goals and policies and 
coordinating inclusion of all stakeholders
Given the cross-cutting nature of migration, 
remittances and diaspora engagement, 
a highest representation in government 
institutions is necessary
Improving the knowledge of the location, 
size, and characteristics of the diaspora 
Improving data collection, compiling 
of inventories of diaspora skills and 
experience, and the like
Policies cannot be based on anecdotal 
evidence and wrong assumptions
Contacting and engaging diaspora 
organizations abroad
Organizing high profile events, appointing 
diaspora members as spoke persons 
on diaspora issues, partnering with host 
countries when possible
Engagement of diaspora has to be a 
continuous process built on trust and thus 
needs to be nurtured 
Defining the role of embassies and 
consulates with a goal of supporting and 
mobilizing the diasporas living abroad 
Strengthening the role of diplomatic 
representation in topics that are of special 
importance to diaspora (legal counseling in 
host countries, information on options for 
investment, return, and the like)
Diplomatic representation should promote a 
quid pro quo relationship with the diaspora 
members and stand ready to help them 
in the host country and inform them of 
options in the home country
Encouraging circular migration, return 
migration and providing return facilitation 
services 
Recruiting highly skilled diaspora members 
for temporary return in key government 
and/or academia positions, providing 
material and non-material incentives for 
return migration
Circular migration and temporary return 
would increase the chances of permanent 
collaboration of locals with diaspora 
members; incentives might entice some 
diaspora members to return for good
Defining and establishing the main 
mechanisms of diaspora engagement 
Depending on the policy goals, activities 
such as financial assistance, tax incentives, 
strengthening of cultural and national 
identity, etc. could be considered
Mechanisms of diaspora engagement 
would depend on policy goals, the 
structure of diaspora and the resources the 
Government has to meet these goals
Extending and upholding citizenship rights Engaging diaspora will be easier if its 
members are granted voting rights, dual 
citizenship, etc.
Having a dual citizenship might strengthen 
the identification with the home country and 
could result in stronger engagement
Defining financial vehicles and legal 
frameworks for attracting specific diaspora 
resources 
Providing incentives for savings, 
investment, skills, knowledge and 
technology transfers 
Depending on the type of diaspora 
resources that is targeted, a proper mix of 
incentives would be needed
Creating a favourable economic 
environment for attracting diaspora 
resources 
Taking any measures that help to create 
a favourable economic environment in 
general
The likelihood of diaspora engagement is 
higher if the economic environment in the 
home country is favourable
Facilitating short-term and tourist home 
visits by the diaspora
Simplifying visa procedures for diaspora 
members, organizing specific, heritage-
tourism programmes, etc.
Diaspora members could provide an 
impetus for the local tourist industry and 
also play a key role in converting the 
country into a new tourist destination
Establishing links of diasporas and 
diaspora business networks with the 
private sector of the home country and the 
national strategy of development
Organizing business events to promote the 
country’s investment opportunities, creating 
a one-stop shop for investment information, 
matching local business leaders with 
diaspora counterparts
Promote links between diaspora and local 
businesses to make sure that national 
development goals are supported by the 
engagement of diaspora resources; use 
diaspora knowledge networks to enhance 
national industrial policy
Encouraging philanthropy to support the 
homeland
Engaging high-profile individuals (artists, 
sport stars, or wealthy businesspeople) 
to serve as “goodwill ambassadors” and 
promote philanthropy in diaspora; when 
possible, providing matching funds, 
especially for investment in public goods
Philanthropic activities of diaspora 
members could substantially improve local 
conditions, especially in terms of public 
goods provision
Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on literature review and Agunias and Newland (2012).
It may be argued that the costs of collecting such information and monitoring 
the activities of emigrants can be disproportionately large for LDC governments 
that are cash-strapped and have many other competing uses for their resources. 
However, with creative policies to engage diasporas and to increase and direct 
the flow of inward remittances, the benefits to LDCs of such data collection and 
monitoring are likely to significantly outweigh the costs. The establishment of a 
migrant remittance observatory for LDCs in Benin is a positive first step,1 but 
should be complemented by concrete national measures in other LDCs.
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b) Policy coherence for diaspora engagement
Policies on migration, remittances and diaspora engagement should 
be formulated as an integral part of national development strategies, not in 
isolation. This is partly because different forms of migration — internal migration, 
emigration, immigration, and return migration — are all interlinked, and various 
macroeconomic and sectoral policies affect each of these. Agricultural and rural 
development policies influence rural–urban migration patterns. Trade policies 
affect domestic employment creation (or the lack thereof) and thus influence 
emigration trends. Monetary and exchange rate policies affect both remittance 
costs and sending channels. Educational policies influence brain drain processes, 
and so on. This being so, a piecemeal approach is inappropriate. Not only must 
migration policies be coherently included in a development strategy, but other 
policies need to take migration issues into account. This is complicated by 
the tendency of different ministries and agencies of government to work in a 
compartmentalized fashion that fails to take other factors and outcomes into 
consideration. 
A further consideration when formulating a development strategy is the 
presence of multiple stakeholders. When designing policies, it is necessary to 
bear in mind that there are at least four sets of stakeholders driving the processes 
related to remittances, diasporas and migration: migrants themselves; migrants’ 
families in the home country; the government in the home country; and the 
government in the host country. Interests and priorities may vary across groups 
of stakeholders and even within them (as in the case of migrants from different 
locations or income groups). For all these reasons, a pragmatic yet holistic and 
coherent approach to policymaking is required. 
Clearly, governments of LDCs cannot control either the pull factors in 
developed countries or the decisions of their neighbours that sometimes result 
in flows of refugees or other migrants. In both cases, however, a development 
strategy should incorporate such considerations. For example, it might be 
possible to reach bilateral agreements with certain vitally important developed 
countries to try to regulate migration flows and encourage circular migration. 
In the case of developing countries, regional cooperation can play a key role, 
especially since a great deal of international migration from LDCs is from nearby 
countries.
In effect, an agency, ideally at ministerial level, is required to deal with the 
cross-cutting nature of these issues; ensure policy coherence and consistency 
across the board; and coordinate potential actors around a set of identified 
priorities. Some LDCs have already established ministries that are dedicated 
exclusively to the issues of migration, remittances and diasporas. For example, 
the Government of Bangladesh, responding to demands by expatriate 
Bangladeshis, created a Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas 
Employment (MoEWOE) in 2001, two years before India and the Philippines. Its 
prime function is the creation, promotion and regulation of employment overseas. 
One important motive for promoting employment abroad is to ensure a steady 
flow of remittances. However, the Ministry’s functions have been expanding, so 
it now also deals with the creation of an investment-friendly economic policy 
package for diaspora members. Some other LDCs, like Haiti and Senegal, have 
also established ministerial positions for dealing exclusively with diaspora issues, 
while in others, these issues are dealt with by ministries with hybrid functions. 
Thus, Ministries of Foreign Affairs often have the additional function of dealing 
with diaspora issues (for example in Benin, Comoros, Ethiopia), while in other 
cases this role is played by a Ministry of Regional Integration, as in the cases of 
Mali, Niger and Somalia. However, most other LDCs do not give these issues 
adequate institutional importance and deal with them at subministerial level 
(Agunias and Newland, 2012).
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While the specific mix of policies and concrete measures for diaspora 
engagement will vary for each country, the overall direction should be to provide 
an enabling environment for development of productive capacities. Like both 
domestic residents and other foreign residents, diaspora members are more 
likely to be interested in investing and participating in an economy that has 
some dynamism, where rules and norms are clearly laid out and followed as 
much as possible and key institutions can be trusted. The importance of clear, 
transparent and fair rules and legal infrastructure cannot be overemphasized.
 As noted in chapter 4, the issue of trust is crucial. In terms of public policy, 
one possible way to build trust is to start with small commitments and gradually 
scale up. If these smaller projects are successful, trust and experience will 
accumulate on both sides. This approach may be advantageous in cases 
where previous experiences with mobilization of diaspora resources were 
unsatisfactory. Further, while it is true that diaspora members are not motivated 
exclusively by commercial interests, their engagement will fail if they are only 
expected to contribute and receive nothing in return. For example, the policy 
approach of the Ethiopian Government recognizes that partnerships should be 
built with the diaspora in such a way as to benefit both parties and include 
building capacity, extending rights and extracting obligations (Kuschminder and 
Siegel, 2011) in mutually beneficial commercial and professional engagement at 
various levels. 
3. DIASPORAS AS ENTREPRENEURS
Very little research has been done on how diaspora entrepreneurs contribute 
to economic development in LDCs. In some middle-income countries, 
entrepreneurial diasporas have been instrumental in developing the productive 
capacities of their home countries. For example, migrant entrepreneurs have 
played an important role in building knowledge-based industries in India, China, 
Taiwan Province of China, Israel and Ireland in the last two decades or so. 
One lesson from these experiences is that entrepreneurs abroad can play an 
important role in helping to develop firms at home and also serve as a two-
way link for market knowledge, connections and technology transfer across 
countries. This has been tried successfully in South America, on a regional 
basis, through the MERCOSUR Entrepreneurial Portal.
In LDCs, this process may perhaps hold less promise in the short run because 
of their more limited base of human capital and venture capital to develop 
high-tech industries at home. Nevertheless, their entrepreneurial diasporas 
operating in light industry can help develop similar industries at home through 
contacts, know-how and other valuable inputs and capabilities developed in the 
host countries. They can also contribute to the upgrading of managerial and 
innovating capabilities at home. 
In general, there are at least two conditions that determine migrants’ success 
in establishing thriving firms upon their return. The first is whether they return with 
more advanced knowledge and skills than before. As discussed in chapter 4, the 
longer they stay as migrants in foreign countries and the more entrepreneurial 
experience they accumulate, the more likely this will be. The second condition 
is the existence of a favourable policy framework in their home country. Return 
migrants would probably need suitable financial support to start a new firm, 
even if they have accumulated some savings. At the very least, they would have 
to be able to get a credit from the financial sector under normal conditions. 
However, given the reluctance of financial institutions to extend credit to SMEs, 
a national development bank with special lines of credit for return migrants 
might be necessary. In addition, return migrants might have accumulated some 
but perhaps not all of the requisite skills for successful entrepreneurial activity. 
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In that case, they would need technical assistance to upgrade their managerial, 
technical, financial, or other skills required for successful management of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Governments could provide this type of 
technical assistance and/or education. One option could be to support these 
entrepreneurs by lowering tariffs on imports of machinery and equipment and 
raw materials to help them get their businesses off the ground. 
Initially, the public policy focus in LDCs would most likely be on small, family 
firms that create jobs. Later, however, policymakers would have to shift their 
focus to medium-sized companies that are more likely to boost economic 
development by moving up the value chain and that have a stronger technology-
upgrading potential. The policies then would have to identify strategic sectors 
for the national economy and provide incentives for entrepreneurial diaspora 
members to invest in these sectors. 
Governments could also provide incentives to migrants to return to the home 
country once they retire by signing double-taxation avoidance treaties with 
the main host countries where the majority of their migrants work. Jamaica, 
for example, has signed double taxation avoidance treaties with all of its major 
trading partners and also the main destination countries of its migrants (the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, etc.). The economic rationale is 
the following: given the income differences, retiring in the home country provides 
retirees with much greater purchasing power than retiring in the host country. 
However, if they have to pay taxes on their pensions twice (in both home and host 
country), this advantage mainly disappears. Thus, double taxation avoidance 
agreements should, among other things, contain a provision that pensions 
and other similar remuneration paid in consideration of past employment to a 
migrant by the host country be taxable only in the country in which a migrant 
decides to retire. The benefits of higher consumption would then accrue to the 
home country to the extent that migrants decide to retire there instead of retiring 
in the host country.
4. DIASPORAS AS TRADE FACILITATORS
A positive empirical correlation has been found between the degree of 
international trade in source and destination countries and the size of the 
migrant community in both nations.2 The dominance of language, culture and 
knowledge of costumer and supplier markets are all factors that help to develop 
trade relations among nations, and diaspora communities can be especially well 
placed to perform this role. 
As noted in chapter 4, a distinct niche for LDCs could initially be to seek an 
advantage in the so-called “nostalgia trade”. Orozco (2008) finds that there is 
a very high participation of migrants in the United States in markets for home-
country goods. On average each migrant spends almost $1,000 per year on 
nostalgia products, and the total volume may top $20 billion annually. A first 
step for many LDCs could be to try to tap the consumption potential of its own 
diaspora by exporting goods that are emblematic of the country but are difficult 
to find in host countries. The potential for policy intervention in nostalgia trade 
is wide since it is a multistep process that involves producers, home-country 
distributors, host-country importers, wholesalers and retailers (Newland and 
Taylor, 2010). Policies in LDCs could be designed to help producers become 
and stay competitive by upgrading their products and adapting them to 
changes in final markets, and to enlist diaspora members to help with branding 
and marketing in the host country. Education and training of producers is crucial 
if they are to become competitive in foreign markets. 
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Governments should also identify hurdles which local firms encounter 
in foreign markets and help them overcome them. Typically, local firms are 
too small to research market conditions abroad. Given the more stringent 
phytosanitary and other requirements in developed countries, small producers 
generally cannot meet them without first incurring significant costs for finding the 
appropriate information and financial resources to invest in technology. Moreover, 
they lack capabilities to market their products. To capture the lucrative niche 
markets in developed countries, LDC governments have to make sure that local 
firms receive support throughout the commercial chain, up to and including the 
retail phase. Diaspora members could be crucial in providing support for these 
policies, and could provide strategic guidance throughout the process.
For countries such as South Africa, diaspora-owned companies were partly 
responsible for the worldwide diffusion and adoption of products such as 
rooibos tea and South African wine. These companies also imported products 
from South Africa for sale first to diaspora members, but later to a broader 
public as well. South African crafts have also benefited from contacts between 
local producers and the diaspora. Policies to connect diaspora members to 
local business in the home country could include initiatives such as providing 
diaspora organizations with information on local producers and their conditions, 
organizing business events or matching local entrepreneurs with their diaspora 
counterparts.  
Another example, that of the Oromo refugees from Ethiopia in the United 
Kingdom developing the Oromo Coffee Company (OCC), mentioned in chapter 
4, shows that LDC diasporas are succeeding in not only catering to the nostalgic 
tastes of their countrymen, but also in moving beyond the narrow focus on the 
consumption potential of diaspora members. In effect, by exporting organic 
coffee, OCC has succeeded in expanding the appeal of its products to a wider 
set of consumers. Given that one of the main problems of small producers in 
penetrating foreign markets is their inability to provide larger quantities of goods, 
policies in LDCs could encourage producers to organize into clusters. That 
would allow them to share information and knowledge; upgrade their production 
processes; improve access to more modern technologies; and penetrate the 
broader markets of host countries beyond the relatively reduced niches for 
nostalgia goods. 
Finally, the examples of China and India in particular show that diasporas can 
be instrumental in increasing exports to new markets. In order to do something 
similar, however, LDCs would first have to substantially strengthen their 
productive capacities to produce competitive goods and services for exports, 
and would have to engage much more actively with their own diasporas.
Diaspora members could be a special target group for a strategy of tourist 
development of the home country as they are more likely to visit the country, even 
in the absence of a full-fledged tourist infrastructure. Besides utilizing diasporas’ 
motivations to visit countries of origin, governments could also generate other 
motives related to culture, business, sport, religious, well-being and other 
activities that also have a strong impact on the development of tourism. These 
visits could also precipitate interest in so-called “nostalgia” goods, and increase 
their consumption in the host country.
The following two examples demonstrate how other countries have used 
specific means of boosting diaspora tourism. One example is the “Homecoming 
Scotland 2009” project, a series of events with the specific goal of attracting 
people of Scottish origin to visit their “ancestral homeland”. The year 2009 
was chosen for a symbolic reason: it was the 250th anniversary of the birth of 
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Robert Burns, the national poet of Scotland. The programme consisted of more 
than 300 events that motivated thousands of people of Scottish ancestry to 
visit Scotland. The timing of the project could not have been better: the boost 
to tourism and the economy was a welcome support, as it coincided with the 
worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression.
The other example shows that sport can connect diaspora members with 
their home country. The Croatian World Games are an Olympic-style competition 
in twelve different sports with participation of young Croats from Croatia and 
from Croatian diaspora communities. The event is organized by the Croatian 
Olympic Committee and the Croatian World Congress, an umbrella organization 
of different diaspora communities, and supported by the Government. Besides 
economic benefits for the home country, its significance is in the outreach to 
younger members of the Croatian diaspora born abroad who would normally 
tend to lose their ties with the country of origin of their parents or grandparents. 
Both examples illustrate a more general point about policies to engage 
diasporas: it takes some creativity and knowledge to devise policies that will 
attract diaspora members as tourists. 
B. Diasporas, knowledge and learning
As indicated in chapter 4, the number of workers with university-level 
education who emigrated from LDCs reached 1.3 million in 2000 — an increase 
of 58 per cent over 1990. The latest figures are not yet available, but given 
recent trends, the total number is estimated to be much higher today. The 
greatest increase was in emigration to developed countries, in particular the 
United States, which hosts one-fourth of all LDC high-skilled emigrants. From a 
home country policy perspective, two points are worth noting: first, brain drain 
from LDCs is most likely to continue in the foreseeable future, due to strong 
push and pull forces mentioned in chapter 4 of this Report. This will increase the 
size of highly skilled professionals in diasporas. Second, in most cases, living 
and working abroad allows nationals to continue to accumulate and upgrade 
their knowledge, skills and experience. 
Home countries can draw on these overseas pools of skills and human 
resources so that they share knowledge and transfer technology with domestic 
agents, thereby contributing to national development. As noted above, the 
burden of devising and implementing development strategies and programmes 
should not fall solely on diasporas (Skeldon, 2008), although the establishment 
of diaspora knowledge networks makes the transfer of knowledge to home 
countries easier. This of course requires the active involvement of home 
country governments and the formulation of well-targeted policies for diaspora 
engagement. 
LDC governments are starting to realize the potential of their diasporas as 
sources of knowledge and technology. Home countries have taken the initial 
steps of devising and implementing policies to mobilize diaspora knowledge 
for domestic development. In many cases, however, the incipient diaspora 
policies of LDCs have been designed by government officials without 
consulting diaspora members. Consequently, the professional priorities, time 
and financial constraints, willingness of emigrants to engage, and the desired 
forms of participation have not been taken into account. These design and 
implementation shortcomings limit policy effectiveness. 
Ideally, the planning and design of policies and instruments for diaspora 
engagement should be made by national home country governments in 
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consultation with diaspora members and their associations. This requires 
home countries to have a good knowledge of their diasporas and to establish 
a dialogue with them. Such consultations are also likely to ensure engagement 
and commitment by diaspora members from the start, as well as coherence 
between diaspora action and national government priorities and programmes.
Dialogue results in a better acquaintance with diasporas in terms of their 
geographical location, skills profile, professional activities, areas of expertise 
and experience. It also allows drawing a clear picture of the way in which a 
diaspora is willing to engage with the home country for the purpose of 
knowledge sharing and transfer. The policies, mechanisms and instruments 
devised and implemented by national policymakers need to be differentiated 
by diaspora segment (e.g. scientists, professionals, entrepreneurs, low-skilled 
workers, peasants, artists, etc.) and their forms of engagement. These forms 
can be “virtual return” (i.e. interaction at a distance), temporary return (through 
participation in development programmes and projects, training activities, 
advisory missions, etc.) or definitive return. Each of these forms of diaspora 
engagement requires different financing mechanisms and institutional support.
 In many cases, policies and programmes will involve just home country agents 
and diaspora members and associations. Often, however, it will be advisable to 
involve more stakeholders in the planning and execution of diaspora knowledge 
transfer programmes and policies. These include host country governments and 
other key agents (e.g. businesses, research centres, government institutions 
and universities), international organizations, and international donors. Such joint 
action avoids the problems of dispersion and lack of coherence of programmes 
and actions discussed in chapter 4 of this Report. 
 Coordinating and leveraging the actions, programmes and resources of 
different stakeholders will allow LDCs to establish dynamic diaspora knowledge 
networks (DKNs) and to reap the benefits from the ensuing flows of knowledge 
and technology transfer to the home country. 
1. DIASPORA KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS (DKNS)
DKNs consist of groups of highly skilled expatriate professionals who are 
interested in maintaining contacts and helping to develop their countries of 
origin. Thus, DKNs do not refer to all the members of the diaspora, but only to 
those groups of individuals who are interested in sharing and transferring their 
knowledge, experience and know-how back home. In order to become agents 
of change and learning, however, DKNs need to become “search networks”,3
which consist of individuals and institutions who and which link and connect 
the most effective segments of relevant institutions in order to discover what 
a country is good at producing (Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2006). As knowledge 
is neither costless nor easily transferrable, for this to occur, proactive policy is 
required that incorporates this potentially key function of a diaspora into the 
government’s strategic developmental framework.4
DKNs are understood as subsets of international knowledge networks that 
“govern the transfer of various types of knowledge, such as intellectual property, 
know-how, software code, or databases, between dependent parties, across 
the economy” (OECD, 2011b:1).5 As such, they include a platform for knowledge 
flows and interaction between diaspora and the local actors in home countries. 
These flows may incorporate various forms of learning and knowledge creation, 
such as research and development (R&D), intellectual property, technology 
licensing, know-how, joint ventures and alliances, technology sharing and 
best practices. Consequently, DKNs represent a subset of global knowledge 
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networks, with vast economic potential that remains untapped in most LDCs. 
For example, as explained in Box 9 of chapter 4 of this Report, the decoding of 
the jute genome in Bangladesh with the direct involvement of the Bangladeshi 
diaspora was a very significant innovation, with enormous economic potential 
and scientific impact. This innovation was produced as a result of knowledge 
sharing between national and international knowledge providers. It serves as an 
excellent example of the success of DKNs in LDCs at the current time and the 
potential of DKNs for building the productive base of LDC economies. 
 The full economic impact of DKNs is believed to be greatly underestimated, 
since the methodology for impact assessment remains to be elaborated. For 
example, how does one measure the impact of research networks on policy 
development? Obviously, knowledge generation and transfer, and the synergies 
involved in innovation and productivity increases, have been central to economic 
growth in developed countries and can be extremely significant in developing 
countries.
DKNs are generally characterized by the absence of formal governance 
arrangements, which can have its advantages and disadvantages. They can imply 
the emergence of non-state actors, thereby potentially generating pressures for 
democratic structures with greater roles for civil society. Conversely, they can 
contribute to the further entrenchment of existing inequalities and asymmetries 
in economies and societies. They should not be perceived as a panacea or a 
substitute for local efforts to build endogenous productive capabilities; rather, 
their role is that of an additional actor in the story of growth based on domestic 
productive capacities.
In this section, it will be argued that there is ample evidence from numerous 
case studies to show that DKNs have played a critical role in the technological 
upgrading, industrial development and building of productive capacities of source 
countries (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006). However, such transfer of knowledge 
and learning does not happen automatically but requires an organized and 
coordinated diaspora network and a home-country national development 
strategy backed by industrial policy and active government engagement in 
diaspora affairs. A proactive diaspora policy is essential to ensure that DKNs, 
which are in essence private voluntary networks, gain the trust and confidence 
needed to remain engaged and ensure that their activities exert a positive impact.6 
As latecomers to industrial development and given their recent experience with 
deindustrialization,7 LDCs need to formulate innovative industrial policies that 
are compatible with their current conditions and requirements as well as the 
rapidly evolving global context. Some LDCs have already designed industrial 
policies with a view to accelerating economic diversification and structural 
change. This Report will argue that in formulating their industrial policies, LDCs 
should learn from countries that have benefited most from DKNs by designing 
their diaspora strategy as an integral part of industrial policy and the broader 
national development strategy. This has already taken place in Asia, less so in 
Africa.
2. DIASPORA NETWORKS AS SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE AND LEARNING
DKNs have been effectively deployed as agents of change in both developed 
and developing countries. There are successful cases of diaspora networks 
such as those formed by Indian, Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, 
Turkish and Bangladeshi emigrants, to name but a few. These demonstrate 
the opportunities associated with the institutionalization of private voluntary 
networks in promoting horizontal inter-firm networks that enable the transfer of 
skills and knowledge. The cases of Taiwan Province of China, India, Republic of 
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Korea and China illustrate, for example, how public policies by developmental 
states can mitigate the losses of “brain drain”. In these countries, government 
policies were not focused on the return of the members of the diaspora; rather, 
they highlighted the importance of integration into international networks that 
would link the professionals overseas with those in the source country (Kapur, 
2001). The massive boom of the Indian sector supplying services of information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) is a good example of how decentralized 
knowledge transfer arrangements can play a critical role in the emerging model 
of industrial policy. In this respect, therefore, DKNs represent a new feature in 
the recent evolution of industrial policy.  
There are many reasons for promoting networks, not least of which is 
knowledge diffusion. It is widely acknowledged that DKNs can lead to knowledge 
spillovers and greater collective efficiency (Barré et al., 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2006; 
Chaparro et al., 2004; Kapur and McHale, 2005). One of the key reasons to 
promote such networks is because they not only help to channel remittances 
and imply higher savings and income, but also boost collective efficiency. DKNs 
can supply new technologies and inform government and other residents of the 
latest technological developments and those appropriate for domestic industrial 
needs. They can assist in matching the needs of local productive sectors with 
specific foreign direct investment (FDI) required for upgrading local skills and 
capacities.
As awareness grows of knowledge’s essential role in the development 
process, hundreds of new DKNs were created throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
in countries as diverse as Argentina, Mexico, Haiti, Panama, the Philippines, 
Chile, China, Colombia, India and South Africa. While not all networks have been 
equally successful, the large Chinese and Indian search networks demonstrate 
how they can effectively facilitate the transfer of knowledge and technology to 
the home countries.8 Moreover, from these experiences, it would appear that 
horizontal interventions at the network level can enhance market efficiency and 
lead to higher productivity and upgrading at the firm level (Kaplinsky, 2005). 
In effect, the significance of the diaspora network to industrial policy is that it 
makes the shift from hierarchy to search networks an essential component of 
industrial policy. DKNs help to link up those who want to learn with those that 
are already learning. Indeed, this shift from hierarchy to horizontal networks 
has a profound impact on the global supply chains and consequently on new 
industrial strategies, where “learning to learn” becomes an essential objective of 
the industrial policy. 
What is different about networks from other forms of market coordination? 
First, within networks, firms relate to each other not through arm’s-length market 
transactions but through long-term, special relationships that are historically 
determined. Empirical evidence shows that market-based, hierarchical 
coordination carries much higher costs than network-based coordination, 
especially when physical proximity is involved, resulting in agglomeration 
economies. Second, the pooling of skills and resources, even by competing 
firms, can lead to higher productivity and increased innovation. Third, DKNs can 
internalize the negative externalities and encourage knowledge sharing within 
networks.
As noted by Kuznetsov and Sabel (2006), a proliferation of professional 
associations of diaspora members illustrates this transition to different types 
of search networks that facilitate trial-and-error experimentation and learning 
what a country is good at producing. The authors underscore the role of open 
migration chains and diaspora networks (expatriate networks) in transmitting 
information about new opportunities and types of skills required in the home 
and host countries and in advancing the collective interests of diasporas. 
The massive boom of the Indian ICT 
services sector is a good example 
of how decentralized knowledge 
transfer arrangements can play a 
critical role in the emerging model 
of industrial policy. In this respect, 
therefore, DKNs represent a new 
feature in the recent evolution of 
industrial policy.  
DKNs can supply new technologies 
and inform government and other 
residents of the latest technological 
developments and those appropriate 
for domestic industrial needs. They 
can assist in matching the needs 
of local productive sectors with 
specific FDI required for upgrading 
local skills and capacities.
DKNs help to link up those who 
want to learn with those that are 
already learning. 
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They also cite the creation of the venture capital industry in Taiwan Province 
of China and other diaspora-led initiatives to promote productive development 
in the home country as practical examples of diaspora-induced productive 
development. According to Kuznetsov and Sabel (2006), “open migration 
regimes” best accommodate DKNs, as they can also transfer “tacit” knowledge 
and experience to home countries, largely based on the success cases of the 
knowledge-intensive sectors, such as Iinformation technology (IT) services and 
biotech sectors in India, Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, and more 
recently in China. 
The profit motive is an implicit incentive which induces knowledge transfer 
within networks and encourages information sharing and collaboration not 
only across firms but within firms and across other entities that make up the 
production system. While many of these networks are essentially private and 
voluntary initiatives based on altruism or philanthropy, several well-known 
DKNs have been institutionalized and become effective agents of change and 
transmission of knowledge, including through student mentoring, policy advice, 
technical assistance and other channels of tacit as well as embodied technology 
transfer. There are several such examples, such as the Chilean “Primera” 
business innovation organizations and SENSA, the South African Network of 
Skills Abroad.
3. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF DKNS IN LDCS’ INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
In recent years, UNCTAD has repeatedly argued that progressive 
transformation in economic structure is a prerequisite for LDCs to achieve 
accelerated and sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. The policies 
and strategies required for structural transformation will involve, inter alia: (a) the 
development of a new industrial policy based on a strategic approach which 
reflects the specific needs and conditions of LDCs; (b) a catalytic developmental 
State to compensate for the incipient and weak private sector in LDCs; (c) 
measures to encourage private investment in productive activities and public 
investment in basic infrastructure, including the development of skills and 
support institutions; and (d) the promotion of domestic technological learning 
and innovation and improvements in productivity in both the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors. 
UNCTAD (2011a) argued that there is an urgent need for LDCs to espouse 
innovative industrial policies instead of imitating industrial policy practices in 
other countries. The Report articulated why the hierarchical industrial policies 
adopted in many of the emerging economies (for example, the East Asian model 
of industrial policy) are not likely to be the most appropriate ones for the LDCs, 
owing to the dearth of conditions and institutions required for these approaches 
to function. The internal conditions, which allowed other more successful 
developing countries to harness market forces for development, simply do 
not exist in most LDCs. These conditions include close alliances between 
the State and the private sector, including financial institutions, expansionary 
macroeconomic policies, and a high degree of strategic integration with the global 
economy, relatively high levels of education of the population, developmental 
elites, and a high level of the institutional development of the State itself. Instead, 
it was argued that the LDCs needed to adopt catalytic development policies 
that are not primarily aimed at market development but rather diversification of 
their productive structures at the sectoral and enterprise levels. 
In the wake of the recent global financial and economic crisis, which has 
exerted a negative impact on the economic performance of LDCs, a renewed 
“Open migration regimes” best 
accommodate DKNs, as they can 
also transfer “tacit” knowledge and 
experience to home countries.
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interest in industrial policy has emerged, as indicated in the final outcome of the 
UNCTAD XIII Conference. The Doha Mandate stresses that: 
“Industrial policies play an important role in establishing dynamic 
and sustainable development in many countries. These need to be 
complemented with other policies in relevant areas if they are to have their 
full and intended effect. This includes economic diversification, improving 
international competitiveness and realizing more sustainable and inclusive 
outcomes.”
This Report reinforces the case for a new industrial policy in LDCs, arguing 
further that such a policy should reflect the role of DKNs because they carry 
a potentially transformative impact on knowledge accumulation, especially in 
accelerating technological change and foreign direct investment.9 At a minimum, 
DKNs can partly offset the huge knowledge gap created by the shortage of 
skills and knowledge in LDCs. For example, underdevelopment of local SME 
sectors, along with development financing gaps, has been identified as a major 
weakness in the industrial structures of most LDCs. These gaps are viewed 
as major stumbling blocks to LDCs’ efforts to foster technological learning and 
upgrading and build their productive capacities (UNCTAD, 2007). In principle, 
DKNs can act as bridging institutions for the LDCs, as they are more familiar 
with the best practices acquired abroad in more advanced countries while 
possessing sensitivity and knowledge of their own developmental needs and 
weaknesses. Moreover, even though physically apart, through the intense use 
of ICTs, DKNs could assist the State in linking local firms up with foreign ones in 
order to address specific bottlenecks and shortages. DKNs, if organized, could 
play a key intermediary role in linking local research capacity and local systems 
of production diffusion with global knowledge and production systems. 
However, the mere existence of DKNs does not necessarily imply a beneficial 
impact on economic development, as much depends on complementary policy 
initiatives and practices towards diasporas, which can be seen as sources of 
financial flows and opportunities for technology transfer and political support. As 
shown in box 12, there are a number of developing countries, including some 
LDCs, primarily in Asia, that have already deployed DKNs effectively in their 
efforts to industrialize and develop. Governments in LDCs would be well advised 
to take a closer look at certain of these success cases, as some of them provide 
useful lessons on how to organize and tap into DKNs.
Unfortunately, to date, there is very little empirical information on measurable 
impacts of DKNs, particularly in African LDCs. This lacuna calls for further 
research, especially detailed case studies, as the macro indicators do not 
necessarily tell the whole story, owing to the high degree of informality. Informal 
channels of transmission and transfer of remittances and knowledge dominate 
all other channels, making formal analysis very daunting. 
This Report recognizes the new opportunities for LDCs arising from 
collaboration with DKNs (table 20). However, it does so in full awareness that 
the fundamental patterns of underdevelopment, which have become deeply 
entrenched in the LDCs’ economies, will not change automatically or without 
strong and active engagement by policymakers themselves. The Report 
proposes that as LDCs formulate new industrial policies, their governments 
need to bear in mind that DKNs, if coordinated through networks, can help 
catalyse and facilitate the process of structural transformation in LDCs. Failure 
to recognize this fact may mean that DKNs will remain untapped resources and 
missed opportunities.
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Box 12. International best practices
The empirical literature shows that there is a variety of experiences with diaspora engagement strategies, policies and 
actions. Two very interesting cases are Ireland and Scotland. These are high-income countries with significant diasporas 
abroad and with diaspora-oriented strategies supported at the highest political level. The size of the Irish diaspora can be very 
large depending on the definition used.1 Scotland and Ireland in the 2000s, acknowledging the potential of their diasporas 
and mindful of the attractiveness of home country conditions, started a process of developing national diaspora strategies 
led by the First Minister (Scotland) and the presidency (Ireland). The two diaspora strategies are broadly similar but not exactly 
the same. Ireland has followed a sort of “light touch” diaspora strategy, network-based -- rather than heavy top-down (and 
bureaucratic). Scotland, in turn, followed a more State-active strategy but without adopting a dirigiste approach of weighty 
statist intervention. The Irish diaspora strategy is multidimensional in scope and built around economic, social, cultural and 
affinity networks. Business and economic considerations are certainly important but are not the only overriding concern. The 
main Irish networks and initiatives comprise the Irish Abroad Unit, established in 2004, which comes under the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and has a mandate to coordinate the Emigrant Support Programme reoriented to centralizing previous 
support programmes for the diaspora such as the Emigrant Advice Network, Enterprise Ireland, Culture Ireland, Emigrants 
News online and Ireland Funds. Most of these efforts were  initially geared to the Irish communities residing in the United 
Kingdom and the United States but later were extended to Irish communities in Australia, Canada, Argentina, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, the Netherlands, France and, most recently, China. 
Diaspora strategies vary across nations. Unlike Ireland and Scotland, several countries have created a principal and single 
government institution (a government minister or full government department) that coordinates diaspora strategy around 
such issues as the legal status and voting rights of diaspora members, the welfare and labour rights of diaspora members in 
their new locations, remittances and philanthropy, cultural and social links to the diaspora, and the development of business 
relationships with the diaspora. In this more centralized model of diaspora strategy, we find the case of India (Ministry of 
Overseas Indian Affairs), Armenia (Ministry of Diaspora) and Jamaica (Diaspora and Consular Affairs Department in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade), and Lithuania (Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad). 
In Chile, DICOEX — the Directorate for Chileans Abroad, a State agency — was established in 2000.2 In turn, a business 
network called Chile Global stands out as an active network geared to attracting successful Chilean entrepreneurs located 
mainly in advanced economies. A new programme, Start-Up Chile, directed to nationals of any country in the world, was 
recently set up by the industrial promotion agency CORFO to attract foreign technological and innovative entrepreneurs to do 
business and create new ventures in Chile, taking advantage of the favourable business climate and overall macro stability. 
This is an interesting programme that provides grants of $40,000 to prospective foreign entrepreneurs seeking to go to Chile 
to develop a productive venture. In addition, the inflow of foreign entrepreneurs is facilitated by a system of (one-year) working 
visas granted in one week’s time. In Chile, the network Fundación Chile has played a major role in building not only Chilean but 
also regional and technological capacities. Fundación Chile has served as a bridging institution for enhancing technological 
capacities in local firms, combined with foreign knowledge. It illustrates the benefits of institutionalized networks supporting 
technological development in the whole region.
Some developing countries have established formal channels for counseling their diaspora on a variety of issues: Jamaica 
has formed the Jamaican Diaspora Advisory Board, while India has created the Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council 
of Overseas Indians. Two high-skilled, entrepreneurial networks are the Mexican Talent Network and the TiE organization in 
India. Kuznetsov (2011) makes a distinction between “sophisticated” and “emerging” diasporas facing a variety of country 
conditions in which countries such as China, Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Ireland and Scotland belong to a 
first group of “sophisticated diaspora/favourable country conditions”, while Chile, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Malaysia and 
Thailand belong to a second group of “emerging diaspora/favourable country conditions. LDC efforts to attract diasporas (see 
below) may be classified as “emerging diasporas”. National country conditions, in turn, may vary across countries, although 
today we can say that progress in terms of having some kind of diaspora policy is greater than in the past.
From this perspective, a variety of diaspora initiatives have been developed in Africa in recent years, showing that African 
middle-income countries and sub-Saharan African LDCs are also participating in this global trend of engaging national 
diasporas for development. Examples include the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad, the Ethiopian Expatriate 
Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Diaspora Coordinating Office in the Ministry of Capacity-building, the National 
Diaspora Council of Kenya, the Senegalese Diaspora Foundation, and the Diaspora Desk in the President’s Office in Zambia.3
High-income nations such Norway, Finland, Sweden, France (Assemblée des Français de l’étranger) and Switzerland 
(Organisation des Suisses de l’étranger) have recently established expatriate parliaments. Italy also has a parliamentary 
representation system for nationals residing abroad.
New Zealand and Australia have been active in trying to build broad global networks of talented and professional people 
living overseas. They are more broadly designed than simple business networks. KEA, in New Zealand, has 25,000 subscribers 
in over 174 countries and 14 international chapters in eight countries. It works to connect the estimated 750,000 New 
Zealand-born people living overseas with home, and specifically seeks to connect to talented New Zealanders in order to 
share knowledge, contacts and opportunities. Australia’s Advance initiative, in turn, is headquartered in New York; it has over 
12,000 members in 63 countries and has chapters in 14 countries. Advance activates and engages overseas Australians 
to use their expertise, contacts, and positions of influence for Australia. It creates industry-specific networks; partners with 
tourist agencies in promoting tourism to Australia; and facilitates return migration. 
One of the best examples of what a government can do through its industrial policy to attract diaspora to build productive 
capacities and to maximize the developmental impact of a diaspora is to be found in China. The Chinese diaspora, estimated at 
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anywhere between 35 to 50 million people, has exerted a major impact on the growth of the Chinese economy. However, this 
did not happen automatically but in response to policy measures taken by the Government. Since the late 1980s, the Chinese 
Government has undertaken major efforts to combine sentiment and incentives to attract investment from the diaspora. The 
Chinese strategy was a combination of efforts by entrepreneurial local officials and Chinese diaspora investors to promote 
a pro-investment policy toward the diaspora. Substantial increases of FDI into China (estimated at as much as 80 per cent 
of the total) largely originate from the Chinese diaspora. Their efforts have helped to make China one of the world’s leading 
manufacturing centres. It is true that the growth was also driven by significant public investment, especially in infrastructure. 
The particular institutional conditions of China also encourage the phenomenon known as round-tripping whereby domestic 
resources were transferred to the Chinese diaspora to enter the country again as diaspora investment. While no precise 
claims can be made, estimates suggest that a significant part of Chinese diaspora investment has been of this type, aided by 
the fact that the Chinese Government made investment a major focus of its relationship with the diaspora. Such investment 
was important, not just for the financial resources it provided but probably more so for the technical skills, external contacts, 
organizational approaches and other “soft” aspects of production with which it was associated. 
The Chinese Government has also actively solicited highly skilled professionals to return to China permanently or for a few 
years, with incentives such as relatively higher pay than local counterparts; better working conditions such as laboratories 
and research assistants; and provision of research grants. In many technological areas, diaspora members are also actively 
encouraged to mentor younger skilled people who are still in China, as well as visit and nurture their previous institutions, 
which has been an important part of the strategy of encouraging innovation and technological upgrading. 
As a vital element of its diaspora policy, India granted generous incentives to diaspora investors who actively promoted and 
supported the Indian software sector in the late 1990s. Indian-born entrepreneurs and those of Indian descent, particularly 
from the United States, accumulated significant financial capital and acquired human capital and business networks that 
enabled them to play a salient role in foreign direct investment and technology transfer.
Indian overseas migrants have also contributed through investment, transfer of skills and technology, and through 
networking. For instance, returnee Indian doctors from the United Kingdom and United States, along with Indian diaspora 
associations in the medical profession, have helped to set up world-class corporate hospitals and extremely specialized 
health-care establishments in India. They have also assisting in procuring the latest equipment and technology and in providing 
specialized skills and expertise accumulated overseas. Professionals in other areas such as software and engineering services 
have helped provided venture capital for start-up companies in India. They have also supported the development of their 
sectors by bringing in projects; facilitating the outsourcing of services to Indian companies; providing contacts to overseas 
clients; and facilitating further inward and outward movement of service providers.
Following the exodus of approximately 90,000 Taiwanese in the second half of the 20th century, the Government of Taiwan 
Province of China focused its attention on the acquisition of skills, technology transfer and “brain gain” through an emphasis 
on networking and return migration. It has designed numerous initiatives on order to maximize the development impact of its 
diaspora. Some of these public policy initiatives include: 
t &TUBCMJTIJOHBEBUBCBTFUIBUUSBDLTTLJMMFEFNJHSBOUTBOENBUDIFTKPCPQQPSUVOJUJFTJO5BJXBO1SPWJODFPG$IJOB
t $PPSEJOBUJOH FGGPSUT UP DPOWJODF FNJHSBOUT UP SFUVSO IPNF CZ QSPWJEJOH UIFN XJUI DPNQFUJUJWF TBMBSJFT
 JNQSPWFE
working conditions and financial subsidies; 
t 4FUUJOHVQOFUXPSLTXJUIJUT5BJXBOFTFDPVOUFSQBSUT
PGýDJBMTBOEGPSFJHOJOWFTUPST
t 4QPOTPSJOHOBUJPOBMEFWFMPQNFOUDPOGFSFODFTBOECSJOHJOH5BJXBOFTFCBDLIPNFUPQBSUJDJQBUF JO UIF GPSNBUJPOPG
multinational networks, geared to building Taiwanese business and technological advantages;
t 4FUUJOHVQUIF)TJODIV4DJFODFBOE*OEVTUSJBM1BSLBOEEJBTQPSBJODVCBUPSýSNTBOETUSPOHMZFODPVSBHJOHJOWFTUNFOU
in R&D and innovation.
The novelty of the approach was that the Taiwanese Government did not treat its diaspora only as a source of investment, 
but as a source of human capital and technology transfer which could support the development of endogenous knowledge-
based industries. The example of Taiwan Province of China offers many valuable lessons for LDCs, especially in regard to the 
variety of intellectual property they may be invited to consider. And while traditional infant industry protection is theoretically 
justified in the presence of Marshallian externalities, and may indeed be welfare-enhancing (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004), 
policy plurality should nonetheless not be abandoned.
The diaspora played a critical role in the technological development of the Republic of Korea. Kuznetsov (2008), notes 
that in the late 1990s, when chaebols (large family-owned business conglomerates) like Samsung were unable to obtain 
critical United States technologies through licensing, the Korean diaspora of the United States intervened and succeeded in 
obtaining these critical technologies. In this way, the networks proved not only critical in identifying binding constraints but 
also designed the way to obtain a transfer of the necessary knowledge. It obtained critical technical knowledge abroad and 
demonstrated how trust and cooperation can outperform competition.
1 The population of the Irish Republic was 4.4 million in 2009 and over 70 million people worldwide claimed Irish descent; 3.2 million Irish are 
citizens (passport holders) and 800,000 Irish born citizens lived overseas (Ancien et al., 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). In turn, millions in the world 
also claim Scottish descent, and nearly 900,000 people born in Scotland live abroad (including the UK).
2 DICOEX has been complemented by the Inter-ministry Committee for Chileans  Abroad and ProChile (export promotion) and ChileGlobal; as 
well as BIONEXA; PymeGlobal; ChileTodos; and EuroChile.
3  See Ratha et al. (2011), Annex chapter 4. 
Box 12 (contd.)
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Table 20. Selected examples of DKNs in LDCs and regional groupings
Geographical 
Zone/County
Name of network Website address
Africa
Africa International Society of African Scientists (ISAS) http://www.dca.net/isas
Africa African Community International (The African Center) http://www.africancommunity.net/
Africa International African Students Association (IASA) http://www.iasaonline.org
Africa African Distance Learning Association http://www.physics.ncat.edu/~michael/adla/
Africa Africa In the Netherlands http://www.africaserver.nl/africadirectory/
Cameroon Cameroon Society of Engineers (CSE), USA http://www1.stpt.usf.edu/njoh/cse/cseusa.htm
Ethiopia Federation Ethiopian Organizations for the Spread of Knowledge 
(FEOSK)
http://www.physics.ncat.edu/~michael/vses/genet/
ees/
Ethiopia Society of Ethiopians Established in the Diaspora http://www.ethioseed.org/
Ethiopia Ethiopian Professionals Association Network (EPAN) http://www.ethiotrans.com/epan/
Ethiopia Ethiopian Professors http://www.angelfire.com/de/Ethiopian Professors/
index.html
Ethiopia Ethiopian Students Association International http://www.esai.org/
Ethiopia Ethiopian Distance Learning Association http://www.physics.ncat.edu/~michael/edla/
Ethiopia Ethiopian Chemical Society in North America http://www.ourworld.cs.com/ecsnal/index.htm?f=fs
Ethiopia Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association http://www.enahpa.org/
Ethiopia Addis Ababa University Alumni Association http://www.aau.ed.et/alumni/president.php
Ethiopia Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (EEA/EEPRI) http://www.eeaecon.org/news.htm
Ethiopia Ethiopian Scientific Society (ESS) http://www.his.com/~ess/
Ethiopia Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Medizin, Ingenieur und 
Naturwissenschaften in Äthiopien
http://www.emenssg.de/
Ethiopia Ethiopian Diaspora Association (EDA) ababum@yahoo.com
Malawi Malawi Knowledge Network, The Malawi Polytechnic http://www.maknet.org.mw
Mali Malinet, the Malian World Network http://callisto.si.usherb.ca/~malinet/
Mali Malilink Discussion Forum http://www.malilink.net/
Sudan Sudan-American Foundation for Education, Inc. http://www.sudan.com/safe/
Togo Communauté Togolaise au Canada (CTC) http://www.diastode.org/ctc/index.html
Asia
Asia Asian American Manufacturers Association (AAAMA) http://www.aamasv.com/
Asia Asia-Silicon Valley Connection (ASVC) http://www.asvc.org/
Asia: Middle East
Arab States Islamic Medical Association of North America http://www.imana.org/
Arab States National Arab American Medical Association (NAAMA) http://www.naama.com/
Arab States Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE) http://www.amse.net/
Arab States Union Arabischer Mediziner in Europa e.V. (Arabmed) http://www.arabmed.de/
Asia: South
Bangladesh EB2000:Expatriate Bangladeshi 2000 http://www.eb2000.org/
Bangladesh TechBangla for transferring to and developing indigenous 
technology and products in Bangladesh
http://www.techbangla.org/
Bangladesh Banglasdesh Environment Network http://www.ben-center.org/
Bangladesh Bangladesh Medical Association, North America http://www.bmana.com
Bangladesh American Association of Bangladeshi Engineers and Architects, 
NY-NJ-CT, Inc. (AABEA Tristate, Inc.)
Bangladesh Bangladeshi-American Foundation, Inc. (BAFI) http://www.bafi.org/
Bangladesh Association for Economic and Development Studies on 
Bangladesh (AEDSB)
http://www.aedsb.org/index.htm
Bangladesh Alochona http://www.alochona.org/
Bangladesh North American Bangladeshi Islamic Community (NABIC) http://www.nabic.org/
Bangladesh North American Bangladeshi Statistics Association mail to: mali@gw.bsu.edu
Bangladesh Bangladesh Chemical and Biological Society of North America 
(BCBSNA)
mail to: kamal.das@netl.doe.gov
Nepal Network of Nepalese Professionals http://www.netnp,org/index.html
Nepal Association of Nepalis in America http://www.anaonline.org/index.php
Nepal Nepalese Entrepreneurs Group (NEG)
Nepal Nepal United States Educational Network http://www.nusf.homestead.com
Nepal America Nepal Medical Foundation http://www.anmf.net/
Nepal Empower Nepal Foundation http://www.empowernepal.hypermart.net/
Nepal Sajha Career Network http://www.sajha.com/sajha/html/network.cfm
Nepal Society of Ex-Budhanilkantha Students http://www.sebsonline.org/
Central America and Carribean
Haiti Association of Haitian Physicians Abroad (AMHE) http://www.amhe.org/
Source: UNCTAD, based on Meyer and Wattiaux (2006).
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C. Diasporas as sources of development finance
1. THE ROLE OF REMITTANCES
One of the more obvious effects of external migration for the home country 
is in terms of increased inflows of remittances. Although remittances are private 
flows, they can play a positive role in not only easing balance of payments gaps, 
but also fostering the development of home countries. However, this role is 
obviously conditional on government policies that enhance their developmental 
impact. It is important to remember that remittances cannot lead development.
As noted in chapter 3, in many countries, remittances have grown remarkably 
and amount to a significant proportion of national income and export revenues. 
These relatively more stable inflows may prevent balance of payments crises; 
allow trade deficits to be financed; and even generate current account surpluses 
in many recipient countries. In addition to the microeconomic benefits for the 
recipient families, the macroeconomic advantages of remittance incomes are 
beyond question. They provide an important (and often the largest) source 
of foreign exchange; they can lead to increases in investment and therefore 
output; they tend to be more stable over economic cycles in both home and 
host economies; they may offset the losses involved in terms of brain drain and 
tax revenue; and they are often associated with an increase in the marginal 
propensity to save (Ratha, 2003). 
However, as noted in chapter 3, the mobilization of remittances for productive 
purposes requires policy and institutional improvements, aimed at reinforcing 
both the “investment channel” and the impact of remittances on financial 
deepening. To ensure that this is indeed the case, more active government 
policies are required which would encourage certain types of expenditure. In 
general, a significant proportion of remittance income — especially for relatively 
less well-off families — tends to be used directly for consumption. This is not 
necessarily bad, since improved consumption patterns are desirable per se given 
prevailing relatively low standards of living. In some countries, it has been found 
that this high and relatively stable source of income has become an important 
source for eliminating hunger and reducing poverty in communities which have 
experienced substantial short-term migration. 
Earlier studies for some LDCs suggest that remittance incomes can work 
to diversify economic activities even independently of government policies. 
For example, a survey in Bangladesh (IOM-UNDP, 2002) found that expatriate 
workers tend to spend 30 per cent of their income on personal consumption 
abroad, send 45 per cent back and save the rest (around 25 per cent). Of the 
amount remitted to families back home, 36 per cent was used for consumption, 
including spending on food, education and health care; 20 per cent was used 
for investing in land or other property; and 14 per cent was used for improving 
housing arrangements, including additions/renovations on existing property. 
It was also found that with a relatively prolonged and constant inward flow of 
remittances, families tended to move away from wage employment to self-
employment and from sole reliance on cultivation to various non-farm activities. 
Policies to channel remittances into domestic financial sector have 
substantially evolved in the last couple of decades. In the past, rules governing 
remittances were part of the larger goal of tightly controlling the flow of foreign 
exchange. One of the earliest efforts was a policy adopted by the Government 
of Lesotho for its migrants working in South Africa. In 1974, it passed the 
Deferred Pay Act establishing the legal terms and conditions of a compulsory 
remittance system for mineworkers. A portion of miners’ wages (initially between 
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60 to 90 per cent) was compulsorily deferred and paid into a special account 
at the Lesotho National Development Bank. Miners received some interest on 
their deposits. The funds could only be withdrawn in Lesotho by the miners 
themselves at the end of a contract. The compulsory deferred pay (CDP) 
system ensured that the bulk of migrants’ earnings returned to Lesotho as 
remittances. While it had the effect of directing remittances to formal channels, 
it also represented a restriction on migrants’ freedom to remit as they saw fit. 
The Deferred Pay Act has been amended several times to reflect changes in 
the composition of migrants from predominantly young, single males to a mixed 
group, with a growing number of women migrating to South Africa. Currently, 
miners defer 30 per cent of their gross earnings for 10 months of every 12-month 
contract (Crush and Dodson, 2010). This alteration of the rules has also been 
part of a broader drive to liberalize the flow of foreign exchange. 
Since then, the policy tide has turned away from the strict control of 
remittances, so LDC governments nowadays rarely impose restrictions on 
remitting. Now, the overall direction of policy is to try to make formal channels 
of remitting more attractive than informal channels and to reduce the cost of 
remitting. As discussed in chapter 3, formal mechanisms of remitting are 
preferable to informal ones. They can stabilize the balance of payments; enhance 
the developmental impact of remittances; enable the monitoring of monetary 
and exchange rate consequences of such flows; improve countries’ external 
creditworthiness; help to prevent fraud and money laundering; and encourage 
financial deepening of the economy. For individual recipients, they allow for 
more reliable service as well as access to other financial services. By contrast, 
informal channels create distortions in a country’s exchange rate and reduce the 
other benefits of remittances.
Policies designed to increase the use of formal channels have to address the 
factors that make informal networks attractive, such as high costs of remitting; 
unavailability of services, especially in rural areas; and unreliability. It was noted 
in chapter 3 that the costs of remitting to LDCs are among the highest in the 
world, so one of the urgent issues which governments should address is how 
to bring the cost of remitting down. There are various measures to be taken on 
both the sending and receiving ends of the process.
In many sending countries, a key prerequisite is the regularization of the 
status of migrants and their eligibility to open bank accounts, which would enable 
them to utilize the host country’s financial services for transferring remittances. 
A larger volume of remittances would be an incentive for other players from the 
financial sector in both sending and receiving countries to enter the market, so 
that competition would drive the cost of remitting down. While policymakers 
in LDCs cannot influence the financial policies and regulatory frameworks of 
sending countries, it may be worthwhile to pursue bilateral agreements to 
regulate this and other issues with some of the major sending countries.
In some cases, the high cost of sending remittances reflects institutional and 
regulatory barriers in the home country, which can be adjusted to reduce such 
costs. In Ethiopia, for example, in 2004 the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) 
allowed Ethiopians abroad and foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin to open 
foreign currency accounts in any of the authorized commercial banks in the 
country. The result was an elimination of the exchange rate risk for diaspora 
members, and indirectly an increase in the attractiveness of formal channels 
of remitting. In 2006, the NBE issued a directive regulating the activities and 
rates charged by international remittance service providers. The aim was 
to improve service delivery in Ethiopia; increase the cost-effectiveness of 
remittance transfers; and make the service faster, more accessible and more 
reliable. Finally, the NBE’s exchange rate policy, which has recently been geared 
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towards eliminating the gap between the official exchange rate and the parallel 
(black market) exchange rate, has also enticed senders to remit through official 
channels.
Further, the formal remittance channels for most LDCs are currently controlled 
by a small number of such service providers. The practice of “exclusive 
agreements”, which are mostly to be found in African LDCs, stifles competition 
by preventing competitors from entering the market. Such concentration is then 
associated with high fees and a lack of branches next to potential customers. 
Many poorer migrants and their families are forced to rely to a large extent on 
less secure informal channels, and many of the rural poor end up being excluded 
from financial services altogether. Allowing greater competition would reduce the 
monopolistic rents that current market leaders enjoy (Mundaca, 2009; Orozco, 
2007; Sander, 2003).
There are several strategies available for increasing such competition. For 
example, it is possible to tap the wide range of financial institutions specialized in 
catering for the rural poor, with track records in reducing their financial exclusion. 
Regulations on money transfers and supervision of financial institutions could 
be revised to allow microfinance institutions and post offices to increase their 
participation in the remittance market (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005; Orozco and 
Fedewa, 2006). This would encourage greater use of formal rather than informal 
remittance channels; reduce costs of remitting and ensure greater access for 
the poor, especially in underserved remote and rural areas; increase banking 
breadth and depth; and allow for better surveillance of transferred amounts. 
Yet promoting competition raises regulatory issues, primarily the need to ensure 
the reliability and integrity of the transfer systems and to avoid the system being 
abused (e.g. for money laundering), which is why only regulated financial service 
entities are usually permitted to provide remittance services. Policymakers face 
a challenge in striking the right balance between promoting competition in this 
market and maintaining supportive regulation.
A central policy conclusion is, thus, to open up the remittance market, 
particularly by encouraging the participation of regulated finance institutions 
targeting the poor. Possible measures could include the following:
t %JSFDUMZ JODSFBTJOHUIFSBOHFPGýOBODJBMBDUPSTJOWPMWFE
FTQFDJBMMZ JOSVSBM
areas, by changing regulations to allow the participation of especially 
microfinance institutions, savings and loans cooperatives, credit unions, and 
post offices; 
t 1SPNPUJOHQBSUOFSTIJQTBNPOHCBOLTBOENJDSPýOBODFJOTUJUVUJPOT
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increasing their technical capabilities and cash resources, and promoting a 
wider selection of savings products; 
t *NQSPWJOHUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTJOGSBTUSVDUVSF
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to participate in mobile remittances; 
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
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particular, banks and money transfer companies.
All of these policies must obviously be part of prudential and careful regulatory 
regimes that recognize the country’s degree of financial development and the 
need to avoid the instabilities and fragilities that may arise from financial market 
failures.10
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These conventional measures could be accompanied by other, more 
innovative approaches in some LDCs. It may be worth having a public sector 
institution compete with private sector providers of remittance services. The 
example of Mexico and the United States is interesting in that respect. As part 
of the Partnership for Prosperity action plan between Mexico and the United 
States, the central banks of both countries (Banco de México and the U.S. 
Federal Reserve) established a payment system in 2003 that offers a reliable, 
low-cost formal transfer channel, initially as a way of sending government 
pension payments to recipients in Mexico. In 2004, a “Directo a México” 
programme was established to make financial transactions between the two 
countries available to any individual with a bank account in Mexico, creating a 
cost-effective alternative to other payment channels. Moreover, the beneficiaries 
are able, from 2010, to cash their payments in post offices in Mexico. The 
benefits of this programme are transparency for the participants, transactions 
guaranteed by the highest monetary authorities, reliability, speed and low cost. 
In LDCs, something similar could be done by establishing a public corporation 
or using existing institutions like public, development, or central banks. Such an 
institution would provide the same service as the private sector but would charge 
a lower cost for remitting. Since there is less pressure on public corporations to 
make a profit, the fee could be substantially lower. The corporation would only 
need to recuperate the operational cost through fees, which could be much 
lower than the cost currently charged by remittance service providers in most 
LDCs. Instead of opening up its own branches, the public corporation could 
team up with the postal service. Working with post offices could help to reach 
customers in remote areas where there are no branches of private financial 
institutions, given its geographic spread. 
The use of new technologies, particularly Internet-based and mobile 
telephony-driven methods of transmitting funds, can be exploited to a greater 
extent. Mobile phones as a delivery channel have untapped potential, especially 
in the more remote areas where banking branches are not present. Since brick-
and-mortar branches are costly, especially when there is no critical mass of 
clients, central banks should encourage “branchless banking” via the use of 
modern technologies, which would expand the outreach of financial institutions 
to hard-to-reach areas and reduce operating costs of financial institutions. The 
growing application of new technologies and their potential role in Africa in 
serving as money transfer channels are analysed in detail in chapter 3.
At present, there is little evidence of significant penetration of the market of 
remittance service providers (RSPs) by mobile money services in LDCs, and 
mobile money RSPs still face significant operational, infrastructural and regulatory 
constraints to market entry. CGAP (2010; 2012) recommends a careful cost-
benefit analysis of any technological innovation as well as an assessment of 
an institution’s information systems prior to commitment. The feasibility of such 
innovations, especially in places like rural Africa, will be influenced to a large extent 
by the availability of supportive infrastructure, in particular telecommunications 
infrastructure, and sociocultural factors like widespread illiteracy in rural areas, 
which may detract from the use of the new technology. This highlights the 
importance of complementary policies promoting both financial deepening and 
the development of infrastructure and productive capacities in LDCs.
Despite the constraints, as noted in chapter 3, several global money transfer 
companies have been promoting the use of mobile phones in rural areas to 
facilitate access to remittances. According to CGAP (2012), mobile money has 
achieved the broadest success in sub-Saharan Africa, with 16 per cent of adults 
having used a mobile phone to pay bills or send or receive money in the last 
12 months. Despite the potential, however, this mechanism poses supervisory 
challenges, and is bound to have an impact on remittance costs and efficiency 
for the recipients. 
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Nevertheless, there are important caveats. Since regulators in LDCs are 
at the forefront of developments in the area of mobile money, they have few 
countries to turn to for policy options and lessons learned. This compounds 
the challenge of effectively regulating the activity and protecting consumers 
without stifling innovation. In addition, the previously distinct regulatory sectors 
of telecommunications and finance will now have to interact more closely, 
addressing new issues like security, consumer protection, money laundering, 
etc. Addressing these issues will be a challenge for regulators, central banks 
and policymakers in general.
The development of new products within the formal financial sector can 
be another means of improving service delivery for remittance transfers 
(Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002; Shaw, 2007; Omer, 2003). For example, 
through groups such as Sénégal Conseils, an association in Lyon, Senegalese 
migrants in France can remit funds to Senegal both in cash and in the form 
of goods. Those remitters who are unable to cover the entire cost of goods 
immediately are allowed to pay in instalments over six months, incurring interest 
charges. Similarly, in Egypt several exchange companies offer door-to-door 
delivery of money, following the example of Philippine banks that successfully 
introduced and implemented the service to compete with unofficial market 
operators (Dieng, 2002; Russell, 1986, 1990; Shaw, 2007).
Since the cost of remitting is the highest within Africa (see chapter 3), there 
is scope for regional initiatives to bring such costs down, for example through 
coordination of measures as a result of formal regional integration initiatives 
or through the good offices of the regional development bank (the African 
Development Bank- AfDB). This regionally driven process led by the AfDB 
should be linked to the international goal of reducing remittance costs known as 
the “5 x 5” initiative discussed in chapter 3.
While policies to increase the ease of remitting money and reduce the costs 
involved are clearly necessary and desirable, they need to be part of a broader 
macroeconomic framework that would enhance the developmental role of such 
remittance transfers. Accordingly, central banks need to monitor the impact of 
remittances on exchange rates and tailor exchange rate and monetary policies 
to compensate for possible undesirable consequences, including through 
open market operations when necessary. More generally, a consistent set of 
trade, industrial and macroeconomic policies that sustainably foster growth and 
economic diversification will obviously be crucial in ensuring that remittance flows 
also contribute to the process of development rather than simply enhancing 
consumption in recipient families. 
On the microeconomic level, governments could enhance the developmental 
impact of remittances by offering migrants additional incentives. For example, 
future remittances could be used as collateral to guarantee small business loans 
in sub-Saharan African countries. The experience of Banco Salvadoreño in El 
Salvador provides a model, whereby the bank offers remittance recipients the 
opportunity to borrow up to 80 per cent of their last six months’ remittance flows 
and provides them with debit cards. Another policy could be to allow migrants 
to open foreign currency accounts in the home country, providing them with 
insurance against the exchange rate risk. Given exchange rate expectations 
in the home country, commercial banks could feasibly accept such foreign 
currency deposits as collateral for loans at preferential terms (lower rates or 
longer maturities). Once again, it is worth noting that when the domestic context 
is favourable for development (also because of appropriate public policies in 
education and health care, macroeconomic stability, supportive industrial policy, 
investment in infrastructure that removes bottlenecks, and the like), remittances 
allow households to save or to invest in their future income (education, health 
care, small businesses and so on) rather than simply in ensuring survival.
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2. DIASPORA SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT
Out-migration can be associated with higher levels of savings and investment 
over time in a country. In addition to the savings transferred by the diaspora, 
households that receive remittances in the home country can also generate 
extra savings. The savings potential of diasporas needs an outlet or vehicle 
to be invested. It is useful to make a distinction between portfolio investment 
and diaspora direct investment (DDI) (Terrazas, 2010; Newland and Tanaka, 
2010). Portfolio investment comprises a variety of financial instruments, such as 
deposits, bonds and mutual funds. Another, non-exclusive possibility would be 
for diaspora members to invest directly in the home economy. This could take 
various forms, such as a capital contribution to family business, acquisition of 
existing firms, a greenfield investment, or other forms of DDI. 
In terms of portfolio investment, LDCs typically have higher domestic interest 
rates because of the increased risk perception in these economies, part of 
which is usually currency risk. Reducing or eliminating this particular risk could 
make saving in the financial instruments of LDCs more attractive. For example, 
if financial institutions in the home country were to offer bank deposits or other 
financial assets denominated in foreign currency, this could be an attractive 
option for members of the diaspora. This would combine a return on saving 
higher than in the case in developed countries with a risk that is lower than 
in the case of saving instruments in the local currency of a typical LDC. The 
Central Bank of Turkey, for instance, offers foreign-currency-denominated fixed-
term deposit accounts and “Super FX” accounts that are similar to certificates 
of deposit, to Turkish passport holders living abroad. Interested policymakers 
should bear in mind the limitations of this strategy; while it transfers the currency 
risks to the central banks of the countries concerned, it may not actually result 
in a net increase in foreign exchange inflows, but simply transfer resources from 
non-interest-bearing remittances to foreign exchange-denominated interest-
bearing investments. 
Issuing diaspora bonds (see also box 13) could provide LDCs with an 
important source of long-term financing. Diaspora bonds are debt instruments 
issued by a sovereign country to raise funds by placing them among its 
diaspora population. Ideally, the conditions for issuing diaspora bonds would 
be a sizeable and wealthy diaspora; a strong and transparent legal system for 
contract enforcement; absence of civil strife; earmarking of proceeds for specific 
projects to help marketability; and although not a prerequisite, the presence 
of national banks in the destination countries could facilitate the marketing of 
bonds (Ketkar and Ratha, 2010). The relevant concern is whether the cost of 
capital acquired through diaspora bonds is lower than the cost of capital raised 
in international capital markets. For many LDCs, however, this issue is irrelevant 
because they have little or no access to international capital markets. In such 
cases, diaspora bonds are attractive options because they can increase the 
pool of development financing sources. It may be argued that patriotic motives 
for investing in diaspora bonds make these instruments less procyclical than 
other external capital flows, and could thereby allow governments to issue 
them not only in good times but also in bad (e.g. natural disasters or external 
economic shocks). 
If sub-Saharan countries were to issue diaspora bonds, they could face non-
trivial costs of marketing and retailing that could offset the benefits of the lower 
interest rates paid to bond holders. However, it has been estimated that there 
is potential for such bonds to raise between $5 to 10 billion annually, which 
is not a small amount (Ratha et al., 2008). One idea worth exploring could be 
regional issuance of diaspora bonds by a group of countries supported by a 
regional development bank. Such an initiative would help make up for the lack 
of concentration of migrants from individual countries in any single developed country. 
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In addition to these strategies for boosting investment by diasporas, there 
are new modalities for using remittances to enable greater domestic investment 
through securitization or collateralization of these flows. Since these have 
recently been receiving a great deal of attention, it is worth considering the 
advantages and risks associated with such mechanisms.
Since remittance flows have proved relatively stable over the medium to 
longer term, it has been argued that these future flow receivables can be used 
as collateral for securitization or long-term loans. For some LDCs, this could 
even represent the only possible access to international capital markets, thereby 
increasing funds available for development, and could become a stepping 
stone to establishing international creditworthiness. Ratha et al. (2008) have 
constructed a hierarchy of future flow receivables for potential securitization 
by developing countries, based on information from credit rating agencies. 
Remittances are among the top of the list of future flows, with only heavy crude oil 
receivables considered lower risk. Further, there is now considerable experience 
with securitizing future flow receivables, following the Mexican experience with 
oil since 1987. However, the amounts involved still represent a small percentage 
of total debt.
In addition, there are several areas of concern which LDC governments 
must consider before engaging in such a process. A typical example of a future 
flow remittance securitization involves a bank in a recipient country establishing 
an offshore special purpose vehicle, to which future remittance receivables 
are pledged. This special vehicle issues bonds, which are then placed in the 
international capital markets. Correspondent banks and/or remittances transfer 
companies are instructed to channel remittances to an offshore account 
managed by a trustee. The trustee makes principal and interest payments to 
bondholders and remits excess funds to the recipient bank. This bank has 
thereby funded itself on the international capital markets at presumably lower 
costs than on the domestic market or if it had attempted to access unsecured 
credit internationally. These funds can then be used to finance consumption and 
investment in the recipient country. Sovereign risk for creditors or holders of the 
asset are minimized since the remittances do not enter the recipient country, and 
potential instability in remittance flows is to be covered by over-collateralization, 
at ratios varying from 5:1 to 10:1. 
Box 13. Diaspora investment
Some countries have been exceptionally successful in attracting diaspora investment. For example, the Chinese diaspora 
provided 80 per cent of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in China between 1979 and 1995, and the Indian diaspora is 
estimated to have invested $2.6 billion out of $10 billion of FDI between 1991 and 2001 (see references in Riddle et al., 
2011). Both India and China have established special export processing zones and have given diaspora investors priority 
for establishing operations in these zones. They have created specific incentives for businesses owned and operated by 
diaspora members, such as tax breaks and access to free or cheap land, to convince them to invest in the home country. 
Where appropriate, LDC governments could consider such measures for attracting investment from their diaspora members.
Israel has issued diaspora bonds since 1951, keeping the Jewish diaspora community interested in this asset class by 
offering a menu of options in terms of maturities and interest rates. The Indian Government has used this instrument only 
occasionally, when having difficulty accessing international capital markets (e.g. after the nuclear tests of 1998). While bond 
prices have been close to market values of non-Indian bonds, a premium may have been paid given that access to other 
sources of international finance was limited at the moment of issuance of the diaspora bonds. Institutionally, the Government 
of Israel established the Development Corporation for Israel to issue diaspora bonds, while India relied on the Government-
owned State Bank of India.
Ethiopia is one of the few LDCs that have introduced diaspora bonds to complement domestic resource mobilization 
for financing major development projects. The Government of Ethiopia is implementing a five-year (2011-2015) Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP). The GTP envisages intensifying the GDP growth rate and maintaining the country’s recent record 
as one of the ten fastest-growing economies in the world. As part of this plan, the Government has embarked on substantial 
expansion of social services and investment in physical infrastructure, in particular the construction of road and railways and 
hydropower supply. One of the mega flagship projects launched in April 2011 is the construction of the Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam on the Blue Nile. When completed, the dam will generate 5250 MW of electricity to supply Ethiopian consumers as well 
as consumers in some neighbouring countries. The project is estimated to cost $4.8 billion and the bulk of the financing will 
be mobilized from Ethiopians — both within the country and among the diaspora. For this purpose, the Government has 
introduced the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam Bond, which includes specific features aimed at the Ethiopian diaspora.
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It can be seen that this could be an expensive route for LDCs, and is truly 
justified when there is no possible alternative means of accessing international 
capital markets. Even to benefit from such a possibility, countries would typically 
have to have credit ratings of B or above, receive a minimum of $500 million per 
year in remittances and allow a few banks to handle the majority of the remittance 
flows. Few LDCs, other than Bangladesh, can meet these stringent criteria, 
and introducing such instruments in other LDCs would involve fairly extensive 
financial deregulation without the requisite institutional support for monitoring 
and supervision. Given these constraints, as well as the global concerns with 
securitization that have emerged in the wake of the United States subprime 
crisis and the financial crisis in the eurozone, it is not clear that the benefits of 
such measures clearly outweigh the costs and potential risks of financial fragility.
Another interesting financial innovation, and one which probably offers more 
potential than securitization for LDCs, is the use of remittances as collaterals 
for arranging long-term syndicated loans. Conditions for arranging remittance-
backed loans are less stringent than those required for securitization, and may 
have greater potential for many LDCs. Sovereign risk can be mitigated by 
remittances, and development banks can offer credit enhancement instruments. 
The African Export-Import Bank has experience in arranging remittance-based 
future-flow syndicated loans. Indeed, in 2001 it launched its Financial Future-
Flow Pre-Financing Programme to expand the use of remittances and other 
future flows as collateral to leverage external financing at lower costs and longer 
maturities. It has led various future-remittance-flow collateral-backed loans in 
Ghana, Nigeria and Ethiopia in recent years (AFREXIMBANK, 2005). The Bank 
has received awards for such activities, since they have enhanced the access of 
Africa counterparties to reasonably priced external trade and project financing 
from the markets using remittances by Africans in diaspora as collateral and the 
main source of repayment.
Given that LDCs have only limited access to development finance, these 
strategies can form part of an approach of building up local institutions and the 
legal framework for financial deepening as well as establishing an international 
track record on sovereign risk. This could eventually facilitate greater access to 
international capital markets for LDCs.
Moreover, similarly to current flow of remittances, from a macroeconomic 
perspective, the additional funds received either through a process of securitizing 
remittances or a remittances-backed syndicated loan could imply additional 
pressure on the exchange rate, and hence on the country’s competitiveness. 
Monetary authorities should always keep this in mind in order to fine-tune 
policies designed to take this potential effect into account, although (given 
the likely small magnitudes involved) it is unlikely that such an effect would 
have significant repercussions. However, the risks of financial pyramiding and 
entanglement that can come from such financial deepening without adequate 
regulation and supervision are more serious, and should be duly considered by 
LDC policymakers.
 Other initiatives include the idea of promoting “community remittances” to 
improve infrastructure and the provision of basic amenities in migrants’ local 
areas of origin (box 14). One prominent example is Mexico’s Programa Tres 
por Uno (box 15), which has sought to coordinate the activities of the diaspora, 
local communities and governments at national and local level through a 
system of matching funds for remittances directed to such uses. Despite some 
drawbacks, Programa Tres por Uno offers an interesting model for encouraging 
and maximizing the developmental impact of collective remittances on migrants’ 
communities of origin. Yet the administrative, fiscal and regulatory requirements 
are high, and could be challenging for some LDCs. 
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experience in arranging remittance-
based future-flow syndicated loans. 
Given that LDCs have only limited 
access to development finance, 
these strategies can form part of 
an approach of building up local 
institutions and the legal framework 
for financial deepening as well as 
establishing an international track 
record on sovereign risk. 
Other initiatives include the idea of 
promoting “community remittances” 
to improve infrastructure and the 
provision of basic amenities in 
migrants’ local areas of origin. One 
prominent example is Mexico’s 
Programa Tres por Uno .
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Box 14. A proposal to combine efforts of diasporas, governments and donor countries
Given that the fiscal requirements of Programa Tres por Uno could be quite high and make it inoperable in a typical 
LDC context, a proposal to include the international community and LDC governments could be designed to similar 
effect. The international community could help LDCs develop faster and harness the potential of remittances for 
development by adopting an international support measure that would provide matching funds through ODA. LDC 
governments would show their commitment to the provision of public goods by matching the collective remittances 
in equal proportions. The three-stakeholder programme would thus include the diaspora, the LDC government and 
the international community with equal contributions.
This would function as follows. The money from collective remittances earmarked for investment in local 
infrastructure (potable water, sewage, roads, electrification, etc.) or educational and health facilities (schools and 
hospitals) would be matched by ODA. This would double the impact of remittances on local development conditions, 
and would provide incentives for hometown associations to finance even more development projects. The LDC 
government would provide matching funds equal to the amount of collective remittances, but in local currency. Thus, 
the final result would be to triple the original amount sent through collective remittances.
UNCTAD (2010a) argues that a “matching fund” approach to aid flows could be a useful element of reforms to 
strengthen government capacities for greater domestic resource mobilization. Such additional matching funds would 
constitute an incentive to recipient governments to raise more revenues. The current proposal to match collective 
remittances would by the same token constitute an incentive for governments to strengthen domestic resource 
mobilization.
An additional ODA fund would be needed for this purpose. It would have to provide disbursements over and 
above the existing commitments of development partners. Given that activities related to the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) are scheduled to end in 2015, this proposal could be a way for the international community to 
continue supporting LDCs in their quest for economic and social development. It would not only provide a means 
of continuing in some form MDG-related activities of the international community, but would also involve substantial 
private-sector financing (remittances) of these activities. It would constitute an international public–private partnership 
for development.
Box 15. Harnessing “community remittances” for local infrastructure development in Mexico
Mexico’s “Programa Tres por Uno” is an interesting public policy initiative which attempts to harness and prioritize 
efforts by the organized diaspora community. The basic idea is that migrants send the so-called “community 
remittances” to places they came from for investment in local public goods like roads, schools, hospitals, potable 
water, sewage, electric grid or other public spaces and objects (monuments, churches, community centres, sports 
facilities, etc.). The Programa has been designed to maximize the impact of migrant organizations’ commitment 
to their communities of origin through a system of matching public funds. It has attracted considerable attention 
for its attempt to integrate joint investments between migrant organizations and the three levels of government 
(federal, state and municipality) to finance basic infrastructure (public goods) in the communities of origin of migrants 
through matching funds to the migrant organizations’ contributions. Other governments and/or migrant communities 
already implementing or considering variants of Tres por Uno include El Salvador, the Philippines, Peru, Colombia 
and Ecuador. 
García Zamora (2007) argues the Programa has evolved from a first phase of “clubs” financing “superfluous” works 
such as church repairs, soccer fields, parks, etc., to a second phase of organized processes enhancing transnational 
communal cohesion to include more ambitious projects of basic infrastructure: water, electricity, drainage, streets 
and roads. In its third phase, the Programa’s investments cover social infrastructure: schools, clinics, computing 
centres, scholarships programmes both in Mexico and the United States, environmental projects, and homes for the 
elderly. Currently, some of the better organized federations of migrant organizations, such as those from Michoacán 
and Zacatecas, are attempting to move into productive investments aiming at generating income and employment 
in their communities.
It should be noted that Tres por Uno has been challenging in terms of administrative capacity even in Mexico, as it 
requires the coordination of four actors at three different levels of government and a civil organization abroad to bear 
fruit in jointly financed projects. Regarding the regulatory set-up, García Zamora (2007) suggests the need to avoid 
overregulation and avoid the exclusion of migrants that are not formally organized in clubs and federations. 
Another line of critique of Tres por Uno is its lack of focalization on the poorest communities. The programme is 
based on self-selection of projects and municipalities by migrants’ organizations. This does not correlate with the 
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poorest municipalities, as migration has a non-linear relationship with poverty. Consequently, poorer municipalities 
would tend to receive less matching funds or none at all.
By nature, Tres por Uno is a meso-level public policy and is not designed to meet macro considerations. Its 
self-selection bias, in a context of a macro-poverty reduction strategy, should be taken into account to ensure 
geographical equity in the allocation of public funds. In this sense, a macro programme aimed at geographical equity 
encompassing meso interventions of matching grants should take into consideration such steps as: (i) earmarking 
funds for the poorest municipalities; (ii) capping the maximum per capita income for beneficiary municipalities of Tres 
por Uno; and (iii) making the public matching funds proportional to poverty levels in the municipality.  
Creating capable and efficient institutions that can provide public goods 
in sufficient quantity and of highest quality remain one of the paramount 
developmental objectives of LDCs. In the meantime, however, programmes 
that combine collective remittances and matching funds could accelerate the 
provision of public goods. Upgrading much of the existing infrastructure and 
implementing new infrastructure projects to provide more and better quality 
services such as potable water, electricity, communications and transport are 
top development priorities for most LDCs. 
It could be argued that encouraging LDC governments to tap into voluntary 
contributions from their diaspora population for financing public goods involves 
some degree of transferring government responsibilities to private citizens. 
In theory, governments tax their citizens to provide for the provision of public 
goods. The fact remains, however, that many LDC governments are unable to 
provide adequate public goods, either partially or in extreme cases at all, which 
means that some basic needs of the population would remain unsatisfied for the 
foreseeable future. Given the scale of the needs for infrastructure development in 
the LDCs, UNCTAD (2006) argued that efforts should also be made to increase 
private sector participation in the provision of infrastructure. Programmes 
that combine collective remittances and matching funds could accelerate the 
provision of public goods.
Box 15 (contd.)
Given the scale of the needs for 
infrastructure development in 
the LDCs, efforts should also be 
made to increase private sector 
participation in the provision of 
infrastructure. Programmes that 
combine collective remittances and 
matching funds could accelerate
the provision of public goods. 
Box 16. WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) — Mode 4
The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the binding multilateral trade agreement to address, inter 
alia, the movement of persons engaged in the supply of services with temporary stays in the host country (the so-called 
Mode 4). The definition of Mode 4 is narrower than migration as the latter also includes movement of persons not supplying 
services. Mode 4, in turn, considers the supply of a service by a service supplier of one Member, through the presence of 
natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member. 
The GATS has no standard definition of what qualifies as “temporary” movement, so the proposals go from three months 
to five years. Although there are several controversies, including the scope of commitments under GATS on Mode 4, it is 
important that LDC policymakers consider the potential policy implications of GATS Mode 4, as migration is often a critical 
livelihood strategy for parts of their population. The contribution of Mode 4 to development could potentially be significant, 
as global labour migrants represent an important channel for transfer of knowledge, skills, ideas, and technology.
 The current round of the services trade negotiations under GATS was launched in January 2000. LDCs have made 
several requests for Mode 4 which have yet to be satisfied. They have identified market access for Mode 4 in the low- and 
semi-skilled categories as the most important element for the group in the negotiations. LDCs have also suggested widening 
the scope of Mode 4 and streamlining the process of verification and recognition of competence, skills and qualifications. 
Thus, provisions of services through Mode 4, broader labour movement covering all skill categories, as well as facilitated 
recognition of qualification, would be important for LDCs.
However, the degree to which Mode 4 commitments can be improved to incorporate requests made by LDCs depends on 
LDC trading partners. Given the current situation of negotiations in general and the employment situation in many developed 
countries in particular, the prospects for adoption of a commitment that would include most of these requests are not very likely.
To bridge this gap, the Eighth WTO Ministerial Conference adopted in December 2011 a decision whereby “members may 
provide preferential treatment to services and service suppliers of least-developed countries” for 15 years.1 While this has the 
potential to open up new opportunities for LDC service suppliers, including Mode 4, its implementation depends crucially on 
the willingness of other Members to provide preferential treatment to LDCs. The challenge which remains is to effectively secure 
preferential market access opportunities for service providers from all LDCs in a predictable, sustained and general manner.
1 “Preferential treatment to services and service suppliers of Least-developed countries”, World Trade Organization, Eighth Ministerial Conference, 
15–17 December, 2011, Geneva.
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D. Harnessing diaspora knowledge
to build productive capacities in LDCs:
An international support measure
The challenge. LDCs have an abundant low-skilled labour force but scarce 
high-skilled professionals. At 1:42, the ratio of high-skilled (i.e. with tertiary level 
education) to low-skilled workers in LDCs is staggeringly low, compared with 
1:16 in  other developing countries and 1:4 in developed economies. As a result, 
the lack of skilled personnel, especially in the fields of science, engineering, 
medical research, education, health-care services, agriculture, accounting, 
administration and other related areas, which are critical for building productive 
capacities and knowledge-based industries, is a major constraint for LDCs. Brain 
drain through the emigration of highly skilled professionals from LDCs has further 
intensified this problem. As shown in this Report, LDCs are disproportionately 
affected by brain drain. The evidence presented in chapter 4 suggests that: 
t #Z
NPSFUIBONJMMJPOIJHITLJMMFE-%$OBUJPOBMTMJWFEBOEXPSLFE
abroad. Current estimates put this figure at more than 2 million;
t 4JY -%$T IBWF NPSF IJHITLJMMFE OBUJPOBMT MJWJOH BCSPBE UIBO BU IPNF
Another 24 LDCs have more than one-fifth of their high-skilled workers in 
the diaspora;
t 5IFCSBJOESBJOSBUFJOUIF-%$TJTQFSDFOU
NVDIIJHIFSUIBOJOPUIFS
developing countries (10 per cent) and in developed countries (4.1 per cent);
t "U UIFTFIJHI MFWFMTPGCSBJOESBJO
 UIFBEWFSTFFGGFDUTPO-%$TPVUXFJHI
potential benefits  from remittances; 
t #SBJOESBJOJTXPSTUJODFSUBJOTFDUPSTTVDIBTIFBMUI
FEVDBUJPOBOEBDUJWJUJFT
relating to science, technology and innovation (STI). These are critical skills 
that make up the backbone of a country’s technological and knowledge 
base. Constraints in these skills and knowledge usually have a negative 
ripple effect on the rest of the economy;
t #SBJO ESBJO JT CFDPNJOH FWFO NPSF PG B DPODFSO GPS -%$T
 HJWFO UIBU
these countries are now facing the dual challenge of promoting structural 
transformation through industrialization while adopting technologies and 
production processes that are sustainable and environmentally sound;
t *OWFTUJOHJOSFQMFOJTIJOHUIFIVNBOSFTPVSDFTMPTUUPCSBJOESBJOIBTBWFSZ
high opportunity cost for LDCs. Paradoxically, it often results in further brain 
drain. LDCs are generally resource-poor economies in terms of capital 
(physical, financial and human), knowledge and technological capabilities, 
and therefore lack the means to offset loss of human resources by 
accumulating other types of resources.
Efforts to date. The adverse effects of brain drain on home countries, in 
particular poor economies that are least endowed with high-skilled professionals, 
are widely recognized. In the last four decades, several initiatives have been 
launched, at both multilateral and host country level, aimed at facilitating 
knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing between the diaspora and home 
countries. Examples include the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate 
Nationals (TOKTEN) programme managed by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP); and Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) and 
Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) initiated by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM). However, as explained in this Report, these 
programmes have had a limited impact due to inadequate resources and lack 
of effective coordination. Many of the bilateral initiatives, for example, the “Co-
development” programmes adopted by some European countries, are aimed 
By 2000, more than 1.3 million 
high-skilled LDC nationals lived and 
worked abroad. Current estimates 
put this figure at more than 2 million.
At high levels of brain drain, the 
adverse effects on LDCs outweigh 
potential benefits  from remittances.
Brain drain is worst in certain 
sectors such as health, education 
and activities relating to science, 
technology and innovation.
In the last four decades, several 
initiatives have been launched, 
aimed at facilitating knowledge 
transfer and knowledge sharing 
between the diaspora and
home countries. 
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at diaspora members who are encouraged to return to their home country 
permanently and/or to invest in their home country. Often, they are provided with 
financial assistance to enable them to start a business in an area of their choice. 
The evidence shows that in most cases, the ensuing investment projects are 
carried out in traditional sectors and/or are small-scale. Moreover, the returnees 
who are assisted through these initiatives are typically low-skilled. Consequently, 
although these programmes are useful in facilitating diaspora members who 
wish to return back home or to invest in their home country, their impact on 
reversing the brain drain processes by transferring knowledge and skills to the 
home country has been limited.
Existing multilateral initiatives are aimed at developing countries in general, 
rather than specifically targeting LDCs. In view of the latter’s special status 
— owing largely to their structurally weak economies — and in line with the 
principles of international support measures for LDCs, this Report proposes 
the introduction of a new international support measure aimed at offsetting the 
adverse impact of brain drain by facilitating investment in diaspora knowledge 
transfer. The main objectives of the new measure or scheme would be twofold: 
(a) enabling home countries to benefit from the knowledge and experience 
accumulated by diasporas, which could be tapped through diaspora knowledge 
networks; and (b) facilitating diasporas’ access to part of the capital needed to 
start investment projects in knowledge-based productive activities. 
The scheme. The proposed scheme — “Investing in Diaspora Knowledge 
Transfer” (IDKT) — is a financial instrument in support of knowledge and learning 
targeting the diasporas. It could be operated by regional development banks, 
more specifically the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), working closely with 
national development banks or a special diaspora support window in the central 
bank of home countries. The rationale for relying on regional development banks 
to manage LDC-targeted investment initiatives is analysed in UNCTAD (2011a: 
114–117). Some advantages are the facts that regional development banks 
have a proven track record in screening and monitoring national investment 
projects; they work closely with home governments and could therefore assist 
diaspora investors in aligning projects with national development priorities; the 
established credibility of regional development banks would generate confidence 
and trust in diasporas; and regional banks are already involved in financing 
knowledge-based regional investment projects that could benefit from links 
with diaspora knowledge networks. The involvement of home-based diaspora 
associations and the specific government department responsible for diaspora 
engagement in this scheme is critical. The latter could also help monitor whether 
the proposed investment projects are in line with current national development 
objectives, and whether or not the proposed diaspora investments through the 
proposed scheme are compatible with activities that enhance home countries’ 
productive and innovative capacities. Therefore, the scheme is not aimed at 
all diaspora members but only those with the knowledge, skills and technical 
know-how needed to broaden the knowledge, innovative and productive base 
of home countries.  
As a result, the scheme would target diaspora members who: 
a) Have expertise in a specific field with high knowledge content which is 
amenable to enterprise development and could contribute to building 
productive capacities; and 
b) Are willing to invest in this field in the home country and share knowledge. 
Investments in productive activities in general, and in knowledge and 
innovation capability-building in particular, often carry risks. The proposed 
scheme is designed to reduce such risks by giving diaspora members who 
meet the above conditions access to a certain proportion of the capital (e.g. 
half) required to initiate the investment. The finance would be made available at 
The impact of these programmes
on reversing the brain drain 
processes by transferring knowledge 
and skills to the home country
has been limited.
This Report proposes the 
introduction of a new international 
support measure aimed at offsetting 
the adverse impact of brain drain.
 The scheme is aimed at diaspora 
members with the knowledge, skills 
and technical know-how needed to 
broaden the knowledge, innovative 
and productive base of home 
countries.  
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preferential interest rates. Therefore, what is being proposed is not a grant system 
but a sort of diaspora venture-capital initiative to help motivate and lead highly 
skilled diaspora members to engage in home country development. Diaspora 
knowledge networks, as well as business associations and academic networks, 
would serve as important search mechanisms for mobilizing diasporas.
In principle, the scheme would encourage investment in middle-to-high 
level technology industries (e.g. machinery, information and communication 
technologies, biotech, precision instruments), and skill-intensive activities (e.g. 
engineering, consultancy, software). These are the types of knowledge-based 
activities that are currently less prominent or even totally absent in LDCs. 
Consequently, the scheme would ensure that the investment projects proposed 
are innovative in the sense that they should contribute to the creation of activities 
that are new to the home countries (or underdeveloped there), although they 
may not be new to the rest of the world. 
In order to strengthen the knowledge-sharing aspect of the investment 
projects initiated through the new scheme and to spread their benefits to 
domestic agents through linkages, joint ventures with local firms would be 
encouraged. In this way, the scheme would serve as a catalyst for knowledge 
diffusion and sharing. For their part, domestic partners would contribute their 
knowledge of local business conditions and their domestic business networks. 
Financing. Multiple sources of financing may be required to raise adequate 
funds to launch the scheme. As shown in this Report, skilled emigrants from 
LDCs live mainly in developed countries. The funds needed to launch the 
scheme could be raised from developed countries and other countries in a 
position to contribute to such funds, and from international and regional financial 
institutions. The details of the function of the scheme would require further work 
and a full-fledged feasibility study, including the scale of financing needed, how 
these funds would be made available to potential skilled diaspora members, 
how the potential bankable projects would be assessed, who should screen 
investment projects and according to which criteria, etc. From the evidence 
presented in this Report, it is clear that there is a need for a special scheme to 
motivate skilled LDC diaspora members to help build the knowledge base and 
innovative capabilities of home countries.
 The role of home countries. Home countries should provide a supportive 
environment favourable to knowledge diffusion and to innovative investment, 
at different levels. At the macro level, home countries should define clearly the 
national development priorities, strengthen the State’s capacity to formulate and 
implement policies, and develop essential infrastructure, including adequate 
energy supply capacity (UNCTAD, 2009: 57–90). 
At the meso level, a series of industrial policy instruments could be put in 
place to favour innovation, technological upgrading and knowledge diffusion 
in the productive sphere. This may include preferential treatment reflected in 
incentives or targeted supports, a plethora of fiscal and investment incentives, 
as well as trade policy tools (tariffs and non-tariff barriers), subsidies, grants 
or loans, fiscal and investment incentives. Even in the absence of a formally 
articulated industrial policy, home country governments could adopt some of 
these instruments. Also at the meso level, different economic agents could 
be involved in the scheme, such as national chambers of commerce, sectoral 
business associations and relevant ministries (e.g. industry, technology). 
At the micro level, home country governments and agencies could adopt 
some of the following actions and instruments: 
t *EFOUJGZJOH QPUFOUJBM EPNFTUJD CVTJOFTT QBSUOFST GPS JOWFTUNFOU QSPKFDUT
stemming from the diaspora and encouraging both sides to form joint 
ventures or enter into other forms of partnership;
What is being proposed is a sort of 
diaspora venture-capital initiative to 
help motivate and lead highly skilled 
diaspora members to engage in 
home country development.
The scheme would encourage 
investment in middle-to-high level 
technology industries and skill-
intensive activities.
Multiple sources of financing may be 
required to raise adequate funds to 
launch the scheme.
Home countries should provide a 
supportive environment favourable 
to knowledge diffusion and
to innovative investment. 
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t %FWFMPQJOHPUIFSFMFNFOUTPGUIFOBUJPOBMJOOPWBUJPOTZTUFN	FHSFTFBSDI
centres, laboratories, technical schools) which could potentially establish 
links with diaspora investment projects;
t &TUBCMJTIJOH JOEVTUSJBM QBSLT XJUI GBWPVSBCMF QIZTJDBM
 CVTJOFTT BOE
knowledge infrastructure and legal frameworks, possibly including include 
business incubators;
t 1SPNPUJOH DPOGFSFODFT XIJDI GBDJMJUBUF UIF JOUFSBDUJPO CFUXFFO EJBTQPSB
members and domestic businesses;
t &BTJOHDPOEJUJPOTPGNPWFNFOUPGEJBTQPSBNFNCFSTCFUXFFOIPNFBOE
host countries;
t &TUBCMJTIJOHDPNNVOJDBUJPODIBOOFMTCFUXFFOEJBTQPSBNFNCFST	JODMVEJOH
potential entrepreneurs) and the national government.
 E. Conclusions and key policy recommendations 
1. OVERALL STRATEGIES WITH REGARD TO DIASPORAS
t -%$T XJUI B DSJUJDBM NBTT PG NJHSBOUT OFFE UP TUSFOHUIFO UIFJS QPMJDZ
framework in order to better harness the development impact of 
remittances and engage diasporas as agents of development and structural 
transformation. In doing so, it is important to note that policies on migration, 
remittances and diaspora engagement should not be formulated in isolation, 
but as integral parts of national development strategies.
t 5IF SFTQPOTJCJMJUZ GPS GPSNVMBUJOH BOE JNQMFNFOUJOH UIF EJBTQPSB QPMJDZ
framework in home countries should lie at the highest level of Government, 
ideally at ministerial level. Moreover, while the specific mix of policies and 
concrete measures for diaspora engagement will vary between countries, the 
overall direction should be to provide an enabling environment for enhancing 
diasporas’ contributions to the development of productive capacities. 
t #VJMEJOH iUSVTUw CFUXFFO EJBTQPSBT BOE IPNF HPWFSONFOUT JT DFOUSBM GPS
sustaining the engagement and contributions of diasporas. While it is 
true that diaspora members are not motivated exclusively by commercial 
interests, their engagement will fail if they are only expected to contribute 
and receive nothing in return. Policies aimed at diasporas should bear this 
crucial point in mind.
2. HARNESSING REMITTANCES TO BUILD PRODUCTIVE CAPACITIES
t *U JT DSJUJDBM UIBU -%$TNBLF GPSNBM DIBOOFMT PG SFNJUUJOHNPSF BUUSBDUJWF
through targeted policies, incentive measures and institutional improvements 
aimed at reducing the cost of remittances sent through formal remittance 
service providers. Opening the remittance market to competition would help 
to lower significantly the cost of remitting. Possible policy initiatives in this 
area could include the following:
» Directly increasing the range of financial actors involved in the remittance 
market, especially in the rural areas, by reforming the regulatory 
framework in order to enable a wider participation of RSPs, particularly of 
microfinance institutions, savings and loans cooperatives, credit unions 
and post offices; 
» Promoting partnerships among banks, microfinance institutions and 
other financial intermediaries; 
» Strengthening post office involvement by improving their Internet 
connectivity, increasing their technical capabilities and cash resources, 
and promoting a wider selection of savings products; 
Home countries can identify 
potential domestic business partners 
and develop other elements of
the national innovation system.
LDCs with a critical mass of 
migrants need to strengthen their 
policy framework in order to better 
harness the development impact of 
remittances and engage diasporas 
as agents of development and 
structural transformation.
Building “trust” between diasporas 
and home governments is central 
for sustaining the engagement and 
contributions of diasporas. 
It is critical that LDCs make 
formal channels of remitting more 
attractive. 
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» Improving telecommunications infrastructure; 
» Harmonizing banking and telecommunications regulations in order to 
enable banks to participate in mobile remittances; 
» Discouraging exclusivity agreements between all market participants, in 
particular, banks and money transfer companies.
» Where necessary, intensifying the market competition by allowing a 
public sector institution to compete with private sector providers of 
remittance services.  
t 4JODF
 BT TIPXO JO UIJT3FQPSU
 UIF DPTU PG SFNJUUJOH JT IJHIFTU JO"GSJDB

the scope of bringing down the rate through regional initiatives, including 
with the involvement of the African Development Bank (AfDB), should be 
explored. 
t "UUIFNJDSPFDPOPNJDMFWFM
HPWFSONFOUTDPVMEFOIBODFUIFEFWFMPQNFOUBM
impact of remittances by providing additional incentives to migrants. For 
example, migrants may be encouraged to open a foreign currency account 
in the home country; an option to use foreign-currency deposits as collateral 
to get loans at preferential terms could be provided; incentives to migrants 
to return to the home country once they retire could be provided by signing 
double-taxation avoidance treaties with the main host countries where 
the majority of its migrants work; the creation of education and housing 
accounts at home for migrants and their families, and a higher rate of 
return on these deposits than on ordinary saving accounts would provide 
an incentive to save more out of remittances and for purposes that would 
help ensure productive use of remittances. The appropriate mix of measures 
would have to be decided by the competent authorities.
t )PNFHPWFSONFOUTTIPVMEFYQMPSF
XIFSFBQQSPQSJBUF
UIFPQUJPOPGVTJOH
diaspora bonds to mobilize additional external finance for development 
projects with high prospective social returns (for example, infrastructure 
development or trade facilitation projects). 
t 8IJMTUCFJOHXBSZPGUIFSJTLTPGFYDFTTJWFJOEFCUFEOFTT
SFNJUUBODFTGVUVSF
flows could be used as collateral for securitization or long-term syndicated 
loans, thanks to their relative stability compared with other receivables. 
In addition, the institutional and regulatory strengthening required for the 
securitization process could represent a stepping stone to establish or 
improve the international creditworthiness of the recipient country. 
t 8JUIUIFBTTJTUBODFPGUIFJOUFSOBUJPOBMDPNNVOJUZ
-%$TDPVMETUSFOHUIFO
the provision of public goods by combining collective remittances and 
matching funds.
3. HARNESSING DIASPORA KNOWLEDGE
TO BUILD PRODUCTIVE CAPACITIES
t )PNFDPVOUSJFTTIPVMEBTTFTTUIFNBSLFUQPUFOUJBMGPSUIFTPDBMMFEiOPTUBMHJD
trade”. Policies in LDCs could be designed to sustain the competitiveness of 
producers of nostalgic goods, by upgrading their products and processes 
and to engage diaspora members to help with branding and marketing in 
the host country. Education and training of producers is crucial if they are to 
become competitive in foreign markets. 
t *NQSPWF JODPNF
 XPSLJOH DPOEJUJPOT BOE DBSFFS QSPTQFDUT JO TPNF LFZ
sectors, especially in the national health and education systems, universities 
and research centres, including with the assistance of donors, so as to 
reduce the intensity of brain drain.
t 4USFOHUIFO DPPSEJOBUJPO BDSPTT UIF BSSBZ PG EJGGFSFOU TUBLFIPMEFST XIP
engage in activities and programmes targeting the diaspora: home and 
host country governments, diaspora associations, NGOs, international 
organizations, private foundations, etc.
Governments could enhance 
the developmental impact of 
remittances by providing additional 
incentives to migrants.
Home governments should explore 
the option of using diaspora bonds 
to mobilize additional external 
finance for development projects.
LDCs could strengthen the provision 
of public goods by combining 
collective remittances and
matching funds.
Strengthen coordination across the 
array of different stakeholders who 
engage in activities and programmes 
targeting the diaspora.
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t 1SPNPUF BO JOEVTUSJBM QPMJDZ GSBNFXPSL UIBU FOIBODFT UIF SPMF PG %,/T

and taps their potential to reinforce the processes of learning, technology 
transfer, and structural transformation in the LDC economies.
t 1PMJDZBDUJPOTBOEJODFOUJWFNFBTVSFTUIBUIPNFDPVOUSZHPWFSONFOUTDPVME
implement to engage diasporas and facilitate the transfer of knowledge and 
technical know-how would include: 
» Monitoring and building reliable database on the diaspora, its skills and 
professional profile, earnings, aspirations and expectations vis-à-vis 
the home country in terms of knowledge transfer, investment, business 
networks, and return (temporary or permanent);
» Assisting diasporas to create diaspora knowledge networks and leverage 
resources (e.g. through umbrella organizations, joint activities with other 
stakeholders) from host countries for productive capacity-building in 
home countries; 
» Involving the diaspora from the start in planning and designing 
national development strategies and programmes, so as to ensure the 
convergence of government and diaspora priorities;
» Promoting diaspora FDI through road shows, investment promotion 
strategies targeted at diasporas;
» Facilitating the assimilation of returnees and diaspora investment though 
agricultural and industrial extension services, incentives to encourage 
enterprise development, investment promotion policies and instruments 
geared specifically to diaspora financing and technical advice. 
t 5IF JOUFSOBUJPOBM DPNNVOJUZ DPVME DPOTJEFS FTUBCMJTIJOH BO JOUFSOBUJPOBM
support measure to harness diaspora knowledge to build productive 
capacities in LDCs through the proposed IDKT scheme.
Notes
  1 The creation of the Migrant Remittances Observatory in Benin is one of the 
recommendations of the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Conference 
of the Least Developed Countries on Migrants’ Remittances held in Cotonou, 9-10 
February 2006.
  2 See World Bank (2011a). 
  3 “Search networks allow us to find and collaborate with those who are already learning 
what we need to know.” (Kuznetov and Sabel, 2006, p. 1)
  4 See UNCTAD (2007) and discussion in Haussman and Rodrik (2003).
  5 The objectives of DKNs are multifold: (1) to disseminate knowledge; through Self 
Discovery Networks, (2) to build alternative communication infrastructure for 
communication via websites, blogs, reports, papers, etc.; and (3) to attract more 
media attention and consequently higher funding than individual entities can.
  6 It is possible that diaspora activities may not always result in positive effects. They are 
by definition elitist, exclusive and non transparent, often not accountable to anyone 
and may become subject to internal disputes (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006). As Kapur 
(2001) argues, DKNs can also transfer fads and fashions as well as inappropriate 
technologies to home countries.
  7 Since the 2000s, 27 LDCs have experienced some degree of deindustrialization, 
reflected in the declining share of value added in the manufacturing sector (UNCTAD, 
2010a).
  8 Indeed, the behaviour and impact of DKNs has been studied and positively evaluated 
by a number of scholars of industrial policy in recent years (Saxenian, 2006, Kuznetsov 
and Sabel, 2006; Lamoureaux et al., 2003; Kuznetsov and Torres, 2006; Kuznetsov, 
2008; Iskander and Lowe, 2011).
  9 Interest in industrial policy in developing countries has re-emerged following the 
disappointing economic performance prescribed by the Washington Consensus. 
(Altenburg et al., 2008; Altenburg, 2011; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; Rosendahl 
2010; Wade 2010).
10 See table 8 in chapter 3 for “regulatory challenges facing international remittance 
service providers (RSPs) in LDCs”. 
Home country governments could 
assist diasporas to create diaspora 
knowledge networks and leverage 
resources.
The international community 
could consider establishing an 
international support measure to 
harness diaspora knowledge to build 
productive capacities in LDCs.
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The least developed countries (LDCs) are a group of countries classified by the United Nations as
least developed in terms of their low gross domestic product per capita, weak human assets and
high degree of economic vulnerability. This Report addresses the issues of remittance flows to LDCs
and the potential role of diasporas in LDCs’ development. It argues that with the right policies and
international support, LDCs could enhance the benefits from remittances and the knowledge and
know-how accumulated in their diasporas. Using evidence and policy lessons from other countries,
the report shows how LDCs could better harness remittances and diaspora knowledge to build their
productive capacities.
Regarding LDCs’ recent economic performance, the Report argues that the uncertain global economic
recovery continues to undermine the factors that enabled them to attain higher growth rates between
2002 and 2008. After a slight improvement in 2010, the group performed less favourably in 2011,
signalling major challenges ahead. Moreover, if another global downturn dampens growth prospects
for the developing economies, LDCs, as major commodity exporters, will be hard hit.
The Report then examines the impact on LDCs of past and current migration patterns that have
created diasporas in different parts of the world, and the potential for utilizing the knowledge and
experience gained by diasporas for the development of the home countries. Given the increasing
magnitude of remittances in LDCs in recent years, the Report explores both their beneficial as well
as possible adverse impacts. The evidence suggests that remittances contribute to poverty reduction
and improved health care and education, and constitute a significant source of external financing
whose availability, if managed through appropriate policies, could prove particularly valuable for
capital-scarce LDCs. However, this Report cautions that remittances may increase dependence
on external sources of financing, thereby further increasing LDCs’ vulnerability to external shocks
and further reducing their policy space. If remittances are to be harnessed for increasing productive
capacities, they must be viewed pragmatically, with the recognition that ultimately these are private
sector resources, and due consideration must be given to each country’s specificities.
Other forms of diaspora engagement with home countries such as diaspora knowledge networks can
potentially facilitate technological catching-up in LDCs and thus enhance development of productive
capacities. While concerns about the adverse impact of brain drain remain valid, the focus of the recent
debate has shifted to how to engage with diasporas and maximize their contribution to development.
In this respect, the emphasis has been placed on their latent role as “knowledge brokers” who could
facilitate the emergence of new trade patterns, technology transfer, skills and knowledge exchange.
Through innovative forms of network-based industrial policy, LDCs could offset some of the adverse
impacts of brain drain on their economies. The Report proposes novel ways to mobilize the diaspora
networks that would boost the development prospects of LDC economies.
Active engagement with diasporas is a recent phenomenon in the LDCs. This Report argues that more
systematic policy action is needed in order to enhance the contributions of diasporas to development.
This requires mobilization and coordination of the efforts and resources of different stakeholders,
especially home country institutions and firms, host country governments, diaspora organizations,
international organizations and bilateral donors. The Report concludes by identifying policies, including
lessons from the experiences of other countries, which LDCs may wish to consider in designing policy
frameworks for harnessing remittances and diaspora knowledge to build productive capacities.
FRONT COVER 
The front cover shows the “diaspora coin”. The word “diaspora” comes from Greek and 
means “dispersion”. The four pictures inside the “diaspora coin” represent the different 
roles that diasporas play. First, emigrants earn money, which they regularly send back home 
country as remittances. This money can be used to reduce poverty in rural and urban areas. 
Second, diasporas also contribute to expanding the knowledge base of the home country 
by paying for the education of family members. Third, remittances help sustain family 
members’ livelihoods. Fourth, diaspora members also invest in their home country, e.g. by 
building local infrastructure works. 
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